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SECRET

PART

COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE

DEPT.

SOUTH ASIA

TITLE:

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MIDDLE EAST : POLICY TOWARDS

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DEPT.	NAME	DATE	DEPT.	NAME	DATE	DEPT.	NAME	DATE
5C 769	MAM.	10/1.		RMP	14/7.			
	MAM.	10/3		RMP	18/7			
	WLA.	4/5		PL	26/7			
	WLA.	17/5		RMP	27/7			
	PL.	19/5		Mr. Duff	31/7			
	WLA.	23/5		A.G.L. Turner	2/8			
	Duggin	25/5		RMP	7/8			
	WLA.	25/5		RMP	8/8			
	PL	7/6		RMP	14/8			
	PL	16/6		Mr. Duff	15/8			
	PL	18/6		RMP	16/8			
	WLA.	28/6		Mr. Duff	18/8			
	Mr. Duff	28/6		RMP	20/8			
	RMP	30/6		Mr. Duff	21/8			
	RMP	4/7		WLA.	23/8			
	PL	7/7						
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PART

A

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SECRET

JG
13/5/69

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TOP COPY

(50)

CYPHER/CAT A

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO NEW DELHI

TEL. NO. 1686

1 AUGUST, 1967

(SE 2/2)

CONFIDENTIAL.

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

(4) SLATER'S LETTER PL 31/1 OF 7 JULY.

GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD LET US KNOW BY LETTER IF ANYTHING HAS BEEN HEARD OF THE OUTCOME OF THE VISITS OF DINESH SINGH AND JHA TO CAIRO AND MOSCOW RESPECTIVELY.

2. WE ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED TO KNOW OF ANYTHING IN CONNECTION WITH THE OPENING OF THE CANAL.

CROSEC SENT 2259Z/1 AUGUST

FILES

C.O. S.A.D.
M.E.W. & U.N. DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

As instructed
R115
R. D. [Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

49



Dear Gary,

British High Commission,

NEW DELHI

21 July 1967

Defence Adviser's Interview with Major General
Vasili K. Nikitin

Soviet Military, Air and Naval Attaché in Delhi

I enclose a most interesting record by General Lunt of his talk with Nikitin, at the latter's initiative, on 20 July.

2. One cannot help thinking that this, if not on direct instructions from Moscow, must at least have been a deliberately premeditated, if not particularly subtle, release by Nikitin to someone whom the Russians know is in the confidence of the High Commissioner, aware of H.M.G.'s policies, and well placed with the Indians and Americans in Delhi.

3. The main object seems to have been to put out a feeler on China.

4. I am sending a copy of this, with enclosure, to Clive in I.R.D. to Howard Smith, Northern Department of the Foreign Office and I enclose two extra copies for your use.

yours ever,

John,

(J. P. Waterfield)

A.A. Duff, Esq., CMG DSO DSC,
C.O.

Mr. Purcell
in lower para 2
Pl. copy to the Densan Far East Dept to
then PA 17/1
Cops 3/1/1
Papers. 17/1
V.E. 17/1



1. I called on General Nikitin on Thursday morning at his request to have a general discussion prior to my departure on leave. By the end of our 90 minutes talk and a bottle and a half of Caucasian brandy I was in some doubt whether he had converted me or I had converted him as to the rights and wrongs of the Middle Eastern situation. He pulled out every stop on the propaganda theme and despite my attempts to switch our conversation to other parts of the world he kept on returning to the subject of "Israeli aggression". I did not give an inch on this and said there could be no peace in the Middle East until the Arabs admitted the existence of Israel and its right under international law to claim free passage for its ships through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran. At the same time I said that the Israelis would have to provide a quid pro quo which would inevitably mean a more liberal attitude to the resettlement of Arab refugees and a return to the original frontiers, redrawn where considered necessary as a result of normal diplomatic negotiation.

2. We discoursed amiably over a wide range of subjects which inevitably included the wicked machinations of the German Federal Republic and its reluctance to acknowledge frontiers which General Nikitin maintained had been established as a right and not as a result of conquest. He told me he was very concerned about the situation in this sub-continent and that the longer he remained in India (he has been here for nearly four years) the harder he found it to understand the Indian political scene. He expressed anxiety lest there should be a fresh outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan this year and said that the Soviet Union was exerting all its influence to prevent this from happening. Unfortunately China was egging on Pakistan, as indeed it was encouraging the Arab States to continue the war against Israel.

3. This brought us on to China, which he confessed was an enigma. He told me China was increasing its influence world wide and that its foreign policy was directed to a single aim. This was to bring about war between America and the Soviet Union. Such a war would be a catastrophe and the Soviet Government was determined to do all that lay within its power to prevent this from happening.

/In

CONFIDENTIAL

In the only reference to Viet Nam in the course of our long discussion he said that the Chinese were doing their utmost to produce a clash between America and Russia. Russia was determined to avoid this. Equally it was determined to support the North Vietnamese in every way possible short of a situation which would bring Russia into direct conflict with America.

4. He then reverted to the Middle East and told me that although the Arabs had lost the war militarily they had won it politically. The Israeli aim, he said, was to topple the existing regimes in Cairo, Algiers and Damascus, but despite their admitted military victory there was greater solidarity between the Arabs today than there was eight weeks ago. I told him that nearly eight years of experience with the Arabs left me in no doubt that he was wrong. He then went on to assure me that the Russian policy to re-arm the Arab States was actuated solely by a desire to prevent fresh Israeli aggression and that he had good reason to believe that the Israelis were planning a further war of conquest. I told him that I thought this was rubbish but am not sure my expression was correctly interpreted. At any rate we drank yet another toast to "Peace".

5. I doubt whether much significance can be attached to all the above but I was very struck by one fact. In all my previous discussions with General Nikitin he has harped interminably on the anti-American theme. He has dragged in at every opportunity American intervention in Viet Nam and the wickedness of American bases scattered throughout the world. He has tried to persuade me that the Enemy Number One for all peace-loving people is America. Today there was absolutely no comment of this kind. In fact he went out of his way to stress the fact that the Soviet Union was doing all that possibly could be done to avoid a clash with America. At one stage he even remarked that the Russians were not so foolish as to allow their foreign policy to be dictated by Mao Tse-Tung. Since I am quite certain that every word of our conversation was being carefully recorded by microphones dotted round the room, I feel it is interesting that he could have gone to such lengths in his efforts to persuade me that the Soviet Union had not the slightest intention of being drawn into a war

/with

CONFIDENTIAL

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with the United States - and particularly in this year when they are celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution.

U. S. A.

Major-General
DEFAD

21 July, 1967.

H.E.

c.c. H of C

AIRAD
NAVAD

CONFIDENTIAL

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
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Major-General
DEFAD

21 July, 1967.

H.E.

c.c. H of C

AIRAD
NAVAD

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Extract from Hindustan Times 11/6/67. 1

BANKRUPT

POLICY

The Government of India is persisting in pursuing a West Asian policy that has been exposed as bankrupt. The outcome of the war has robbed its partisan approach of even the pragmatic justification of supporting the winning side. Whatever the future of President Nasser — on whom so much has been staked — his role in Arab politics and in world affairs cannot be restored. The Soviet Union, whose interests and reputation are more deeply involved than India's, has shown its policy to be far more cautious and pragmatic than its words might have led the inexperienced to expect.

Despite these major developments, India's representative at the Security Council has plunged deeper into the morass. His four-point plan demands that solutions for peace be within the framework of what he chooses to describe as "the just and immemorial rights of Arab peoples." He again finds Israel exclusively responsible for the crisis. The possibility that the United Arab Republic might have contributed to the conflagration by demanding removal of UNEF and blockading the Gulf of Aqaba is not even mentioned.

Had the representative of a new inexperienced government made such a speech it might have been possible to disregard it. Had the statement come from an aligned nation, it could have been interpreted as blind support for the party line, although the purpose it served would still be unclear. But for it to come from India's representative indicates that the Government whose views he is presumed to express is so unwilling to admit taking a wrong road that it will follow it to the bitter end rather than retrace its steps.

This is not to suggest that the policy of seeking President Nasser's friendship was misguided. It is plainly in India's interest to support a liberal, progressive Arab leader and to persuade at least part of the Arab bloc not to support Pakistan. But friendship does not mean commitment to support Cairo right or wrong. The UAR avoided taking sides during India's conflict with China and Pakistan and yet retained India's friendship. Had India adopted a similar attitude towards the current conflagration, it would have maintained its independent reputation, avoided giving encouragement to Cairo to continue a course that has led to dis-

aster and been trusted to play an impartial, mediatory role in stabilizing the region. This would not only promote the cause of peace, but also give New Delhi a say in evolving the conditions governing the reopening of the Suez Canal — a question of crucial importance to India. All this has been lost by persistence in following an outmoded and mistaken policy.

Persistence has led to other unfortunate results as well. The Government has resorted to emotive, propagandist terminology to justify its partisan policy and has also neglected to disclose information that fails to fit into its black-and-white rendering of the West Asian situation.

As we have stated before, the Israeli attacks on the Indian contingent serving with UNEF deserve condemnation. Tel Aviv has made matters worse by not even expressing regret. Indian soldiers have helped maintain the peace in the area for ten long years. In these circumstances for them to be strafed and shelled while awaiting embarkation is particularly reprehensible. But it is also true that the language in which Indian spokesmen have described the attacks, the immediate presumption that they were "wanton, deliberate, brutal..." has introduced an element of strident policies into a human tragedy.

The possibility of the attacks being unintentional or due to carelessness has been ruled out by Indian spokesmen. Yet such accidents do occur in the heat of war, as evidenced by the loss of American lives when a U.S. communications ship was mistakenly attacked by Israeli forces. Such incidents call for strong protests, but not for charges that the attack was deliberate unless the facts are clearly established. Communications sent by the UNEF Commander to UN Headquarters indicate the possibility that his men were caught in the cross-fire between Israeli and UAR forces. New Delhi must have had full access to these documents, but these important facts have failed to find place in the detailed accounts provided by the Foreign Minister.

In any case, the incident — tragic as it is — has no direct bearing on the merits of the policy India is pursuing. Yet it has somehow been dragged into the discussion every time the Government is under fire in Parliament.



2 AUG 1967

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12- circ India & the Mid East

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TIMES

Indian charges of brutality

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

DELHI, AUG. 1


An Israel tank in Gaza deliberately fired on an Indian Unef (United Nations Emergency Force) vehicle from five yards and then deliberately squashed the driver to death knowing that he was a member of the United Nations, India alleges in an *aide memoire* handed to the Israel consul general in Delhi today. The Indian Government "categorically" rejects the Israel apology that Indian soldiers serving with Unef during the hostilities in Gaza were killed accidentally.

The *aide memoire* adds that on the basis of the reports of the United Nations Secretary-General, and the information given by officers and men of the Indian Unef contingent, there can be no doubt that, leaving aside the accidental death of three Unef staff on June 6, the Israel forces on five occasions deliberately attacked Indian Unef staff, killing 11 and wounding 24.

The Indian Government maintains that there is first hand, undeniable evidence to show that the Israelis attacked the Indians deliberately knowing that they were members of Unef.

The *Times of India* today attacked the Indian allegations, saying that the Secretary-General's report does not bear out the charges of wanton attacks. The Washington correspondent of the newspaper says that the only possible explanation for the charges is "the Indian anxiety to uphold the thesis that the Israelis are dreadful people and that the Arabs are their innocent victims".

P.A.



CONFIDENTIALMr. Purcell

A sponsored visiter, Mr. Justice Mudholkar, Chairman of the Indian Press Council, told me in strict confidence on Monday, 24 July, that his son had been an officer with the Indian United Nations troops in Sinai. His son, who is now of course back in India, told him that the Indian casualties were really the fault of the Egyptians, who had moved up behind and alongside the U.N. observers. Some of the Indian casualties had been caused by an Egyptian mine. He asked that this should not be passed on because if it was known that his son had revealed this the boy would get into very serious trouble with the Indian authorities.

2. I wonder whether in fact this information is not pretty well known in Delhi and is one of the factors contributing to the unpopularity of Mrs. Gandhi's "West Asian" policy.

(W. L. Allinson)
26 July, 1967

→ Copy to: Mr. Turner, MEWUN Dept.

Mr. Allinson,

But I must confess to an impression of having seen a report - perhaps in "The Times" - to the effect that the Indians had been killed by the Israelis! This however could still be a bit of Egyptian propaganda.

P.A.

A. G. L. Turner

(A. G. L. Turner.)

27 July, 1967.

1. Mr Purcell 8/18
2. Mr Turner

Thank you. I think I have since seen that the Indians are sending the Israelis Notes about this - though there is some restiveness in the Indian Press?

ACT
3/8-

*The Indian Govt. & Press have blamed the
Israelis entirely. The facts the Judge told me
are in conflict with this, but he says correct.
That is why he doesn't want his son
compromised.*

*When I said I wondered whether all this
was not pretty well known I meant in private circles.*

CONFIDENTIAL



(47)

British High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

PL 31/1

25 July, 1967.

Dear Tony,

Mr. P. J. Waterfield
Mr. Duff (less e)
1:3 25/7/1

Arab/Israel Conflict

Report on gift of Indian ammunition to U.A.R.

(15)

In my letter PL 31/1 of 9 June I reported a story from Bombay that the Indian Government had, at one stage in the Arab/Israel crisis, intended to send some ammunition as a gift to the U.A.R., and I asked for any further information on this subject which Arthur Wooller was able to pick up.

... 2. I now enclose a copy of a letter from Wooller of 14 July saying that circumstances have made it inappropriate for this matter to be pursued any further. I think therefore that subject to your views we must let this intriguing affair rest, but if Wooller's contact is able, in due course, without embarrassment to produce any other information we should be grateful to ~~hear~~ it.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter, with enclosure to Gilmore in Washington, and without enclosure to Wooller in Bombay.

yours ever


J. P. Waterfield

(J. P. WATERFIELD)

A.A. Duff Esq., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.S.C.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.


P.A.

CONFIDENTIAL





CONFIDENTIAL
B.M.Y. 139/192/1



Dear John.

Gift of Indian ammunition to U.A.R.

In reply to your letter of 30 June, 1967, I regret that I have not gathered any further information on this subject and, indeed, on balance felt it better not to make any moves to this end. In order to provide details of the types of ammunition involved, my source would on his return from Calcutta have had to call for papers or be seen to take out files which had been available to him at an earlier stage in the discharge of his responsibilities as Marine Superintendent in relation to the loading and stowage. As the transfer fell through with the cancellation of the sailing, I considered on balance that I should not ask my informant to take risks which would jeopardise his position in the Company. I have left it that if he ever gets a chance to look at the papers in circumstances which will give rise to no suspicion he will let us have the information.

You will be aware that the Mogul Line is a Government of India enterprise. I know the Managing Director, an I.C.S. Madras, personally, but have not mentioned this transaction to him. I have no doubt that he did not lightly describe the shipment as an Indian gift to the U.A.R. Nor do I doubt that my informant reported him correctly.

Yours Ever

Arthur Wooller

(A. WOOLLER)

J.P. Waterfield, Esq.,
British High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMONWEALTH ~~RELATIONS~~ OFFICE,
DOWNING STREET, LONDON, S.W.1.

20th July, 1967

~~Mr. Duff~~ ^{20/7}
~~Mr. Percall~~ ^{20/7}
suggest ~~Naomi~~
Remarks are copied
to Dulhun ^{WPA 20/7}

With the Compliments
of

Mr. A. G. L. Turner

copied to
1). S (at ~~date~~ 20/7)
Naomi ~~20/7~~

WPA - 20/7

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

CONFIDENTIAL

Copies To

P.H.S.

S.N. Pithaw

Mr. Martin

Mr. Edmonds

July 18, 1967

20/iii

✓ Mr. Turner

The Prime Minister thinks that the Foreign Secretary might be interested in the following account which he has received from a reliable informant of some remarks made recently in London by Krishna Menon and the Israeli General Yoffe.


Menon had been in Cairo at the beginning of July for talks with President Nasser and subsequently in Stockholm where he had seen a number of influential Swedes before coming here en route for Belgrade to see President Tito. The following are the main points he made:-

(1) His attitude is roughly speaking that India has lost the leadership of the non-aligned world that she enjoyed after the Bandoeng Conference and that, since the Chinese upset, India has not really counted in world affairs. Mrs. Gandhi is a weak Prime Minister, determined to stay in office at all costs and the fact that she is Prime Minister is in itself a reflection of the Indian political scene. At the moment there is enough food to arrest starvation provided distribution problems can be overcome.

(2) On July 3, Menon found President Nasser depressed about his failures and the failures of his intimates but beginning to think of the future

26

9/7



primarily in terms of the internal Egyptian problem. Nasser felt bitter about Field Marshal Amir on whom he had placed his complete trust, so much so that the army operated as a completely independent unit from the government. In sacking the top echelon, Nasser had given places to younger men since he was convinced that immediate progress in building up Egypt's morale could come only through the Arab Socialist Union. At the moment he did not completely trust anyone, not even Aly Sabri, to run the Arab Socialist Union. He realised that he was now completely committed to Russian support.

(3) On the economic side, Egypt had been temporarily helped by large loans and grants from friendly countries and Nasser expected this help to continue. The loss of the tourist trade was not vital but it was doubtful if Nasser had fully appreciated the implication of the loss of income from the Suez Canal. In Menon's view there was an overall determination by Nasser not to bow to the Americans at any cost; Britain was regarded by Nasser with contempt as an American hanger-on but there was the same basic bitterness towards Britain as towards the United States. He said that Nasser was particularly bitter about the Prime Minister's speech (presumably of May 24) on the Straits of Tiran which the Egyptians regarded as having encouraged the Israelis to attack, despite the assurances Egypt had been given that if they kept their heads down the Israelis would do likewise.

(4) As for France, Menon said that Nasser realised the French had played a double role, but he continued to welcome De Gaulle's overtures because he wanted at least one friend in the West. He had commented that the supplies to Israel by Dassault and some other French firms were commercial and not governmental transactions. Nasser drew a firm distinction between the action of the French Government on the one hand and the action of French business in association with the Israelis on the other.

(5) Menon felt that Nasser's resignation was instinctive and not a put-up job. Subsequently, Nasser assumed the "whole burden" of government because he could not trust anyone, indeed this distrust lay at the heart of his internal political difficulties.

(6) The non-aligned bloc would concentrate on the main theme of "no gains from aggression". Nasser was thinking of what initiative Tito could take (this could indeed be the main reason for Menon's visit to Tito). In Nasser's view, there would now be a long stalemate. There would be no sitting down with the Israelis and any Western statesman or Israeli who thought this issue would be forced was sadly mistaken. Informed circles in Egypt no longer believed the charges of Anglo-American collusion: but the Prime Minister's speech on the Tiran Straits and the "equivocal" British stand at the United Nations were now the main barriers between the United Arab Republic and Britain.

General Yoffé, as the Department probably know, has been here for a few days and has been seeing a number of Jewish organisations here and giving them his impressions of the recent fighting.

He has spoken in the warmest terms of the British Centurion tanks in the Israeli army. His own division was composed almost wholly of reservists having been created on mobilisation with a nucleus of only a hundred regulars. He added that five weeks before the 5th of June Operation, the Israelis had carried out a rehearsal, including a test mobilisation.

Yoffé also said that Israel had no desire and no intention of leaving the Suez Canal. Their policy was to keep the Canal closed as long as possible and meanwhile to build up effective road and rail communications between Eilat and the Mediterranean coast. They also planned to explode a nuclear device in the Sinai Peninsula before finally evacuating it and hoped to be able to do this next year.

The Prime Minister was particularly interested in Yoffé's assertion that Israeli policy was to keep the Canal closed. He would be grateful for your comments on this. If this is the Israeli purpose, he wonders whether somehow this could not be exploited with Nasser to obtain his agreement to re-opening the Canal. He would also be interested to have your assessment of the strength internally of Nasser's present position.

I am sending copies of this letter to Forster (Commonwealth Office) and Reid (Cabinet Office).

(SGD) MICHAEL PALLISER

D.J.D. Maitland, Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office.

19 JUL 1967

12.115

MA 1

Times

Row in Delhi over Arab policy

FROM PETER HAZELHURST

DELHI, JULY 18

In a bitter debate, with members challenging India's pro-Arab policy in the Middle East crisis, Mrs. Gandhi, the Prime Minister, was forced to intervene today and apologize to Parliament for Mr. Chagla, the Foreign Affairs Minister, who had accused an Opposition member of "assassinating the character of our country".

The Government's policy on the Middle East has been under heavy fire from both the Opposition and members of the ruling Congress Party for two days, and Mr. Chagla was answering a most biting attack which came from a Praja Socialist party member, Mr. Nath Pai, this morning.

Mr. Nath Pai had questioned India's future prestige as a non-aligned nation because of her pro-Arab partisanship policy during the Israel-Arab conflict. In a speech applauded by the Opposition and by Government members, Mr. Nath Pai said: "Aggression, like beauty, is in the eyes of the seer". He accused the Government of pursuing a policy which had harmed the prestige and image of India, reducing the United Nations to helplessness. "When the war is over in Sinai there will be an epitaph on one of the tombs: 'Here lies the non-alignment of India'".

Had India remained impartial it could have done something towards peace in the area, he said. Mr. Nath Pai was echoing the sentiments of several members of the Lok Sabha, who have attacked pro-Arab partisanship during the two-day debate on external affairs.

Personal attack

Mr. Chagla, stung to anger by the attack, began his reply on foreign policy with a personal assault on Mr. Nath Pai. He said he had seen personal assassination in the House before, but he was "sorry to say I have heard today the character assassination of our country indulged in by Mr. Nath Pai."

The Opposition protested in an unroar, shouting down the Prime Minister while the Deputy Speaker insisted that Mr. Chagla withdraw his statement. After 20 minutes Mrs. Gandhi stood up to apologize.

Obviously shaken by the hubbub Mr. Chagla continued with his reply, which had lost its initial tone of confidence. He said non-alignment should not be confused with neutrality. The present policy was dictated by the justice of the Arab cause and India's interest.

"It is in our national interest to see we have friendly relations with the Middle East," he declared.

Mr. Chagla explained this interest in terms of trade, oil and strategic position, adding: "It is essential for India to see the Suez Canal remains friendly."

Times

Disillusionment

Explaining why India supported the non-aligned resolution on west Asia in the General Assembly, he said: "It is important, not only with reference to the present conflict but to the future also, that no aggressor should be permitted to retain the fruits of aggression and that no aggressor should be permitted to negotiate from strength derived from military conquest."

Interjection and uproar continued throughout his speech and one member was heard to say "You would swear this was an Israeli Opposition".

Disillusionment with India's pro-Arab stand in the Middle East crisis has been growing lately and is dictated by two basic reasons. The man in the street feels that India is backing the wrong horse, and the survival of the Arabs means a strong and hostile Muslim block, which would lend force to Pakistan.

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20 JUL 1967

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45

PL 31/1

Mr. Payell 18/7
M. 18/7

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ARCHIVES No. 57	NEW DELHI.
18 JUL 1967	
SE 2 2	

13 July, 1967.

Dear Sir,

Middle East Crisis

(4)

In my letter PL 31/1 of 7 July, I reported that Dinesh Singh was visiting Cairo and C.S. Jha had gone to Moscow, both for consultations in connection with the Middle East Crisis. The Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Chagla was likely to visit Belgrade in the week beginning 16 July "for consultations with the Yugoslav Government on the West Asian situation and other matters of common concern".

2. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Belgrade and Washington.

Yours ever

S. Slater

(D. SLATER)

W.L. Allinson Esq., M.V.O.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

En Clair

PRIORITY COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO NEW DELHI

Telno 1535 12 July, 1967 (South Asia)

14/7

44

TOP COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

(43) Your telegram No. 1470.

Person named is not (not) now coming to London.

CROSEC

Sent 1423Z 12 July

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M.E.W. and U.N.D.

Ceremonial Secretary

Protocol and Conference Dept.

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H.D. S. DELHI

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PRIORITY NEW DELHI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1470

TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

11 JULY 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MYTEL 1451 PARA 3.

INDIA AND THE SUEZ CANAL



HIS PERMANENT SECRETARY TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT DINESH SINGH, MINISTER OF COMMERCE, INTENDED TO VISIT LONDON ON PRIVATE AFFAIRS AFTER HIS DEPARTURE FROM GENEVA, POSSIBLY ARRIVING WEDNESDAY EVENING 12 JULY OR THURSDAY 13 JULY. HE IS DUE TO LEAVE FOR DELHI ON 14 JULY.

2. LALL SAID SOMEWHAT APOLOGETICALLY THAT HIS MINISTER HAD ASKED IF HE OUGHT TO MAKE HIS PRESENCE KNOWN IN LONDON AND, PRESUMABLY, PAY CALLS. LALL'S REPLY WAS THAT THE BRITISH WERE SOPHISTICATED PEOPLE AND WOULD NOT WORRY FOR A PRIVATE VISIT OF SUCH BRIEF DURATION.

3. DINESH SINGH IS COMMONLY ACCEPTED TO BE BROBACU* = E788

9 -----

SH SINGH IS 8 -----

DURATION.

3. DINESH SINGH IS COMMONLY ACCEPTED TO BE MRS GANDHI'S MOST INTIMATE MINISTERIAL CONFIDANT. SHE IS UNDERSTOOD TO WISH TO HAVE HIM AS HER FOREIGN MINISTER. HE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A FRIEND OF OURS, PARTLY BECAUSE HE CARRIES A PERMANENT CHIP ON HIS SHOULDER DUE TO HIS BELIEF THAT HIS LAND-OWNING FATHER WAS HARSHLY TREATED BY THE BRITISH BEFORE INDEPENDENCE AND PARTLY BECAUSE HIS ADVICE TO MRS GANDHI OVER THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT IS THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN UNWAVERINGLY TO ENCOURAGE HER IN PLICIES CONTRARY TO OUR INTERSTS.

4. NEVERTHELESS HE HAS JUST SEEN NASSER: HE IS A MAN WITH WHOM IN TERMS OF POWER AND INFLUENCE HERE WE HAVE TO RECKON WITH: AND IF THERE IS ANY SUBSTANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SLIGHTLY MORE REALISTIC INDIAN POLICY, AS SUGGESTED IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, DISCUSSION WITH HIM IN INTIMATE SURROUNDINGS IN LONDON MIGHT PROVE USEFUL.

5. DINESH SINGH IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO FLATTERY AND THIS, I VENTURE TO SUGGEST, WOULD BE THE BEST APPROACH TO HIM. YOU MAY, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, THINK IT WORTHWHILE TRYING TO TRACE HIM THROUGH INDIA HOUSE AND OFFERING HIM APPROPRIATE ATTENTION OR HOSPITALITY, IF POSSIBLE, AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL.

5. DINESH SINGH IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO FLATTERY AND THIS, I VENTURE TO SUGGEST, WOULD BE THE BEST APPROACH TO HIM. YOU MAY, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, THINK IT WORTHWHILE TRYING TO TRACE HIM THROUGH INDIA HOUSE AND OFFERING HIM APPROPRIATE ATTENTION OR HOSPITALITY, IF POSSIBLE, AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL.

13th Link S&S

FREEMAN

SENT 0745Z/11

RECD 0855Z/11

UNESCO Geneva

BoT v busy leave J tues

India Hse don't know

Mr. Duff
Mr. Forster

Indian Minister of Commerce

We have received a telegram today from Mr. Freeman informing us that the Indian Minister of Commerce, Mr. Dinesh Singh, who has been in Cairo where he saw President Nasser and is now in Geneva, intends to visit London on private business, possibly arriving on the evening of 12 July or Thursday 14 July. He is due to leave for Delhi on 14 July. Mr. Dinesh Singh had asked his permanent secretary whether he ought to make his presence known in London and pay calls but was advised that the British would not be concerned about a private visit of such brief duration. Mr. Freeman, however, recommends that if possible the opportunity should be seized to offer the Minister of Commerce hospitality preferably at ministerial level. It might be possible in intimate surroundings to help bring him and through him Mrs. Gandhi with whom he has much influence towards a more realistic Indian policy over the Arab/Israeli crisis and with regard to the Suez Canal.

2. If therefore the Secretary of State could offer Mr. Dinesh Singh lunch on Thursday 13 July with only two or three other people present it might help considerably in our relations with India. Mr. Dinesh Singh is no friend of Britain's and carries a permanent chip on his shoulder due to his belief that his father was treated harshly by the British before Independence. ~~He has~~ ^{He has} ~~advised~~ ^{advised} Mrs. Gandhi ~~on~~ ⁱⁿ the Arab/Israeli conflict ~~as~~ ^{as} ~~is~~ ^{is} better to have been consistently to encourage her in policies contrary to our own interests. But as



Minister of Commerce he must now be realising what harm the closure of the Suez Canal is doing to India's interests. The Indian food authorities have already approached us for help in connection with the carriage of grain as the result of the closure of the Canal.

3. I therefore recommend that the Secretary of State should reserve lunchtime on Thursday 13 July to entertain Mr. Dinesh Singh though at present India House is unable to confirm if and when he will arrive in London. I have informed the Private Office of the President of the Board of Trade of the visit but understand that the President is fully committed during the period Mr. Dinesh Singh will be in London.

W. L. Allinson

(W. L. Allinson)
11 July, 1967

I think it would be very helpful, and appropriate, if the Secretary of State could entertain Mr. Singh (with the Acting High Commissioner) in circumstances in which they (could)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

could have a good talk.
The S. G. S. will go
sample here with him
simply as guest from the
F.O., and - expect
from the C.O.

We will probably
get in touch with
D'Souza in Geneva
today or tomorrow.

Mr. Althusius

11:7

I of course informed that Mr. Dinesh high
in not coming.

Regd

Put by W.H. 13/7

O.P. Foster
12/7



BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

7 July 1967.

25 circ
R.C.E.D. 1140

ARCHIVES No. 57

10 JUL 1967

SE 2 | 2

PL 31/1

PA 1

Dear Sir,

Indian Attitude to the Middle East Crisis

(16) In my letter PL 31/1 of 9 June, I reported on Indian attitudes to the Arab/Israel conflict.

2. On 5 July the leaders of several Muslim organisations called to see the High Commissioner, at their request, to discuss "Western Asia". The composition of the delegation was as follows:-

Mr. Nuruddin Ahmed, ex-Mayor of Delhi;
Sr. Syed Mahmood, M.P., President of the Majlis-e-Mushavarat;
Mr. Mohammed Ismail, M.P., President of the Muslim League;
Maulana Abdul Lais Sahib, Amir of the Jamiat-Islami;
Mr. Zamin Nizam Sajjuda Nasim, of the Nizamuddin shrine in Delhi;
Mr. Ebrahim Sulaiman Sait, M.P., General Secretary of the Muslim League;
Maulana Mohamed Yusaf Sahib, Secretary of the Jamiat-Islami;
Mr. Yusaf Siddiqi Sahib, Editor of "Radiance";
Mr. Syed Baduddiya Sahib, M.P.

3. Mr. Nuruddin Ahmed said the delegation had come on behalf of the Muslim organisations to express to the High Commissioner their concern about the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem, and the strong feelings of the Indian Muslims that this occupation must not be allowed to continue. He also said that they hoped that there would be no question of the "internationalisation" of Jerusalem.

4. The High Commissioner pointed out that the Foreign Secretary had made it clear that H.M.G. did not want to see territorial claims made as a result of conquest. The Muslim leaders were all aware of this statement, and were clearly grateful for it. On the question of "internationalisation", however, the High Commissioner said that he could not give a categorical answer since, so far as he was aware, H.M.G. had not yet taken a definite stand on this issue.

5. There was some discussion about the origins of the conflict, which the Muslim leaders, though in moderate language, naturally attributed to Israel. But Mr. Mohammed Ismail, for the Muslim League, made it clear that the essential purpose of their visit was to enlist H.M.G.'s support for their point of view on Jerusalem.

6. This was a high-powered delegation, representing all the Muslim organisations of any political consequence in India. It should not be imagined that they have much leverage with the Indian Government, though Mr. Nuruddin Ahmed in particular has some influence on the Congress leadership and, as we have already explained, the Muslim vote is a factor in Mrs. Gandhi's calculations on policy in the Middle East. The meeting was friendly and amiable, and there were no recriminations about our alleged support for Israel.

7. I am sending a copy of this letter to Alec Ward in Rawalpindi.

*Yours ever
D. Slater*

W.L. Allinson, Esq., M.V.O.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.

(D. SLATER)

~~Mr. J. H.~~

Having passed the day to
Delhi I have sent a brief
telegram asking them to advise
if they have heard anything
about the outcome of these visits,
particularly of anything concerning
re-opening of the Canal.

To see also -/47 & -/48

2nd. April

~~1/8~~

Thanks

1:7

P.A.



BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

7 July 1967.

125 C/41
10/7

PL 31/1

RA

Dear Sir, Middle East Crisis

Dinesh Singh, the Indian Minister of Commerce, left Delhi today to attend the Economic and Social Council meeting in Geneva. According to the Indian Press he will stop in Cairo on his way for consultations with President Nasser and it is also reported that he may call in Belgrade on his way home. Dinesh Singh is, as you know, an influential member of Mrs. Gandhi's "kitchen cabinet" and he is believed to be one of the people principally responsible for India's current pro-Arab Middle Eastern policy.

2. The Foreign Secretary, Mr. C.S. Jha, left Delhi for Moscow yesterday. According to the press he is carrying a letter from Mrs. Gandhi to Mr. Kosygin about the Middle East and whilst in Moscow is expected to have talks with Mr. Kosygin and senior Soviet officials. Afterwards he is also going on to Geneva to preside over a Joint Committee entrusted with the task of co-ordinating programmes of U.N. Special Agencies in the coming years.

3. Neither we nor the American Embassy here have had any explanation from the Indians as to the purpose of these visits, /it seems clear that /but the Indian Government is conferring with its friends about further joint action to be taken about the Middle East crisis.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Washington, Moscow, U.K. Mission in New York, Belgrade and Peking.

Yours ever
Slater

(D. SLATER)

W.L. Allinson, Esq., M.V.O.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.

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6/7/67


BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

3 July, 1967.

(40)

PL 3p/1

Dear Tony,



Indian politician's views on the Arab/Israel
conflict and on nuclear matters

... I enclose a copy of a most interesting minute by Renwick which vividly illustrates some of the topsy-turvy, but by no means untypical or insignificant, thinking of Indian politicians in the aftermath of the war.

2. You will note Mr. Gujral's comments on the Congress Parliamentary Party's present attitudes to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and Indian nuclear policy, arising from their conclusion that "any Great Power can let you down any time".

3. On the point made by Mr. Lalit Sen, M.P., about the Arab Ambassadors apparent dis-satisfaction at the degree of support they have received from India, the High Commissioner adds that when the acting Doyen gave a farewell party on 27 June for the Ceylon High Commissioner the Arab envoys were there in force. But one hour later, at a farewell party for the Foreign Secretary, Mr. C.S. Jha, none of them appeared and only western Ambassadors were present. Mr. Lalit Sen has since told us that, according to his information, the Indian Ambassador in Cairo was instructed on more than one occasion in the course of the crisis to keep in touch with President Nasser, but was unable to secure an interview with him.

yours ever,
 John

(J.P. WATERFIELD)

A.A. Duff, Esq., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.S.C.,
 South Asia Department,
 Commonwealth Office.

1. M' Hunt ^{8:7}
 2. R: Atkinson ^{10/7}
 3. R: Powell ^{10/7}

Copy of India - the Balkan
 file please aff

Mr. I.K. Gujral's Views

On 28 June, I called to see Mr. I.K. Gujral, Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs, and a member of the "kitchen cabinet". The conversation seems just worth recording for the (pretty depressing) light which it throws on the thought process of one member of that coterie, and for his remarks about the Russian role in the Arab/Israel conflict.

2. We talked first about the meeting of the All India Congress Committee. Mr. Gujral considered that the Government would be bound to attempt to implement the resolution on abolition of the privy purses; and that the question of nationalising the banks would certainly come up again at the next meeting. The Congress, in his view, would have to move to the Left if it was to have a chance of survival. He hoped that we realised that Mrs. Gandhi's Government was "the last chance". If it failed, India would lurch either to the Right or to the Left.

3. It emerged that Mr. Gujral was not at all confident that it would succeed. The prospects of economic progress, in his view, depended on the possibility of securing a drastic cut in defence expenditure. But in view of the continued war-readiness of Pakistan and China, the dangerous situation in West Bengal, and the disturbances in the Naga and Mizo areas, there was no chance of bringing this about. In this connection, he made a vague plea for our help. I pointed out that in the recent Aid Consortium meeting in Paris, we had been very helpful indeed. He rather grudgingly conceded this but said that what he meant was political help, i.e. that we should use our influence with the Americans to cut off the supply of arms to Pakistan!

4. I asked Mr. Gujral what conclusions the Indian Government drew from the Arab/Israel conflict. He said that they had drawn the conclusion that "any Great Power can let you down any time". He did not disguise that what had passed had caused a considerable shock to the Indian Government. They simply had not believed that the Russians would not give any adequate help in time to as close an ally as Nasser - especially as it was apparent that we and the United States "had egged the Israelis on" (a statement which Mr. Gujral subsequently withdrew, but in which he no doubt still believes).

5. He added that this had obvious implications for the defence of India. The Congress Parliamentary Party was now 90 per cent against India signing the non-proliferation treaty. Indeed many of them wanted the Government to go ahead with an Indian nuclear bomb now.

6. On "Western Asia", Mr. Lalit Sen, MP., told me on the same day that the most ironic feature of the situation was the fact that the Arab Ambassadors in Delhi were now expressing dissatisfaction at the degree of support they had received from India! According to Mr. Sen, when the Ceylon High Commissioner gave a farewell reception for Mr. C.S. Jha, the Arab Ambassadors boycotted it; and there was also a partial boycott of a recent meeting of the Indo-Arab Friendship Society.

P.A.

R.W. Renwick.

(R.W. RENWICK)
30 June, 1967.Head of Chancery

c.c. D. Slater

129
30



M' Hunt.

~~for DMR~~
for Mr. with us
you will be for us
Rebut for us for us
letter of pressure
copy to Sir Gordon
Neill
7/1

This is interesting,
and a timely warning. It
seems to me probable that,
one way or another, the U.S.
Administration will be able
to recruit & dispel any former
child of India & rule at
the South Asia. But I
hope they will not fall into
the lesser evil of fragmenting
Pakistan & India.

P.A

Armenia

Sir A. S. Syat

you might care to look at Mr. Odhams letter.
We may see a toughening in the U.S. attitude towards
and in the sub-continent.

Neill
5.7.67

P.O.S.

This interesting letter shows that

American opinion is hardening towards India & Pakistan. On the other hand in this country opinion — as judged for instance from MP's & other letters from the public — seems to be moving in the direction that we ought to be doing more for India on account of the famine.

Ans. 6/7

Interesting and significant no doubt. But I do not think the contrast is quite so stark as you suggest. There are many cross and counter currents in both countries.

LG

1/2

Mr. A. Sarkiss

MT Hunt
N. Uncal

Please ~~not~~ star 1.
K.G. — Det on ack.

1) ~~Mr. Hunt~~ 10:7
2) 20 min ^{11/11} _{10/1}

4/7/67

(29)

(2218)


CONFIDENTIALBRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

29 June, 1967

Sefanti minsk

4:7

Dear Duff,

The Middle East Crisis and India

I have been wondering whether the Middle East crisis would have any particular effect on relations between the United States and the sub-continent. It is perhaps too early to be sure, but I am inclined to think that it may have a considerable effect, though one which may not perhaps be particularly noticeable since it will work mainly through public opinion and will intensify existing attitudes rather than change them.

2. Possibly the most important effect will be in Congressional thinking about aid. One important factor in the way Congressional opinion on aid has hardened was the bitter resentment here of the war of September 1965. This feeling has of course since been generalised, and has been mixed in with many other factors. But it is still present in the minds of many Congressmen that it was India and Pakistan which consumed so much American aid (economic and military) and wasted it in a stupid war about their trivial local disputes. Now, of course, the Arab countries, particularly Egypt, attract the same hostility. But the relationship between Nasser and Mrs. Gandhi does not go unnoticed, and the performance of the Indians in the Security Council (which was widely and attentively watched here on television) has done them considerable harm with American opinion. I suspect that many Americans, including Representatives, have the feeling that once again India is lending her support to the proposition that the poorer countries of the world have a right to be fed and maintained by America while they devote their own resources to working up wars among themselves.

3. I do not suggest that this view of Indian policy in the Middle East will prevail in the Administration, but it may have a significant effect on what they can expect to get through Congress. A variant which could perhaps have its effect within the Administration also is the view that the reason for the Indian position on the Middle East goes back to Kashmir - i.e. to the need to cultivate the Soviet veto in the Security Council and to pre-empt the possibility of the Pakistanis marshalling a Moslem vote in the General Assembly. There is, as you know, a world of patience and good-will towards India among American officials who

/work on

A. A. Duff, Esq., C.M.G., D.S.C., D.S.O.,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

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-2-

work on Indian problems. But much of this relates to the expectations which Americans have of a country with India's size, and India's cultural and human resources, and they can be correspondingly exasperated by Indian small-mindedness. They will not object to the Indians making up their minds what they think about the situation in the Middle East and saying it; but to the extent that they think that India is exacerbating a crucially dangerous world problem for reasons relating largely to certain limited aspects of the Kashmir problem, they will be offended by the irresponsibility of it.

4. India's standing with Congress will be affected not only by the strengthening of anti-Indian sentiment but also because they are alienating the pro-India lobby, which tends to be also pro-Israel on Middle-Eastern issues.

5. Finally, one further effect of the crisis on American policy towards the sub-continent will be the purely administrative one of making American decisions even more piecemeal and spasmodic than hitherto. The widening, but still "patchy", domestic political impact of decisions taken vis à vis India will tend to bring in the White House more often but still ad hoc and without any overall grip or direction. It has also obviously been one of the regrets of middle and junior-ranking officials in the State Department during my time here that they have been able to secure so little of their superiors' time and attention for the careful working out of coherent and purposeful policies towards the sub-continent, because of the pressure of world crises elsewhere. This used to be a problem for the whole Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs: now even within that Bureau the South Asian half gets the short end of the time available, and I am afraid this in itself will complicate American policy in the sub-continent and make it seem to you even more puzzling and jerky than hitherto.

6. The effect of all this on Pakistan is rather mixed. Those who take an informed interest in the sub-continent, which applies to quite a few Congressmen nowadays, speak increasingly well of Pakistan's economic performance, and of her careful attention to her own business. The "flirtation" with China is increasingly seen as something to which the Pakistanis were forced by the Indians, which has been kept within decent bounds at all stages, and which is in any case cooling off. The trouble, for Pakistan, I am afraid, is that there are far more people whose interest in the sub-continent is less informed, and who draw no particular distinction between India and Pakistan. On Congressional attitudes towards aid, for instance, it seems to me quite possible that we may see an attempt within the next year to restrict American economic assistance to the "real allies" in Latin America

/and

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-3-

and South-East Asia, with a withdrawal from the troublesome and wasteful middle world of Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. In such broad-brush treatment, of course, Pakistan will get no exemption; though if such a move develops, the Administration will be able to resist it with much hard work and some more concessions.

7. I am sending copies of this letter to Waterfield in Delhi, Stratton in Rawalpindi and Denson in the Foreign Office, and I enclose an extra copy in case you want to pass one on to the Ministry of Overseas Development.

Sent
4/7

*Yours ever,
Brian Gilmore*

(B. T. Gilmore)

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Allijan
For me with
Kish ?
AB 12/7
12/7
(Carlier refc)

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SE22.

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BAG RPNDI DE LDN CAIRO BERUT ANKRA DE PARIS TAVIV DE OTT
REF OURTEL 1263 JUN 16

MIDEAST-INDIAN POLICY

WE CALLED ON HUSAIN, SECRETARY II, MEA, ON SAT AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS
INDIAN MIDEAST POLICY SINCE HE HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE SENIOR
OFFICIAL. AS EXPECTED HE MAINTAINED A HARD PRO ARAB LINE. IT IS
PERHAPS UNFORTUNATE THAT EA MINISTER CHAGLA AND HUSAIN ARE BOTH
MUSLIMS WHILE TN KAUL WHO HAS ALSO HAD A HAND IN POLICY FORMATION
IS AGGRESSIVELY ANTI IMPERIALIST.

2. MOST INTERESTING WAS HUSAINS EMPHASIS ON THESIS THAT ISRAEL
IS A EUROPEAN COUNTRY DRIVEN AS A WEDGE INTO ASIA. THE EUROPEANS
MISTREATED THE JEWS FOR CENTURIES AND THEN DUMPED THEM ON THE
UNFORTUNATE ARABS. WHEN I REMONSTRATED THAT THE JEWS ARE SEMITICS
LIKE THE ARABS HUSAIN INSISTED THAT THEY WERE A DIFFERENT RACE
AND WERE EUROPEANS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT UN MUST TREAT ISRAEL
EXACTLY AS IT WOULD ANY OTHER ASIAN COUNTRY WHICH HAD HAD A
CEASEFIRE IMPOSED ON IT. WHEN INDIA AND PAK ACCEPTED UN CEASE-
FIRE IN SEP/65 THEY WERE FORCED TO RETURN TO THE POSITIONS HELD
BEFORE FIGHTING BEGAN. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS PRESSURE IN INDIA TO
HOLD GAINS IN KASHMIR, THEY HAD BOWED TO UN REQUEST. SIMILARLY
ISRAEL MUST GIVE UP ALL TERRITORY GAINED AS RESULT OF FIGHTING.

PAGE TWO 1276 CONFD

IT WOULD BE INTOLERABLE IF ISRAEL, BECAUSE IT WAS A EUROPEAN COUNTRY, WAS TREATED DIFFERENTLY THAN INDIA HAD BEEN TREATED.

3. I SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL HAVING WON AN OVERWHELMING MILITARY VICTORY COULD NOT RPT NOT BE EXPECTED TO RETURN TO JUN4 POSITIONS WITHOUT AT VERY LEAST GUARANTEE THAT THEY WILL HAVE FREE PASSAGE IN GULF OF AGABA. NO RPT NO, THIS MUST BE NEGOTIATED WITH UAR AFTER WITHDRAWAL. LEGAL POSITION ON STRAITS OF TIRAN WAS IN INDIAN VIEW STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF UAR. EVEN MR DULLES HAD SAID LEGAL POSITION WAS UNCERTAIN IN 1956. INDIAN POSITION WILL THEREFORE APPARENTLY BE THAT ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW FROM SHARM EL SHEIK, AND THEN NEGOTIATE WITH UAR FOR PERMISSION TO USE STRAITS.

4. HUSAIN CONFIRMED OUR REPORT IN PARAS OF OUR REFTEL THAT INDIA FEELS VERY STRONGLY ABOUT THE FRUITS OF AGGRESSION PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF LADAKH, WHERE THE CHINESE OCCUPY 15,000 SQUARE MILES OF INDIAN TERRITORY. HE DID NOT RPT NOT MENTION AZAD KASHMIR BUT MIGHT WELL HAVE DONE.

5. I ASKED HUSAIN WHETHER INDIA WOULD MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO MR NASSER ABOUT OPENING THE SUEZ CANAL SINCE ITS CONTINUED CLOSURE WOULD DO GREAT HARM TO INDIA AND WOULD AGGRAVATE FOOD SHORTAGE IN COMING MONTHS. HE SEEMED PHILOSOPHICAL ABOUT THIS. NASSER KNEW ABOUT INDIAS PROBLEMS. BUT SUEZ CANAL WAS ONLY TRUMP CARD LEFT IN NASSERS HAND AND INDIA AS ONLY ONE COUNTRY IN A SITUATION INVOLVING MANY COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TO BE PATIENT. IN THIS CONNECTION HE ASKED HOW MUCH LONGER IT WOULD TAKE SHIPS TO COME FROM CDA VIA CAPE RATHER THAN SUEZ AND I GUESSED 7 OR 8 DAYS, MAYBE MORE.

PAGE THREE 1276 CONFIDENTIAL

6. EVEN ON BASIC QUESTION OF ISRAELS RIGHT TO EXIST HUSAIN WAS NOT RPT NOT ENCOURAGING. INDIA RECOGNIZED ISRAEL-THEY HAD CONSULAR RELATIONS. BUT EVEN THE UN CREATION OF ISRAEL ONLY GAVE IT TERRITORY WHICH WAS 40 PERCENT LESS THAN ITS PRESENT BOUNDARIES. IMPLICATION BEING THAT THIS 40 PERCENT IS ALSO FRUITS OF AGGRESSION. BUT IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT INDIA WILL PRESS THE ARABS TOWARDS A RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST AT ALL. (IN AIRPORT INTERVIEW ON DEPARTURE FOR NY SAT CHAGLA SAID INDIA WAS INTERESTED IN HAVING PEACE IN WESTASIA BUT IT MUST BE PEACE BASED ON JUSTICE OR IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE ENDURING. ONE WONDERS WHAT IS JUSTICE IN INDIAN EYES).

7. ALTOGETHER THEREFORE INTERVIEW WITH HUSAIN CONFIRMED WORST FEARS OF THE ANTI-WESTERN ANTI-EUROPEAN DIRECTION OF INDIAN WESTASIAN POLICY. IT SEEMS INEVITABLE THAT UN SPECIAL ASSEMBLY WILL BE DIVIDED ON ARAB-ISRAELI QUESTION AS AN IMPERIALIST AND COLONIALIST PROBLEM WITH INDIA TRYING TO PLAY A LEADING ANTI-IMPERIALIST ROLE. HOWEVER NEPAL AT LEAST, WHICH IS BRAVELY PRO ISRAELI, AND SOME AFRICANS MAY UPSET INDIAN CALCULATIONS. MOST DEPRESSING IS THOUGHT THAT UNGA MAY PASS YET ONE MORE INEFFECTIVE RESLN ON A MAJOR INTERNATL ISSUE CONDEMNING ISRAEL AND INSISTING THAT IT RETURN TO JUN4, TO WHICH ISRAEL WILL PAY NO RPT NO ATTN.

8. IN THIS CONNECTION WE SHOULD HAVE REPORTED SOONER A SPEECH BY MRS GANDHI IN AMBIKAPUR, MADHYA PRADESH, ON JUN11 IN WHICH SHE

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WAS REPORTED IN HINDUSTAN TIMES OF JUN12 AS SAYING INDIA STOOD FIRMLY BY ARAB WORLD IN GENERAL AND UAR IN PARTICULAR IRRESPECTIVE OF THE REVERSES SUFFERED BY THEM IN THE ISRAEL-ARAB CONFLICT. INDIAN NEWS AGENCY REPORT OF SPEECH WENT ON QUOTE THE PM SAID INDIAS FRIENDSHIP WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES WAS BASED ON SOUND PRINCIPLES. THERE WAS NO RPT NO REASON WHY IT SHOULD BE CHANGED NOW, SHE ADDED. SHE HOWEVER MADE IT CLEAR THAT INDIA DID NOT RPT NOT STAND FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL. MRS GANDHI COMPARED ISRAEL WITH PAK AND SAID THE SEEDS OF CONFLICT WERE SOWN WITH ITS BIRTH. SHE SAID AS IN THE CASE OF PAK IT WAS WESTERN POWERS WHO HAD ARMED ISRAEL HEAVILY. SHE SAID QUOTE PEOPLE SAY THE UAR NEVER HELPED US WHEN CHINA AND PAK ATTACKED US. IT IS NOT RPT NOT CORRECT TO SAY THAT THE UAR HAD NOT RPT NOT HELPED INDIA. IT WAS PRESIDENT NASSER WHO PREVENTED MANY COUNTRIES FROM GOING AGAINST INDIA UNQUOTE. IT WAS ONLY IN THE INTEREST OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THAT THEY SHOULD STAND TOGETHER, SHE ADDED UNQUOTE.

9. IN PRESS INTERVIEW ON RETURNING TO DELHI FROM THIS VISIT TO DROUGHT AREA SHE DESCRIBED NASSER AS QUOTE A FORCE FOR PROGRESS UNQUOTE AND WELCOMED NEWS THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE TO HEAD UAR GOVT. HE HAD ALWAYS SUPPORTED CERTAIN IDEAS WHICH INDIA STOOD FOR. REPORT OF INTERVIEW CONTINUED QUOTE ASKED TO AMPLIFY HER REMARK AT A PUBLIC MTG IN AMBIKAPUR YESTERDAY THAT SOME IMPORTANT LEADER HAD TOLD HER RECENTLY THAT WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN WESTASIA

PAGE FIVE 1276 CONFD

AS NOT RPT NOT THE END OF THE STORY BUT THE BEGINNING, THE PM REPLIED QUOTE ALL THE ARAB LEADERS ARE SAYING THAT, IT MAY NOT RPT NOT BE A SHOOTING WAR, BUT THE CONFLICT IN THE AREA IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE UNQUOTE.

10. FACT REMAINS THAT VERY LARGE SECTION OF, AT ANY RATE, ENGLISH LANGUAGE PRESS IN INDIA IS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO PRO-ARAB LINE OF GOI, AND EVERY INDIAN TO WHOM ONE SPEAKS SEEMS TO HAVE GREAT ADMIRATION FOR ISRAELI MILITARY ABILITY AND AGREES THAT ISRAEL HAS A RIGHT TO EXIST. GOVT'S WESTASIAN POLICY HAS ROUSED MORE INTERNAL OPPOSITION AND CRITICISM THAN ANY FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE SINCE HUNGARY IN 1956. HOWEVER INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS OVER WHICH GOI SEEMS TO BE LOSING CONTROL ARE FOR IMMED PRESENT OVERSHADOWING MIDEAST IN PUBLIC MIND. PRESENT CONTROVERSY WITH CHINA OVER TREATMENT OF DIPLOMS, RECENT EXPLOSION OF CHINESE HYDROGEN BOMB AND FACT THAT BOTH PAKS AND ARABS IN GENERAL SEEM TO BE VERY PRO-CHINESE IS NOT RPT NOT HELPING AVERAGE INDIAN TO RECONCILE HIMSELF TO GOVT'S POLICY ON ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

SHICKS & BAPTIST HAVE CALLS OF URGENCY TO SUPPORT GOI'S POLICY BUT DON'T GET ON PUBLIC RECORD AND ARE THUS TAKING CARE OF THINGS ALONE. DON'T GET THEM INVOLVED. DON'T GET GOVT'S ADVICE. DON'T GET ARAB LEADERS PREDICTING STABILISATION IN MIDEAST BY 1962. THIS IS NOT WANTED. IN TALKING WITH THOSE IN GOVT. TELL THEM TO TALK WITH ARAB LEADERS AND GET THEM TO REASSURE THEM OF SUPPORT FOR 1962. THIS IS NOT GOING TO WORK.

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British High Commission,

NEW DELHI

30 June 1967

Dear Tony,

Middle East

I enclose a copy of a minute by the High Commissioner recording a conversation which he had with the Foreign Secretary, Mr. C. S. Jha (the senior official in the M.E.A.) about the Middle East crisis.

2. I am sending copies of this letter with enclosure to Trench in Washington and Youde in New York.

yours ever
John

(J. P. Waterfield)

J:J

Mr. Puxell

20/6/67
John

A. A. Duff, Esq., CMG, DSO, DSC,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.

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AA 1/5/7



Arab - Israel: Views of Indian Foreign Secretary

In the course of a brief conversation with the Foreign Secretary on 27 June, he made the following points to me:

- (a) It was his personal view that, prior to 5 June, G.O.I. had gone too far in supporting publicly the Egyptian cause and that this had weakened the Indian position. He hoped that the same criticism was not valid after 5 June. I reminded Mr. Jha that I had made exactly this point to him personally in the last week of May.
- (b) Mr. Jha told me that he had been very much interested in the press reports of Mr. Brown's U.N. speech. If Mr. Brown's view of 'territorial aggrandisement' had been correctly reported, there seemed little difference between the Indian and British positions. I said that to the best of my knowledge Mr. Brown had been correctly reported, but possibly out of context. This was a long speech; and while H.M.G.'s view on territorial aggrandisement had been stated with complete clarity, there were other points in the speech - e.g. the priority or sequence of various elements in the possible final settlement had been left open - which the Indians might not fully agree with. I suggested to Mr. Jha that he might like to study the whole text before jumping to conclusions. I thought he would find the speech very telling and constructive, but it did not in itself carry any implication that H.M.G. would support a resolution demanding an unconditional Israeli withdrawal as a terminus a quo.
- (c) Mr. Jha volunteered that there was close consultation in New York between the Indian and the Arab and Soviet delegations. He wondered whether it was adequately close between the Indian and the British. We should try to keep in close touch in New York. I said that I appreciated the good intention of this remark and would pass it on. Perhaps he would do the same to the leader of the Indian delegation.

(JOHN FREEMAN)

29. June 1967

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British High Commission,
NEW DELHI

(36)

PL 31/1

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31/7/67

Dear Tony,

Arab-Israel Conflict

I think you will be interested to see the enclosed copy of another of James Lunt's valuable reports, which I had asked him to produce, recording a visit to the National Defence College to deliver a lecture on the South Arabian Federation. It gives a vivid illustration of Indian, and particularly Indian Army, attitudes to the subjects raised. As this is essentially "illustrative reporting" of Indian domestic interest, I am not copying this elsewhere; but I enclose two copies of the report in case you want to pass one on.

yours ever,
John.

(J. P. WATERFIELD)

3:7

A. A. Duff, Esq., CMG, DSO, DSC,
South Asia Department,
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE.

1. Mr Allison 3/7
2. Mr Cooper 4/7
3. Ede

P.A.

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Lecture by Defence Adviser
to the
National Defence College on 27th June, 1967

1. I was invited by the Commandant to address the National Defence College on the Federation of South Arabia, and with the High Commissioner's approval I accepted the invitation. Prior to delivering the lecture I cleared my script with the Head of Chancery.
2. I made it clear at the outset that I was not going to attempt to unravel the extremely complicated political situation in Aden today, but intended to restrict myself to the historical background for Britain's presence in South Arabia. I hoped that this background knowledge would enable my audience to make their own judgments of the present situation without bias or prejudice.
3. Although I exceeded by ten minutes what I should regard as being the most suitable length for a lecture of this kind, I found my audience remarkably attentive throughout. After a short break for coffee we reassembled and I then took questions.
4. These questions covered a wide range and were not confined solely to South Arabia. The most intense interest was displayed in the recent Israeli-Arab war, and in particular on the collapse of the Jordanian Army. It was apparent to me that the Israeli victory over both the Egyptians and the Syrians came as no surprise, and the Commandant said in open forum that he had all along doubted whether the Egyptians would last a week against the Israelis. It was however a different story so far as Jordan was concerned, since all the students believed the Jordanian to be far and away the best Arab Army. I did my best to explain the reasons for Jordan's defeat, and here I was fortunate in having listened to an admirable account of operations in Jordan given

/by

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by the BGS(Int) to the recent Defence Advisers' Conference in Singapore. I was struck by the fact that almost everyone appeared to sympathise with the Israeli case. The sole exception was Mr. A.K. Dar from the Ministry of External Affairs whose paranoia can only be compared with Hitler's. X

5. So far as South Arabia is concerned, I was surprised by the almost complete lack of knowledge of the issues involved. There was a certain amount of prejudice, derived mainly from newspaper articles, but also astonishing ignorance. The ability of many intelligent Indians to get the wrong end of the stick always surprises me, as for example one questioner who wanted to know how we expected the Arabs to crew the aircraft carrier we proposed to "give" them. I explained that we were not "giving" the South Arabians an aircraft carrier but were proposing to provide one "on station" for the limited period of six months after our withdrawal, as a deterrent to any aggression from outside South Arabia.

6. There was the inevitable tendency to see the trouble in South Arabia as being a conflict between feudal rulers and Adenese democrats. This theme came up time and again and I explained the complications of South Arabian tribal society, the historic differences between tribesmen and townsmen, and the divisive influences of the Yemen and Egypt. I doubt however whether my message got home.

7. The very last question was the only one which might possibly have been "loaded". A Naval student wanted to know why we proposed building bases on islands in the Indian Ocean when in fact we were in the process of withdrawing from both Aden and Singapore. I tackled this question by first trying to define what is meant by a "base". I then pointed out that whether or not we remain in Singapore, we continued to have close ties with Australia and New Zealand and we required the capability of being able to fly to and from those countries. This in turn might involve the construction of one, or possibly more staging posts in BIOT, but they would certainly not be "bases".

/8.

X He was a great man in our Yash in Delhi
in 1965 - 66 when he was Joint Secretary
dealing with Pakistan affairs WADP/7

CONFIDENTIAL

8. At least two of the questions concerned the possibility of establishing a United Nations presence in South Arabia and turning Aden into something like pre-1939 Danzig. I agreed that this might be a desirable solution but doubted whether it would prove practicable. It would be an expensive undertaking and who would pay for it. I pointed out that it was America and Britain who footed the largest share of the bill for United Nations peace-keeping activities and that so far as I was aware the Indian financial contribution was relatively small. I added that we were being subjected to a campaign of vilification in the Arab press on account of our supposedly pro-Israeli policy, but I asked which nations had been contributing to the support of the Arab refugees since 1947? Had India or Russia? How many rupees of their taxes had gone to pay for the subsistence of these wretched Arabs? Almost all the money provided had come from the pockets of American and British taxpayers.

9. I do not believe that many members of my audience suffered under any illusions regarding Nasser. Their attitude towards Egypt can be summed up as being contemptuous. Many thought that Nasser must inevitably be overthrown once the full story of Egypt's humiliation leaks out, (which I venture to doubt). Whatever the policy of the Government of India, I am quite sure that in the Armed Forces at least, India's alignment with the UAR is regarded as being no more than a political charade.

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29th June, 1967.

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to the
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29th June, 1967.

HRC

Extract from "The Times of India"

12/6/67

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Untiring advocacy for Arabs in vain: India equated with Pakistan

By H. R. VOHRA
"The Times of India" News Service

WASHINGTON, June 11.

A SIGNIFICANT development from India's viewpoint is the appointment of Pakistan by the United Arab Republic and Syria to represent their interests in London.

This fact appears to have gone unnoticed in the prevailing elation that India is to represent them in Washington after their diplomatic break with the United States.

The two Arab countries are thus demonstrating that nothing has happened to change their equal treatment of India and Pakistan.

RECESSION IN POPULARITY

To some Indian observers this is proof enough of India's failure to obtain any tangible gain from its exertions on behalf of the Arab world in the Security Council. They say that India has, instead, suffered some recession in its relative popularity with the Arabs since 1956. Then, India was lionised for some time by the Arabs because, while India sided with them, Pakistan stood aloof.

Now India, no longer shines by contrast. Pakistan's promised assistance for the Arabs has been effusive, thus greatly neutralising India's practical assistance. India has found the competition difficult because Pakistan is not only a Muslim State, but, like the Arabs, it does not recognise Israel.

The appointment of Pakistan as the guardian of UAR interests in London is taken to mean that it has successfully worked its way back into the affections of the Arab world. Its role in 1956 has been forgiven.

Indian observers regard this as an important development which further complicates the manoeuvring over the Kashmir issue.

SIZABLE LOSS

India's total gain through its unreserved support of the Arab side of the argument, if this analysis is true, will appear insignificant. Its diplomatic loss on balance is generally considered sizable.

Some observers think India will now also need to reassess its relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. A balanced friendship for both is an essential ingredient of India's foreign policy. The West Asian crisis has shown that they both play safe in international disputes in which the other party is a nuclear Power.

Since China is well on the way to acquiring a sizable nuclear arsenal and a delivery system, the question arises whether India can reliably depend on either.

The record of the two countries is not identically the same if Cuba is recalled. On that occasion the U.S. did not shirk its regional responsibility and its more primary obligation towards its own self-defence. These observers also take into account the U.S. role in the Korean war and the war in Viet Nam despite the sacrifices they entailed.

SOUL-SEARCHING

Similar questions are beginning to be raised in the Arab countries where some of the elation towards the Soviet Union has already diminished. Some soul-searching is stated to have started in Israel. Neither the Arabs nor the Israelis received the help they expected.

The Arab countries understandably

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Arabs maintain U. K. and U. S. helped Israel

Continued from Page 1 Column 7

express their grievance more energetically. They were led to believe, or they had convinced themselves, that they could count on ultimate Soviet backing. Instead, the Arabs bemoan the Soviet Union reconciled itself to a cease-fire without the withdrawal of the Israeli forces to the positions held before June 4.

These grumblings are likely to become more audible as tempers cool, permitting a proper appraisal of the recent convulsive events.

The trend of Arab thinking is to be found in the allegation that the U.S. and Britain actively assisted their friends in Israel. It does not at all matter that the two countries vehemently deny the charge because, first, Nasser says so.

Secondly, the Arabs desperately need a credible explanation for their rout. They would rather be defeated by the U.S. or Britain, each a big Power, than by small Israel. Hence, President Nasser must cast the U.S. as his enemy. This stance he apparently wishes to maintain. His question is whether, in future, he can continue to rely on the Soviet Union when he has found that it did not come to his help when he was in difficulties.

Unfortunately for the Soviet Union, the logic of the Arab argument is that the U.S. and Britain have proved their loyalty to Israel while the Soviet Union has sought safety in retreat.

This accounts for the stony Soviet silence on the Arabs' anti-U.S. allegation. It does not serve Soviet interests to endorse it. It would rather help that Israeli troops marched under the protective air umbrella of the U.S.

The West Asian conflict appears to have caused damage over an area wider than the theatre of war. How it will be repaired is difficult to foresee.

Pak caution yields dividends

NEW DELHI, June 11: The Arab-Israeli conflict has enabled Pakistan to establish, for the first time, a firm foothold in the pro-UAR camp. The news that Rawalpindi had been requested to look after the UAR's interests in the U.K. and Syrian interests in the U.S. was published prominently in the Pakistani press.

Pakistan's approach to the West Asian crisis was more cautious than that of the non-aligned countries, and in practice followed the policy of its allies, Iran and Turkey, which refused to oblige the Arab nations even with lip sympathy. At the same time, the Pakistani newspapers carried stories about India's "betrayal" of the UAR in the Security Council.

(35)

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Commonwealth Office
London, S.W.1.

22 June 1967

Arab/Israel

(17a)

Through a slip of the pen I said
"the American, Cargill" in my letter of
20 June. Of course he is British but in
the World Bank.

(W.L. Allinson)

J.P. Waterfield Esq.,
New Delhi.

c.c.
W.G.C. Trench Esq., C.M.G.,
Washington.
P.J.S. Moon Esq.,
U.N. Mission, New York
W.A. Ward Esq.,
Rawalpindi.

P.A.

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With the Compliments of

Mr. R. H. Belcher

MINISTRY OF OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT
ELAND HOUSE, STAG PLACE,
LONDON S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIALMr. Heptinstall

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22 JUN. 1967

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I lunched with Mr. Cargill on Friday, June 16th. The following records the main points of interest in our talk.

2. Indian debt He confirmed what he had told Sir Alan Dudley of the U.S. position as it appeared from a talk he and Mr. Woods had had with Mr. Linder of the Ex-Im Bank - i.e. no decision to give debt relief: no conviction, on the figures, of Indian need: but acceptance of the inevitability of U.S. giving relief because others would: therefore examining methods of doing so and probably concluding that roll over of this year's payments to end of loan period would be best. Nothing new about German position (he had the previous day telephoned Washington about this): on that account he proposes to visit Bonn on Wednesday (21st) after the Indonesia aid meeting at the Hague. He would greatly welcome our making the approaches in Washington and Bonn which I had described to him.

3. Indian food aid He thought the Indians had behaved very stupidly over this. The U.S. had begun negotiations with them over 1½m. tons of grain from the second 3m. tons immediately after the Consortium meeting. The Middle East crisis broke at the same time and over the weekend of the negotiations the whole of Washington was watching the Security Council meeting in which the Indian delegate (Mr. Partasarathi) took the lead in speaking forcefully on the side of the Soviet Union against the U.S. He (Mr. Cargill) had spoken to Mr. Partasarathi in New York to warn him of the damage this was doing the grain negotiations and was referred to the Indian Embassy for the exchange of telegrams with Delhi which Mr. Cargill then saw. From them it emerged that Mr. Partasarathi had himself questioned the wisdom of his instructions but Mr. Chagla in Delhi had specifically and peremptorily reaffirmed them. Later, whenever members of the Lok Sabha questioned the wisdom of Indian tactics, Mrs. Gandhi had second thoughts - too late.

4. Mr. Woods and the Indians Although, as he had told us, the Indians and the Pakistanis had made it quite clear there was at present no hope of economic talks between them, he had no confidence that Mr. Woods would drop the idea of promoting such talks since he greatly hankered after the credit of breaking the Indo-Pakistan deadlock. I said we should regard very seriously this sort of threat to the standing of the Bank vis-a-vis India and Pakistan, and consequently

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also to the effectiveness of the Consortium. Mr. Cargili said he appreciated this and would continue to argue against any involvement of this kind unless both parties expressed a wish for it.

5. Pakistan Consortium On this he said that Mr. Ahmad had derived over-optimistic expectations from what the Japanese and others had said to him before the meeting. He had tried without success to make it plain that the reality was different. So when the pledges etc., were made he deliberately reported this result ^{baldly} to him. Mr. Ahmad had of course been upset, but had later seen Mr. Cargill to say that he realised he (Mr. Cargill) had been right. He said all was now on a friendly footing. We had better resort this to Karachi for what it is worth - stressing (as Mr. Cargill says he did to Mr. Ahmad) that Pakistan has done at least as well as India.

AB

(R. H. Belcher)

19th June 1967

Copies to Sir Alan Dudley,

Mr. Healey,

Mr. Edwards,

Mr. Whitehead (C.O.)

Sir J. Johnston " (for para. 3 and 4) ✓

Mr. Mackay (Treasury)

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CYPRUS/CAT A

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1395

16 JUNE 1967

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1395 OF 16 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM:

MIDDLE EAST: ACCUSATIONS OF U.K. INVOLVEMENT.

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT OF SUGGESTED LETTER.

QUOTE


I WROTE ON THE 7TH OF JUNE TO INFORM YOUR EXCELLENCY THAT MY GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME AN IMMEDIATE IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION BY THE UNITED NATIONS OF REPORTS CARRIED BY OFFICIAL MIDDLE EAST NEWS MEDIA WHICH ALLEGED THAT BRITISH AIRCRAFT TOOK PART IN THE RECENT HOSTILITIES IN THE REGION ON THE SIDE OF ISRAEL. MY GOVERNMENT AND I HAVE SINCE MADE CLEAR ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS THAT THESE REPORTS WERE MALICIOUS FABRICATIONS.

I AM NOW INSTRUCTED BY MY GOVERNMENT TO REAFFIRM TO YOUR EXCELLENCY THEIR DESIRE FOR AN IMMEDIATE U.N. INVESTIGATION. I AM TO POINT OUT THAT ALTHOUGH THESE LIES CONTINUE TO BE SPREAD ABOUT, NO EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PRODUCED TO JUSTIFY THEM, NOR HAVE THOSE STATES WHICH MAKE THE ACCUSATIONS VENTURED TO PUT THEM TO THE TEST BY TAKING UP THE OFFER OF INVESTIGATION.

I REPEAT THAT MY GOVERNMENT STANDS READY TO OFFER THE U.N. INVESTIGATING OFFICIALS ALL NECESSARY FACILITIES. IN ADDITION MY GOVERNMENT REMAINS PREPARED TO INVITE U.N. OFFICIALS TO VISIT BRITISH AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, AS WELL AS THE AIR FIELDS IN THE SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS IN CYPRUS AND OUR INSTALLATIONS ON THE AIR

/FIELDS

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~ UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1395 TO FOREIGN OFFICE
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FIELDS IN MALTA. COPIES OF THE RELEVANT RAF STATION FLYING LOGS AND DAILY ROUTINE ORDERS FOR THE DATES 5, 6 AND 7 JUNE AND OF SHIPS FLYING LOGS AND DAILY ROUTINE ORDERS FOR THE SAME DATES FOR HER MAJESTY'S AIRCRAFT-CARRIERS HMS VICTORIOUS WHICH WAS AT MALTA AND HMS HERMES IN ADEN WILL BE AVAILABLE TO THE U.N. TEAM FOR THEIR INSPECTION.

2. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOUR EXCELLENCY WOULD HAVE THIS LETTER CIRCULATED IMMEDIATELY AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT.

UNQUOTE

LORD CARADON SENT AT 17/0125Z
RECD AT 17/0130Z

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Reg. Copy these two by hand. It
my copy to Mr. P. Hall New Delhi
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TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1394

16 JUNE 1967

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1394 OF 16 JUNE REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

(NR) MY TELEGRAM NO. 1374:

MIDDLE EAST: ACCUSATIONS OF U.K. INVOLVEMENT.

I WENT TO SEE RALPH BUNCHE THIS MORNING AND PUT TO HIM THE
PROPOSAL IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 2905.

2. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS A VERY DIFFICULT ONE AND THAT HE WOULD
IMMEDIATELY CONSULT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

3. BUNCHE, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT HE DID
NOT EXPECT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ACT ON A LETTER IN THE TERMS
WHICH I HAD PUT TO HIM. HE SAID THAT THE ISSUE INVOLVED HAD BEEN
RAISED IN THE COUNCIL AND HE COULD NOT THEREFORE IMAGINE THAT THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD TAKE ACTION ON HIS OWN WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY
OF THE COUNCIL. IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT IF THE MATTER HAD NOT
ALREADY BEEN RAISED IN THE COUNCIL DEBATE. ON THE GENERAL QUESTION
OF ARTICLE 99 HE SAID THAT HE FELT SURE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
WOULD NOT ACT UNDER THAT ARTICLE EXCEPT IN AN IMMINENT CRISIS. IN
FACT THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN CALLED UNDER THIS ARTICLE BY THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL ONLY ON ONE OCCASION (HAMMARSKJOLD ON THE CONGO). THIS
WAS A POLITICAL ISSUE OF FIRST IMPORTANCE OF WHICH THE COUNCIL ITSELF
WAS ALREADY SEIZED AND FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ACT ON IT ALONE
WOULD BE CONTRARY TO ALL PRECEDENT AND PRACTICE.

4. BUNCHE ADDED THAT THE ONLY OCCASIONS WHEN HE COULD REMEMBER THAT
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD TAKEN SUCH ACTION WITHOUT AUTHORITY FROM
THE COUNCIL WERE THE TWO INVESTIGATIONS ON THE OPERATION OF UNEF,
BUT THAT WAS ENTIRELY ANOTHER MATTER.

/5. I HAVE

P.A.

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UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1394 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

-2-

5. I HAVE SINCE RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONFIRMING THAT HE WOULD NOT FEEL ABLE TO ACT ON A LETTER OF THE KIND PROPOSED WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE COUNCIL, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE THE QUESTION HAD ALREADY BEEN RAISED IN THE COUNCIL. HE WOULD CONSEQUENTLY PREFER THAT WE DID NOT ADDRESS A LETTER TO HIM AS WE HAD PROPOSED.

6. WE HAVE AGAIN CONSULTED THE AMERICANS WHO CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT INSISTENCE ON A U.N. INVESTIGATION WILL NOT PROVE FRUITFUL. THEY TOO BELIEVE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CANNOT ACT WITHOUT SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORITY AND THAT SUBJECT WOULD GET BOGGED DOWN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IF IT WERE PURSUED THERE. THEY FEEL AT THIS STAGE MOREOVER THAT IF THEY WERE TO MAKE THEIR CARRIER LOGS AVAILABLE, THOSE WHO DO NOT WISH TO BELIEVE THEM WILL SAY THAT THE LOGS HAVE BEEN FUDGED. THEY BELIEVE THE BEST TACTIC IS TO LEAVE THEIR CHALLENGE FOR AN IMPARTIAL ENQUIRY ON THE TABLE AND TO POINT OUT THAT THEIR ACCUSERS HAVE SHOWN NO KEENNESS TO TAKE THIS UP.

7. I FULLY RECOGNISE HOWEVER YOUR CONCERN TO NAIL THE LIE PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE CONTINUING PARLIAMENTARY INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT. I SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT WE MIGHT RETURN TO THE CHARGE WITH ANOTHER LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH REAFFIRMS OUR DESIRE FOR AN IMMEDIATE U.N. INVESTIGATION. WE MIGHT ADD AN OFFER TO SUBMIT STATIONS' AND SHIPS' FLYING LOGS FOR INSPECTION IN ANY U.N. INVESTIGATIONS. (IF WE MADE THESE LOGS AVAILABLE FOR INSPECTION AT THE U.N., AS WE HAVE DONE IN PARLIAMENT, PARTS OF THEM MIGHT BE DISTORTED TO PROVIDE GRIST FOR THEIR MILL BY RESEARCHERS FROM INTERESTED ARAB STATES OR THEIR BACKERS.) THE TEXT OF THE SORT OF LETTER I HAVE IN MIND IS IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 17/0050Z

RECD AT 17/0058Z

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FCW



BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

(31)

PL 31/1

15 June, 1967. *At 11/6*

1) Mr Allinson *(2)*
2) Cdg to: Col Affairs *(2)*
Miss S. Robson *(2)*
19/6

Dear Purcell.

The Middle East : A Mini-Demonstration

On 9 June we were warned by the Indian authorities that an attempt would be made on the following day to stage a demonstration outside the High Commission and the U.S. Embassy (across the road) to protest against our alleged support for Israel.

2. In the event, about 30 Arab students paraded around some areas of New Delhi. Their efforts were greeted with total apathy, and they did not therefore venture as far as the diplomatic enclave. On 11 June we were again warned of a possible demonstration, which again failed to materialise.

3. On the evening of 12 June the promised demonstration at last took place. It was arranged by the Right Communist Youth Federation and the Indo-Arab Youth Forum. The Communists provided four or five buses to bring the demonstrators to the area, and the crowd was about 500 strong. The demonstrators, who were mainly students, carried banners and handed out pamphlets with such slogans as "Israel is the mask which neo-colonialism wears to conceal its sordid ambitions and lust for the wealth of the newly independent countries".

4. The police had taken comprehensive precautions. A member of the Intelligence Bureau confirmed that the Indian authorities had a rather guilty conscience about their failure to do so on previous occasions. Two half-hearted attempts were made to break through the police cordon and were easily repulsed. The demonstrators then contented themselves with burning a large portrait of President Johnson. In order to keep the fire going they were obliged to add to it several portraits of President Nasser.

5. John Robson has reported from Madras that a similar "mini-demonstration" was organised by the Right Communists in Madras on 7 June outside the U.S. Consulate there. The Deputy High Commissioner in Calcutta reported that the Socialist Unity Centre and the Right Communists both intended to hold demonstrations in Calcutta on 9 June. We do not know whether they took place.

16. The

R.M. Purcell, Esq.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.

P.A.

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19 JUN 1967
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6. The earlier abortive attempts to organise a demonstration in Delhi, and the lethargic character of the demonstration when it did take place, were a confirmation, if one were needed, that Indian opinion, apart from the Communists and the Muslims, cares little about the Middle East, and insofar as it cares, is anti-Arab. The Muslims, of course, do feel themselves to be involved. The half-dozen letters and telegrams we have received from the public all emanate from Muslims or Muslim organisations. On 7 June a Muslim crowd in Srinagar registered its dis-approval of the Western attitude towards Israel by setting fire to two churches there. (Hicks is writing by this bag to Hunter in Consular Department about this incident.)

7. In this connection Mr. Prem Bhasin, General Secretary of the Praja Socialist Party, observed to me today that although the major factors in deciding the Indian Government to take its intransigent line on the Middle East had been the desire to keep on wooing the Arab states away from Pakistan, reinforced by Mrs. Gandhi's ideological sympathy for President Nasser, he was convinced that this stand, together with the Prime Minister's insistence that Dr. Zakir Husain must be the Congress candidate for the Presidency, also represented a deliberate attempt to win back the Muslim vote about whose partial defection from the Congress Mrs. Gandhi and her advisers were known to be greatly concerned (see my letter PL 5/79/9 of 23 March).

8. I am copying this letter to Calcutta, Bombay and Madras.

Yours ever.

R. W. Renwick.

(R. W. RENWICK)

PL 31/1

Copy to MEWIND CO
Easter Day 1967
13 June 1967



BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

13 June, 1967.

20

Dear Sir. Middle East Crisis

(16)

In paragraph 6 of my letter PL 31/1 of 9 June (not to Tel Aviv), I mentioned that the Ministry of External Affairs had handed over an Aide Memoire to the Israeli Consul General about the casualties which had been caused by the Israelis to the Indian element of the U.N.E.F. I now enclose a full text of this Aide Memoire.

2. I am sending copies of this letter, with enclosure, to the Chanceries at Washington and Tel Aviv.

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16 JUN 1967
SE 2 2.

Yours ever

D. Slater

(D. SLATER)

W.L. Allinson, Esq., M.V.O.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.

P. D.

AIDE MEMOIRE

The Secretary General of the United Nations has already conveyed to the Government of Israel his strong protest against repeated attacks by the Israeli Armed Forces on the Indian contingent of the UNEF. On June 5th, two camps occupied by the Indian contingent of the UNEF came under Israeli artillery fire causing casualties. As a result of this, the Commander of the UNEF sent an urgent message, through the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, to the Chief of the Staff of Israeli Defence Forces to give instructions that a strict ceasefire should be observed in the vicinity of the well-known UNEF installations and camps. This appeal was acceded to and General Rikhye was notified that instructions had been given to the Israeli Forces to observe strictly the ceasefire in the vicinity of all UNEF installations and camps.

2. Despite this assurance, the same day, Israeli aircraft strafed a UNEF convoy south of Khan Younis, killing three Indian soldiers and an unknown number wounded. It is noteworthy that all vehicles in the convoy were painted white, as indeed are all UNEF vehicles, and were thus easily identifiable. Following these wanton attacks on UNEF camps and the UNEF convoy, the UNEF Commander again urged, through the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, the Chief of the Staff of Israeli Defence Forces, to order the Israeli Forces, and specially

Israeli.....

Israeli aircraft, to adhere to the undertaking to refrain from firing on UNEF personnel and UNEF camps, buildings and vehicles. Disregarding these appeals, and in violation of the undertaking given by the Israeli Defence Forces, the main camp of the UNEF Indian contingent came under Israeli artillery fire which killed one officer and one soldier and wounded one officer and nine soldiers. It is further understood that these attacks continued, bringing the total losses to eight killed, fourteen wounded and eighteen missing so far.

3. It is clear that the action of the Israeli Armed Forces can only be considered callous, deliberate and unprovoked. Such action against personnel who were in the area on behalf of the United Nations, whose duty and functions were the preservation of peace, who were non-combatants and not in a position to defend themselves, heighten the enormity of this action. Government of India consider these attacks as an open affront to the United Nations and a flagrant violation by the Israeli authorities of international law and accepted norms of civilized behaviour.

4. Intervening in the Security Council Emergency session on June 5, 1967, the Indian Representative expressed the Government of India's profound shock and grief over the dastardly action of the Israeli military authorities and pointed out that "our soldiers had gone to the area ten years ago as sentinels.....

Parliament on 25th May 1967, has described the incident as a highly provocative one. But when this incident is seen in the context of the more recent killings of innocent Indian personnel of the Indian contingent with UNEF, it takes on an even graver aspect. It is apparent that the Israeli military authorities have systematically ignored the immunity of personnel functioning under the aegis of the UN and wilfully repeatedly attacked Indian personnel of the UNEF.

7. The Government of India protests most vigorously against these attacks on the Indian personnel employed under the auspices of the UNEF, and strongly condemns the utter disregard by the Israeli authorities of the immunity which UN personnel engaged in peace-keeping operations enjoy. The Government of India demands that while the UN is making necessary arrangements for their evacuation, these barbarous attacks on the Indian personnel of the UNEF cease forthwith. The Government of India further demands that the Israeli Government pays adequate compensation to the families of the deceased and to the injured personnel of the Indian contingent of the UNEF. The Government of India reserves the right to take such further action in the matter as it may deem necessary according to international law and practice.

June 8, 1967.

M 28/6

Mr. AllinsonMr. Lever PL 28/6

An article in last week's "Economist" on South Arabia contains the sentence:-

"The V-Bombers were presumably intended to deter this sort of big operation (if indeed it really is Arabia, not India, they are supposed to defend)".

Now come

Range?

No

2. I confess it had not hitherto occurred to me that the presence of the V-Bombers at Masira could be viewed in this light. Perhaps we should just consider this possibility, although I doubt whether there is anything in it? Incidentally, have we had any report from Delhi or Rawalpindi about Indian and Pakistan reactions to the announcement about the defence of South Arabia?

(A.A. Duff)
27 June 1967Mr ALLINSONMr DUFF (See also 29)

I am not clear what the thought behind the Economist's suggestion is, but presumably the defence of India against China is in question. If this is so Masirah is hardly a suitable base: MOD(Air) were unwilling to quote any specific figures for the range of a V-bomber, since this depends on the type of load carried and whether they fly at high or low level. But even with a light load and at the most economical (in terms of fuel) level a V-bomber would probably only just about reach the Indo/Chinese border from Masirah and would not pose much of a threat to Chinese military or industrial targets.

2. The preliminary Indian reaction to our announcement about the defence of South Arabia is reported in Mr Waterfield's letter at (28). There has not so far been any comment from Pakistan.

Flag A

P. Lever

(P. Lever)

28, June 1967

Thanks

28/6

Mr Duff 20/6
Regd Entd 20/6
M26/6



SEC 2

British High Commission,

NEW DELHI

23 June 1967

The separation of Indian economic and political policy: Arab/Israel.

(17a)

Many thanks for your letter of 20 June reporting Cargill's observations on the damage caused to Indian interests over food aid by their public posture on the Arab/Israel conflict at the U.N. (Cargill is, I think, a British, not American, official of the International Bank).

2. This does indeed illustrate the persistent refusal of the Indians to see their international relations as a whole. In this connexion the correspondence between Whitehead and Heptinshall in the O.D.M., in the context of the High Commissioner's letter on policy to the Secretary of State, about the extent to which we can informally try to bring home to the Indians the need for some awareness of the indivisibility of their foreign relations is of considerable relevance.

Y

3. In fact, the U.S. Government seem at the moment careful to avoid any direct confrontation with the Indians on this matter in any sense which could be construed as exercising a direct official leverage or threat. Certainly the Americans go around saying forcibly to the Indians that the climate of Congressional and public opinion is such that it will be difficult for aid to be continued on its present level if the Indians do not put their economy in order, and, in particular, control their arms expenditure. The Americans are more direct on this than ourselves but even at the discussions on arms policy which, as we have reported in Delhi Telegram No. 1309 of 22 June, are due to begin on 23 June, they still intend to hold back from a direct threat, though going nearer to the brink than ever before.

4. Moreover the American acting Minister/Counsellor told me on 21 June that the current PL 480 food aid contract which is about to be concluded with the Indians had been negotiated, contrary to Indian press reports, without any delay on Washington's part because of Indian policy at the U.N. or elsewhere, and the Americans had not sought to bring any pressure to bear at all. Delay, such as it was, was almost entirely due to bureaucratic dilatoriness on the part of the Indians themselves.

5. Nevertheless it is encouraging that Partasarathi himself should have become aware of the damage to India's relations with the U.S. which their line at the U.N. was likely to cause, and perhaps the penny will drop eventually. All our evidence

PA.

/goes

W. L. Allinson, Esq., M.V.O.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.



CONFIDENTIAL SEC 2



-2-

goes to show that it is Mrs. Gandhi herself, with a handful of personal advisers, who persists in treating foreign policy as independent of everything else, and as far as the Middle East is concerned, her blind support for Nasser bears no relationship to India's real interests either in regard to the Canal or in regard to the likely provenance of foreign aid, if the Americans are antagonized too far. As I write, Mr. Chagla seems to have shown no sign of moderating the pro-Nasser line in his U.N. speech of 22 June. But on the whole it seems better from our point of view that arguments about the need for realism in India's foreign policy should come spontaneously from Indian sources. We have had some fairly encouraging signs lately that in Parliament and Government departments such arguments are being pressed. But as stated in Delhi telegram No. 1271, there is no sign yet that Mrs. Gandhi will be moved.

6. I am sending copies of this letter to Trench in Washington, Moon in New York and Ward in Rawalpindi.


*yours ever,
J. P. Waterfield*

(J. P. Waterfield)

CONFIDENTIAL

(28)

Our ref: PL.125/561/1



British High Commission,
New Delhi.

20 June 1967

Copy to Aden 23/6/67
Newspaper 23/6/67
Waterfield

P.A

Dear Tony,

South Arabia

(23) On the morning of 19 June the High Commissioner went to see Mr. C. S. Jha, Foreign Secretary, as instructed in C.O. telegram No. 1352 of 17 June, and left with him an Aide Memoire on South Arabia, a copy of which I enclose. The High Commissioner then spoke on the lines of paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 1333 as amended by your telegram No. 1345.

(21) 2. Jha received the Aide Memoire in a friendly manner but he was evidently pre-occupied with the China crisis and did not seem to pay very much attention to what was said. He had Mehta and Jaipal in with him on the High Commissioner's arrival and brought them back in again as soon as he left. However he did ask whether the independence of South Arabia really meant the winding up of the Aden base and whether we thought that the Israel-Arabia war had in any way changed the situation in South Arabia and the Yemen. In answer to the latter question, the High Commissioner said, as authorized in C.O. telegram No. 1345, that it was too soon to say what the effects would be but it would certainly be dangerous to assume any improvement. When the High Commissioner said, in reply to Jha's former question, that this did indeed mean the winding up of the Aden base, Jha reverted to the point which he raised last year (my letter PL.126/561/1 of 12 October) that India had an interest in seeing that no potentially hostile power acquired too strong a position there. However he made the point in a perfunctory way and it seemed that his mind was on other things.

3. Jha concluded by thanking Her Majesty's Government for their courtesy in letting the Government of India have this Aide Memoire in advance of the official statement. It therefore seems that it was wise to give the Indians this advance warning although it remains to be seen whether they will take a line which is helpful to us should this issue be raised either in Parliament or in the United Nations.

4. I am sending copies of this letter with enclosure, to Ward in Rawalpindi, Balfour-Paul in Bahrain and to the High Commission in Aden and enclose an extra copy for the Foreign Office.

yours ever,

John

(J. P. Waterfield)

A. A. Duff, Esq., CMG., DSO., DSC.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.

AIDE MEMOIRE

South Arabia

The British Government will make a statement in Parliament on 19 June which is likely to contain the following elements. The U.K. High Commission are authorised to communicate this information to the Government of India in advance.

- (a) South Arabia will become independent early in January, 1968.
- (b) Her Majesty's Government cannot conclude a defence treaty with the new state, nor leave British forces in its territory.
- (c) Her Majesty's Government will be spending over £60 million in the next three years to build up the South Arabian defence forces and economy. Her Majesty's Government recognise, however, that during the first few critical months of independence the South Arabian Government would feel greatly reassured if help against external aggression were at hand. Accordingly, they are offering to station a strong naval force off South Arabia for the first six months after independence to deter any such external aggression.
- (d) Her Majesty's Government are also offering to position a force of V bombers at Masirah for the same purpose. There is, of course, no question of these bombers carrying nuclear weapons.

British High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

19 June, 1967.

INWARD CABLEGRAM

R&L
PL 21/6/

19 FROM AUSTCOM NEW DELHI 17.6.67

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Mr. [unclear] to see O.R.

P.M.
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Addressed Canberra 575, repeated Belgrade 1, Washington 12
U.N. New York 6, London 19, Ottawa 3, Paris 4 (Canberra please
repeat these posts).

India and West Asia.

While still maintaining support for U.A.R. in West Asia
situation, Indian government may follow a somewhat more cautious
policy in future due mainly to the persisting adverse political
reaction to Government's stand.

Among internal factors influencing this policy were
Congress concern about its hold on Muslim vote, and reaction of
the C.P.I.; right faction of which has been recently increasingly
securing public support from Moscow which Congress had enjoyed
until elections.

But strong adverse reaction in executive of the
Congress Parliamentary Party and general lack of enthusiasm in
parliamentary party would appear to have offset these considera-
tions.

One "dissident" estimates that opinion among Congress
M.P.'s was 60/40 against Government policy; it was only saved
from serious embarrassment at party meeting last week by Morarji
Desai (who opposed adoption of pro-Arab policy in Cabinet
Foreign Affairs Committee) telling his supporters that in
interests of party unity they must accept the policy.

In addition the press has been more critical of the
Government on this issue than almost any in recent times.

2. In past week Marko Nikzic (Emissary of President Tito)
has held series of discussions with Minister for External Affairs
and the Prime Minister on West Asia.

It is reliably reported that they have agreed that
Arabs could not be expected to negotiate directly with Israel
until Israeli aggression on their territory has been vacated.

Nikzic said at Press Conference that neither India
nor Yugoslavia could urge the Arab nations to negotiate peace
with Israel under pressure and from a position of weakness.

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19/2

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He said that there was no move at present for Afro-Asian or non-aligned initiative to deal with situation.

Both India and Yugoslavia, he said, were determined to work for a solution to the West Asian situation within framework of United Nations.

In general discussion on situation Nikzic said that much would depend on whether the U.S. and U.K. brought pressure to bear on Israel.

It is significant that in all his public statements, Nikzic pointedly refrained from mentioning or apportioning blame to France.

3. Although it has not yet been confirmed we understand that Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Chagla, will go to New York to lead Indian delegation at proposed Emergency Session of General Assembly on West Asian situation.

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High Commissioner

Deputy High Commissioner

Official Secretary

*External Affairs

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TO CTER 1263 PRIORITY

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BAG TERAN TAVIV DE OTT ANKRA BERUT CAIRO DE PARIS RPNDI DE LDN

INDIAS WEST ASIAN POLICY

GOIS WEST ASIAN POLICY HAS BEEN DISASTROUS AND A VERY LARGE SECTION OF INDIAN OPINION HAS NOT RPT NOT HESITATED TO SAY SO.

RESPONSIBLE MAJOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS, STATESMAN, TIMES OF INDIA, EXPRESS, HINDUSTAN TIMES, AND ECONOMIC TIMES, HAVE BEEN HIGHLY CRITICAL AS HAVE BEEN ALL OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES EXCEPT COMMUNISTS.

2. STARTING POINT IN RECENT PAST WAS CHAGLAS STATEMENT IN LOK SABHA MAY 25 WHEN EXTAFFS MINISTER INFORMED HOUSE THAT INDIA HAD TOLD PRESIDENT NASSER IT FULLY APPRECIATED REASONS WHY THE UAR HAD TO INSTITUTE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES AGAINST ANY ISRAELI AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS. HE ALSO, SAID GOI ADHERED TO VIEW TAKEN IN 1957 THAT GULF OF AQABA WAS IN INLAND SEA AND ENTRY TO THE GULF LAY WITHIN TERRITORIAL WATERS OF UAR AND SAUDI ARABIA; THAT GOI COULD NOT RPT NOT AGREE TO UNEFS CONTINUED PRESENCE IN UAR WITHOUT LATTERS CONSENT AND IN ANY CASE INDIAN TROOPS COULD NOT RPT NOT REMAIN PART OF ENEF WITHOUT UARS APPROVAL. HE HAD ALSO SAID IN HIS OPENING SENTENCES QUOTE THE CREATION OF ISRAEL HAS GIVEN RISE TO TENSION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ARAB COUNTRIES UNQUOTE. ON QUESTIONING MR CHAGLA SAID

Mr Lewis PL 19/VI
Req: Extract of para 7
for India. Back file 11.
Mr Duff to 5250.v.

29/6

P. A

PAGE TWO 1263 CONFD

INDIA ACCEPTED THAT EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL WAS A FACT OF LIFE BUT THAT THE TENSION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ARAB WORLD SINCE CREATION OF ISRAEL WAS ALSO FACT OF LIFE.

3. WHEN HOSTILITIES BROKE OUT IN SOME SLIGHT PART AS RESULT OF INDIA'S NEGATIVE ATTITUDE PM GANDHI PLACED BLAME ON ISRAEL WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING EXTENT OF UAR PROVOCATIONS AND, IT HAS BEEN CHARGED, INDIA IMPEDED EARLY CALL FOR CEASE FIRE BY SECURITY COUNCIL BY INSISTING UNSUCCESSFULLY ON UNREALISTIC CONDITIONS. IN A WORLD SEEMINGLY ON VERGE OF A MAJOR WAR IT ALSO SEEMED DISPROPORTIONATE THAT INDIA MADE SUCH AN ISSUE OVER THE SHOOTING OF INDIAN SOLDIERS IN UNEF AND FINALLY INDIA'S PRESENT ROLE IN SECURITY COUNCIL DOGGEDLY HARPING ON ITS FOUR POINT PROPOSAL AND FAITHFULLY SUPPORTING ALL RUSSIAN MOVES TOGETHER WITH MALI AND BULGARIA APPEARS TO BE NEITHER DIGNIFIED NOR CONSTRUCTIVE.

4. WHAT HAS BEEN GOI'S REASON FOR PERSISTING IN ITS SUPPORT OF THE ARAB WORLD? BASICALLY, IT MUST STEM FROM MRS GANDHI'S DESIRE TO CONTINUE NEHRU'S DEEP FRIENDSHIP WITH UAR AND YUGOSLAVIA AS PILLARS OF NON-ALIGNED WORLD. WHEN NASSER VISITED DELHI IN OCT/66 WITH TITO FOR TRIPARTITE MTG MRS GANDHI MUST HAVE ASSURED HIM OF INDIA'S UNFAILING SUPPORT WHICH WAS SPELLED OUT IN TRIPARTITE COMMUNIQUE QUOTE THE TWO PRESIDENTS AND THE PM FULLY SUPPORT THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN ARABS AND THEIR STRUGGLE FOR THE REALISATION OF THEIR ASPIRATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE

PAGE THREE 1263 CONFD

DECLARATION OF THE CAIRO CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

UNQUOTE.

INDIAS INSISTENCE ON THE DOCTRINE THAT ISRAEL MUST NOT RPT NOT BE ALLOWED TO ENJOY THE FRUITS OF ITS AGGRESSION IS ALSO CLOSELY RELATED TO INDIAS OWN EXPERIENCE WITH PAK IN KASHMIR AND WITH CHINA ON ITS NORTHERN BORDERS WHERE IN FACT ALLEGED AGGRESSORS ARE STILL ENJOYING THEIR FRUITS. INDIAS FAILURE TO OBTAIN UN CENSURE OF PAK AGGRESSION IN SEP 65 STILL RANKLES. EQUALLY, INDIA MUST SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLE THAT UN FORCES CANNOT RPT NOT REMAIN WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE HOST COUNTRY SINCE THIS QUESTION COULD EASILY ARISE AGAIN IN KASHMIR. INDIAN PERSISTENCE IN SUPPORTING A SHATTERED UAR MAY ALSO BE DUE NOT RPT NOT ONLY TO LOYALTY TO PAST FRIENDS BUT ALSO TO IDENTIFICATION WITH ARABS AS VICTIMS OF WESTERN IMPERIALIST POWER. ARAB DEFEAT MAY WELL EXACERBATE INFERIORITY COMPLEX OF UNDER-DEVELOPED WORLD. FINALLY INDIAS PERFORMANCE IN SECURITY COUNCIL DEMONSTRATES ITS FEAR OF TAKING AN INDEPENDENT LINE TO RUSSIA ON ANY MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE.

6. THERE ARE MANY IRONIES IN PRESENT INDIAN POSITION. JUST WHEN THEY ARE ENGAGED IN BITTER EXCHANGES WITH CHINA OVER TREATMENT OF EMB SECRETARIES IN PEKING AND EXPULSION OF CHINESE SECRETARIES HERE, CHINA IS POSING AS GREAT AND TRUE FRIEND OF UAR OFFERING WHEAT, ARMS, AND MORAL SUPPORT.

LIKEWISE PAK. SECONDLY, INDIA WILL SUFFER SEVERE ECONOMIC LOSS FROM INCREASE IN FREIGHT RATES AND DELAY OF NEEDED

PAGE FOUR 1263 CONFD

INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS AND AGGRAVATION OF FOOD SHORTAGE IN FAMINE AREA IF SUEZ CANAL REMAINS CLOSED FOR LONG AS DELIBERATE UAR POLICY. ONE WONDERS WHETHER INDIA WILL MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO NASSER OR WILL SUFFER IN SILENCE.

QUESTION OF WHETHER INDIAS WEST ASIAN POLICY WILL AFFECT USA SUPPLY OF FOOD IS MATTER OF PUBLIC CONCERN. MRS GANDHI HAS SAID THERE IS USA PRESSURE; MR DESAI HAS DENIED THIS.

7. ONE LESSON WHICH INDIA HAS DRAWN FROM RECENT WEST ASIAN CONFLICT IS THAT SMALLER COUNTRIES SHOULD NEVER COUNT ON SUPPORT FROM GREAT POWERS IN AN EMERGENCY. RUSSIA COULD NOT RPT NOT SAVE UAR FROM MILITARY DISASTER, EQUALLY INDIA MUST BE ABLE TO RELY ON ITS OWN RESOURCES IN ANY FUTURE CONFLICT WITH CHINA. AS MENTIONED IN OURTEL 1215 JUN 13, CS JHA USED THIS ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF INDIA EVENTUALLY ACQUIRING A NUCLEAR BOMB. ANOTHER IDEA WHICH HAS OCCURRED TO SOME OBSERVERS HERE IS THAT PERHAPS IF SMALLER OPPOSING POWERS, EG, ISRAEL AND UAR, BOTH POSSESSED ATOMIC BOMBS THEY WOULD NOT RPT NOT ALLOW QUARRELS TO DEVELOP INTO FULL-SCALE WAR FOR FEAR OF ATOMIC DEVASTATION OF THEIR OWN TERRITORY.

8. WHILE WE CANT RPT NOT EXPECT A REVERSAL OF INDIAS WEST ASIAN POLICY THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS THAT SEVERE CRITICISM AT HOME AND ABROAD MAY INDUCE INDIA TO PLAY LESS ACTIVE ROLE. TODAYS TIMES OF INDIA REPORTS THAT HIGH LEVEL MTG OF PM DEPUTY PM, HOME MINISTER AND EXTAFFS MINISTER YESTERDAY DISCUSSED WEST ASIAN POLICY. NEWSPAPER REPORT CONCLUDED,

PAGE FIVE 1263 CONFD

PROBABLY AUTHENTICALLY, QUOTE THE CONSENSUS HERE APPEARED TO BE GENERALLY TO ADHERE TO INDIA'S POLICY OF CHAMPIONING THE ARAB CAUSE AS BEING JUST BUT NOT RPT NOT TO TAKE ANY BIG INITIATIVE. IT WAS FELT THAT WITHOUT GIVING UP ITS OWN BASIC APPROACH IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE FOR THIS COUNTRY TO WAIT FOR THE SOVIET LEAD UNQUOTE

HICKS

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 57
19 JUN. 67



British High Commission,

NEW DELHI

13 June 1967

SET 2. Dear Gay,

ARAB/ISRAEL

Although you will be flooded with paper, you, and Speares in North and East African Department to whom I am copying this, may find some points of interest in the enclosed account by General Lunt, Defence Adviser, of a call which he made, in a personal capacity as a former officer of the Arab Legion, on the Jordanian Ambassador on 13 June.

2. I am sending a copy of this to Speares in the Foreign Office.

yours ever,

John

(J. P. Waterfield)

16/6

Mr. Lester

RE PA
PC 16/v3/

A. A. Duff, Esq., CMG DSO DSC,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.

Is this ours?
Ask Dept
I don't think
so

1. I paid an informal visit at my own request on the Jordanian Ambassador this morning. As a former officer of the Arab Legion and the holder of a Jordanian decoration I felt it proper that I should, in a purely private capacity, express my regret for the heavy casualties suffered by the Jordanian Army.
2. The Ambassador was in a highly emotional state and on several occasions almost broke down. He was fiddling for much of the time with a cheap transistor radio which he said was his only source of news, apart from the British and Indian newspapers. He told me that Jordan had been "utterly smashed" and its Army "obliterated". Refugees were flooding across ^{the} Jordan into East Jordan where conditions must be chaotic. He kept on saying that he hoped Britain would use all her influence with the United States (whom he appeared to regard as the real nigger in the woodpile) to make Israel disgorge her conquests of West Jordan.
3. He was very bitter about Nasser and repeatedly said that the closure of the Straits of Aqaba was an act of folly. He was also very critical of U Thant for complying with Nasser's demand for the removal of UNEF.
4. In true Arab fashion he put much of the blame for the disaster on the Syrians. He told me that Nasser had been worried for some time lest the Syrians might establish a Communist Government and that the Egyptians had been intriguing in Damascus for the overthrow of the present Syrian Government. When it appeared that Israel was preparing to undertake some form of large-scale raid in reprisal for Syrian infiltrations, Nasser's prestige would have suffered severely had he not taken action to demonstrate that he was prepared to come to Syria's assistance. To this extent he agreed

/with , , ,

with the Egyptian reoccupation of Sinai but he did not agree with the closure of the Straits and the removal of UNEF.

5. If the Ambassador's feelings are any guide, it seems clear that Jordan believes that the West bank is lost, unless the Americans bring pressure to bear on Israel for a withdrawal. He believes that the King's position is gravely threatened, although he says that the King could not have acted any differently than he did. Had he not thrown in his lot with Egypt there would have been a mutiny in the Army. Apparently the Army had been grumbling for some time about the King's "soft line" over Israel.

6. The Ambassador kept harping on the theme that America had tacitly encouraged the Israelis to attack and were now frustrating the attempts of the Security Council to establish a Cease-Fire, but he was incapable of arguing anything rationally.

7. At the conclusion of our interview he begged me with tears in his eyes to do all that I possibly could to ensure that Jordan's case got a fair hearing. I said that in a purely personal capacity I would naturally do my best but surely the time had come for the Arabs and Israel to reach a permanent settlement? The only man who could ensure or frustrate such a settlement was Gamal Abdul Nasser, and the kind of propaganda emanating from Cairo at the moment was not such as to suggest that he wanted a settlement. I added that every time Jordan had thrown in her lot with Egypt, disaster had followed.

2

Major-General
DEFAD

13.6.1967.

H of *Orw*
13.6.1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Duff

cc. Mr. Ellis (News Dept. C.O.)
I.R.D.
M.E.W. & U.N.D.
Eastern Dept.
N.E.A.D.

New Delhi telegram No. 1271: Arab/Israel;
the Indian Government's attitude.

2. I would recommend urgent briefing of a reliable
British journalist who could do an analysis of the
consequences for India of the present Middle East
situation.

3. The most effective form would probably be the
New Statesman if the briefing could be done in time
for Thursday's edition.

~~Mr. Duff~~
Peter Joy

J. J. Littlejohn Cook

(G. S. Littlejohn Cook)
21 June, 1967

Discussed with Mr. Joy - Indian press done
to J.L. already. Counter-productive?

PL Wk 27/6

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(24)

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY NEW DELHI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno 1271

19 June 1967



CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No.1271 of 19 June. Repeated for information to Washington, U.K. Mission New York and Saving to Paris, Moscow and Rawalpindi.

(13)

Duff's letter of 12 June.

P.A.

Arab/Israel. Indian Government's attitude.

As I have already reported, the Indians approach the Arab/Israel conflict wholly committed to Nasser. This is a long-standing commitment, based partly on sentimental piety towards the founding fathers of non-alignment, partly on the desire to win (or at least neutralise) the Arab vote in the dispute with Pakistan and partly from political consideration of the Muslin vote inside India.

2. The Arab defeat and the United Nations Debates do not so far seem to have brought home to them their glaring miscalculations before the campaign began, or made them think again about the future.

3. I therefore expect that Indian policy in public and through diplomatic channels will now be directed to implementing the slogan that "the aggressor must vacate his aggression" before any further negotiations can take place. We must accept that in the immediate future, at least, Indian policy will be in direct conflict with British interests and that no reasoned arguments by us will in the short term have any contrary effect.

4. Although it is moving into more uncertain areas of speculation, I suspect that the sudden Chinese hostility to Indian diplomats will put G.O.I. into a further ferment of anxiety about Chinese intentions, either direct, or through collusion with Pakistan. This will I judge cause them to curry favour with the Russians and thus incline to keep them pro-Nasser. Moreover I doubt if the likely degree of American pressure will have more effect than at best, making Indian diplomacy a little less obtrusive than in the past four weeks.

5. This assessment must suggest that Indian policy makers are signally reckless of their own long-term interests. So I believe they are. Foreign policy is still alarmingly isolated from domestic affairs and remains largely in the hands of Mrs. Gandhi and her closest advisers, of whom T.N. Kaul is certainly one and even Krishna Menon, with no public responsibility, may be another. Day-to-day decisions on the Arab-Israel crisis are apparently made by a Cabinet Committee consisting of Mrs. Gandhi, Mr. Chagla, Sardar Swaran Singh (Defence Minister and previously Foreign Minister) and Mr. Chavan. Of these only Mr. Chavan might be expected to take a realistic view and he is wholly uninformed about international affairs. Those in the Cabinet whose departmental interests may be adversely affected by, for example, the continued closure of the Suez Canal have probably not yet had any direct cause to press their interest or influence. All the opposition parties

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/except

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

New Delhi telegram No. 1271 to Commonwealth Office

-2-

except the Communists have been battering the Government in Parliament about the lack of realism in their policy. I have heard that many officials and service officers have grave doubts. Businessmen in Bombay are reported to hold the same opinions and the Press has been outspoken in its criticism. I understand that in Cabinet on 15 June the Deputy Prime Minister and Financial Minister Desai spoke up for neutrality but was out-voted and subsequently had to temper his views when questioned in Parliament on the Canal. A number of Congress M.P.s associated with him have also indicated their disapproval of the Government's line but this is certainly not an issue on which they would be prepared to carry such opposition to a vote against the Government. So there is no public rift yet discernible in the Congress leadership over Mrs. Gandhi's pro-Nasser line but there is a considerable body of official and private opinion which is either apathetic or opposed to it.

6. Thus, if and when the full effect of the continued closure of the Canal is felt in the budgets of Government Departments and businessmen we may just possibly see a change. The risk here is that Mrs. Gandhi might then swing the disgruntled into support for opening the Canal on Nasser's terms only and we should still have India as our direct opponent. Our hope, such as it is, lies in a realisation by India that her direct interests are best served by genuine non-partisanship and in the opening of the Canal as a prime Indian national interest.

7. I must admit that I am far from sanguine that this will happen. There are two developments which could change the situation:-

- (a) a decisive economic squeeze or threat by the United States (though this might well recoil adversely).
- (b) the realisation by a sufficient number of Congress leaders including Ministers that their economic interests are at risk to Nasser.

8. Meanwhile although I shall develop the arguments of realism and self interest as the opportunity offers, I am afraid that short of some more practical leverage than appears at present open to us our influence on Mrs. Gandhi at least, is nil and we must accept that under her present direction India is operating in direct opposition to us as regards any solution of the Arab/Israel crisis which is likely to suit our interests.

9. I must now add that the risks of an overriding crisis with China seem so great that the foregoing analysis may be overtaken by entirely new emotional influences which could force the Middle East into the background and thus reduce India's effective influence at the United Nations. This could also weaken Mr. Chagla's position.

/There

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New Delhi telegram No. 1271 to Commonwealth Office

-3-

There has already been criticism among M.P.s that he has gone to New York when his place was in Delhi.

C.O. pass Washington 86, U.K. Mission New York 22 and Saving to Paris 5 and Moscow 14.

Mr. Freeman

Sent 0820Z 19 June
Recd. 1130Z 19 June

[Repeated as requested]

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vvvvv

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(23)

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO NEW DELHI

TELNO. 1352

17 JUNE 1967 (S.ASIA)

SE 2/2

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO NEW DELHI TELNO. 1352 OF 17 JUNE AND TO RAWALPINDI
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BAHRAIN H C ADEN (PERSONAL).

(21) SOUTH ARABIA.

MY TELNO. 1345 TO NEW DELHI.

IT IS NOW PROPOSED TO REVEAL LOCATION OF V-BOMBER FORCE -
MASIRAH - IN STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT. YOU MAY THEREFORE MENTION
MASIRAH IN YOUR APPROACH ON MONDAY MORNING TO INDIAN/PAKISTANI
AUTHORITIES.

2. SUBJECT TO THIS CORRECTION PLEASE ACT AS PROPOSED IN MY TELEGRAM
UNDER REFERENCE.

CROSEC SENT 1545Z 17 JUNE

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Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno 1250 16 June 1967

SECRET



Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 1250 of 16 June
Repeated for information to Rawalpindi, Bahrain, Aden (Personal)

Your telegram No. 1333: [No. 719 to Rawalpindi of 15 June].
South Arabia.

On balance I do not think we shall lose and may gain if we inform the Indians in advance. I should like to do so, if so authorized, on Monday morning 19 June, to senior official in Ministry of External Affairs, if possible C.S. Jha, who expressed Indian Government's anxiety to me last year about the vacuum in South Arabia which would follow our departure (reported in letter to Duff on 12 October).

2. If questions are asked in Parliament it will help us if Indian Ministers were able to say we had informed them in advance.

3. I do not think Indians will connect this with B.I.O.T. but I should like to pre-empt them by saying that bombers will not, repeat not be stationed in B.I.O.T.

Commonwealth Office pass Priority to Bahrain 20, Aden (Personal) 4.

Mr. Freeman Sent 0715Z 16 June 1967
Recd 0804Z 16 June 1967
[Repeated as requested]

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ADVANCE COPIES SENT:

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Defence Dept.

F.O. Aden Dept.

Arabian Dept.

United Nations Dept.

D.D. & P.U.S.D.

P.A.

SECRET

:::::

(21)

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT.A

IMMEDIATE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO NEW DELHI

TELNO. 1345

16 JUNE 1967

(S.A.D.)

SECRET 2

SECRET

ADDRESSED DELHI TELNO 1345 OF 16 JUNE AND TO RAWALPINDI REPEATED FOR INFORMATION BAHRAIN HC ADEN PERSONAL.

SOUTH ARABIA.

WE EXPECT TO SEND YOU FURTHER TELEGRAM TOMORROW INSTRUCTING YOU TO ACT A M 19 JUNE AS PROPOSED IN MY TELNO 719 TO RAWALPINDI, SUBJECT TO THREE CORRECTIONS.

(A) WE SHALL NOT SPECIFY VULCANS BUT REFER TO V BOMBERS.

(B) WE SHALL NOT SPECIFY NUMBER BUT REFER TO A FORCE.

(C) AVAILABILITY OF BOMBERS BEYOND SIX MONTHS WOULD BE AT OUR, NOT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S DISCRETION.

(22) 2. DELHI TELNO 1250 PARA 3. WE WISH TO LEAVE ENTIRELY OPEN FOR TIME BEING QUESTION OF WHERE BOMBERS MAY BE STATIONED. REGRET THEREFORE YOU CANNOT MENTION B I O T EVEN IN REPLY TO QUESTION, THOUGH INDIANS WILL DOUBTLESS RECALL THAT THERE ARE STILL NO FACILITIES THERE. IF TACTICS CHANGE BEFORE 19 JUNE WE WILL LET YOU KNOW.

(22) 3. RAWALPINDI TELNO 634. YOU MAY SAY THAT KING FEISAL WILL WELCOME THESE MOVES IN SUPPORT OF SOUTH ARABIA AFTER INDEPENDENCE, AND THEN CONTINUE AS IN THIRD, FOURTH AND FIFTH SENTENCES OF PARA ONE OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, SUBSTITUTING QUOTE COULD RESIST UNQUOTE FOR QUOTE SHOULD BE FREE FROM UNQUOTE.

4. REFERENCE PARA 2 OF RAWALPINDI TELNO 634, YOU MAY SAY THAT THIS /IS UNILATERAL

P.A

SECRET

SECRET

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1345 TO NEW DELHI

-2-

IS UNILATERAL OFFER WHICH WE ARE SURE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL WELCOME. FOREIGN SECRETARY'S STATEMENT WILL GIVE LATEST ON NEGOTIATIONS BUT TEXT MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE BY TIME YOU ACT. IT IS TOO SOON TO SAY WHAT WILL BE EFFECT ON SOUTH ARABIA OF MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, BUT IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE DANGEROUS TO ASSUME ANY IMPROVEMENT.

CROSEC

SENT 2240Z/16 JUNE 1967

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Cypher/Cat.A.

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno. 1246 15 June, 1967.

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Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 1246
of 15 June.

Repeated for information to Rawalpindi.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 57
16 JUN. 967

Your telegram No. 1301.

Arab-Israel. Mrs. Ghandi's letter to the
Prime Minister.

SE 2/2 I do not at all dissent from your assessment of
Mrs. Ghandi's letter, which was probably a circular. (The Press
reported that she had written to the Presidents of United States,
France and Yugoslavia and to the Prime Ministers of Britain and
U.S.S.R.)

2. I wonder, however, whether a little more cutting edge
might not be very politely put on the reply. For instance,
to paragraphs 2(b) and (c) of your telegram under reference might
be added the point that our diplomatic representations before the
actual conflict in India as elsewhere correctly identified the
two triggers which were almost bound to touch off the explosion:
i.e. the removal of the UNSEF insulator and the closing of the
Gulf of Aqaba, which the Israelis had repeatedly warned was
acarus belli. When these triggers were pulled the explosion in
fact came. In other words British diplomacy at the relevant
time was concerned with the realities of avoiding war. By
implication Indian diplomacy was not. And that is regardless
of where the political predilections of the two countries may have
lain.

P.A. 3. Again, to your paragraph 2(e) might be added a reminder
that the opening and keeping open of the Canal is a major, if not
vital interest, to many Powers, including India. This objective
can be achieved only if a durable peace is achieved.

The history of recent years shows that this can be done
only if Arabs and Israelis accept rights and duties to one another.

The process of getting them to do so will not be helped
by preconceived commitments to one cause or the other but only by
patient pursuit of a negotiated settlement.

4. I attach particular significance to Mrs. Ghandi's choice
of words in the eighth, ninth and tenth sentences of her letter.
The doctrine that "the status quo should be restored" is one
which you will recall from the Kutch affair and the Indo-Pakistan
War of 1965. The Indians nurture a permanent fear that Pakistan
may strike suddenly at them, e.g. in Kashmir, and that before

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/ overwhelming

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New Delhi telegram No. 1246 to Commonwealth Office.

- 2 -

overwhelming Indian strength can be mustered to roll them back, pressure from the Great Powers will have enforced a cease-fire.

The fact that things did not turn out like this in 1965 has not removed the fear and the "vacation of aggression" to use the usual Indian jargon is a doctrine to which Indian foreign policy attaches much importance.

5. I do not suggest that Mrs. Ghandi's letter merits a long reply or that the reply should be drafted in the brusque language of this telegram. But I am anxious to bring home to her and her senior advisers that they have been guilty of the most damaging miscalculations in their reading of the Arab-Israel situation and that the miscalculations are equally glaring whatever view they choose to take of the "aspiration, the faith and the hopes of millions who live in West Asia".

Mr. Wilson's reply offers an opportunity at least to hint at these points: although I must admit that it is not (repeat not) likely to have any effect on Mrs. Ghandi's policies in the immediate future.

Mr. Freeman Sent 1310Z 15 June.
 Reed. 1403Z 15 June.

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? SE 2 b

M. Lerner

M. E. debates in
Security Council

It would I think
 be helpful to Delhi
 to have copies of them
 and up to India whatever
 is in Security Council,
 Galle will one or two of
 the main telegrams. And
 the Bandarwadi - Delhi and
 probably like 5 have copies
 to UKMIS New York
 telegram No. 1357 of 14 June

P.A.

15/6

14 JUN 1967

Scotsman

India may change view after Arab rout

From C. P. Ramachandran,
"The Scotsman" Special
Correspondent in New Delhi

After the rout of the Arab armies, India's policy of fulsome support for the United Arab Republic is very likely to be modified. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was badly mauled by the Opposition in Parliament for what many of them think a blatantly partisan attitude in favour of President Nasser.

Indian public opinion, always conditioned by Pakistan, is not at all satisfied with the explanation that Arab support for India on the Kashmir question is propaganda against Pakistan. It is pointed out that the U.A.R.'s support for India was guarded during the hostilities with China in 1962 and in the Pakistan war of 1965. There is also a certain communal satisfaction at the discomfiture of a Moslem nation.

More serious and better reasoned arguments have also been produced against the Government's policy of unrestrained backing for Arab governments in relation to Israel. The "Times of India" in a long editorial said: "In the dismal record of Indian foreign policy in recent times nothing can compare with such an exhibition of amateurishness, the only fruit of which will be to attract the world's amused contempt."

GREAT POWER RULES

The editorial went on to conclude: "As the West Asian crisis peters out, the question that surely needs to be asked is whether the country can afford to remain at the mercy of those who are obviously incapable of shaping and conducting foreign policy with intelligence and discretion."

Mrs Gandhi is being taken to task in Parliament and the Press for failing to note the cautious response of the Soviet Union to the Middle East crisis. She had enough trouble in her own party and with some Foreign Ministry officials who were against over-committing India's position. Whether they would have stuck to this opinion if the Arabs had won is a different matter.

Support for the Government's policy has come exclusively from the Communists, both pro-Peking as well as pro-Moscow. After the poor showing of the Arabs and the staid response of Russia there are some mutterings of baffled discontent from among the pro-Moscow ranks. But it is now generally recognised that the super Powers have evolved a set of rules which they will not lightly break.

ESCALATION CLAIM

Mrs Gandhi has continued to maintain that her Government are convinced that Israel escalated the war without provocation but the note of conviction in her statements is increasingly missing.

The delay in evacuating the Indian troops of the U.N. emergency force — for financial reasons, it is said — has also come in for caustic comment. Though nothing like the chagrin of President Nasser, it has certainly been an unhappy week for Mrs Gandhi. — Copyright.

S. T. Bhattacharya

14/6



P.D.

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14/6 (19)

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 57
15 JUN 1967

SE2/2

PL 31/1

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

13 June, 1967.

Dear Gony,

Middle East Crisis

In the course of a visit to drought stricken areas in Madhya Pradesh, Mrs. Gandhi made a speech on 10 June at Ambikapur during which she mentioned the Middle East. We have not been able to get hold of a verbatim record of what she said, but news agency reports quote her as saying that "the U.A.R. has been wronged". She went on to say that India stood firmly by her policy of friendship with the Arab world in general and the U.A.R. in particular, irrespective of the reverses suffered by them in the recent war. Indian friendship with the Arabs was based on sound principles; there was no need to change it now. She went on: "People say the U.A.R. never helped us when China and Pakistan attacked us. It is not correct to say that the U.A.R. has not helped India. It was President Nasser who prevented many countries from going against India". She also compared Israel with Pakistan and said that the seeds of conflict were sown with its birth. She said as in the case of Pakistan it was the Western powers who had armed Israel heavily, but she added that India did not stand for the destruction of Israel.

2. Mrs. Gandhi is also quoted as saying in the same speech "The Western powers do not appreciate our viewpoint. It is only those with identical views and common problems that will understand each other". She then said that India was receiving help from the West, but not without pressure being tried now and then. "They will of course help us if we set up a capitalist society". It is not clear from the agency reports in what context these remarks were made, but they seem a fair indication of Mrs. Gandhi's instinctive feelings.

yes.

A.A. Duff Esq., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.S.C.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.

1. Sir J. P. Bhaktan

2. Eder

14/6
14/6

14/6

P.A.

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- 2 -

4. I am sending a copy of this letter to Nigel Trench in Washington.

yours ever
John.

(J.P. WATERFIELD)

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By Bag 61110 distribution SAVING TELEGRAM

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(18)

NEW DELHI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno 26 Saving 13 June 1967

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Addressed to C.O. telegram No. 26 Saving of 13 June, 1967

Repeated for information saving to:

UKMIS, NEW YORK 8
WASHINGTON 35
TEL AVIV M45

P.R.

I called on Mrs. Gandhi on 13 June to deliver the Prime Minister's personal letter.

2. I first conveyed orally the deep sympathy of the government and people of Britain to the Indian government and people and to the families concerned over the killing and wounding of Indian soldiers in U.N.E.F. Mrs. Gandhi's demeanour was appreciative but she did not answer this by a single word.

3. I then handed her the Prime Minister's letter which she scanned through in my presence. She made no comment on it at all.

4. I then tried to draw her into some discussion of the Middle East situation, by observing that the most difficult time probably lay ahead in trying to achieve a durable settlement as opposed to an explosive cease-fire. I knew that Mr. Wilson believed that India had a significant role in this and I hoped we could work together. Mrs. Gandhi nodded. I said that H.M.G.'s views had been by no means firm when I left London, but that much work had to be done by all the interested powers both inside and outside the U.N. No doubt such a settlement would require concessions from both sides. Mrs. Gandhi replied that this would not be easy since so much new bitterness had been created. I replied that we must all try to rise above bitterness and see the realities of the situation for the first time and before it was too late. For instance, one of the realities was the free passage of innocent shipping through the international waterways, not only Aquaba, but Suez which directly concerned India. Mrs. Gandhi said: Yes, Suez did concern India.

5. Finally I hoped that no credence was attached in India to the monstrous allegation that British aircraft had in any way supported military action by Israel. Mrs. Gandhi said that she accepted that they did not take part but quote they were standing by in support. That is what these people (sic) say unquote. I replied that I did not see how aircraft carriers in dock over a thousand miles away could be described as standing by in support and that I must strongly repudiate the suggestion which was simply not true. Mrs. Gandhi then said quote I was not really referring to the British but to the American ships unquote. I said that it was not for me to enter an argument about American actions, but I had no doubt at all that this allegation was equally untrue.

6. Mrs. Gandhi, who throughout 10 minutes of quote conversation unquote had, apart from greeting me quite cordially on my arrival, uttered no word that I have not reported above, made it very clear that she had no wish to continue talking. So I took my leave with the best grace I could muster.

17.

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New Delhi telegram No.26 Saving to Commonwealth Office.

-2-

7. Those who know Mrs. Gandhi personally will not be too much surprised at the course of this discouraging conversation. She has recurring bouts of apparent depression when she appears unable or unwilling to communicate. This was the worst I have known. Perhaps she was brooding on the follies of previous Indian policy.

Mr. Freeman

Recd 14 June

[Copies sent to No.10 Downing Street]

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Copy to Eastern Day
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BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

(17)

9 June, 1967



PL 31/1

Dear Lee,

Middle East Crisis

(NR) In my letter, PL 31/1 of 2 June, I reported the reactions in Delhi to the Middle East Crisis and the opposition both in press and Parliament which had been aroused by the Indian Government's policy.

2. In public meetings and seminars the opposition have been keeping up their pressure on the Government. However, not all the opponents of the Government's policy were in the opposition parties, and we have been interested to discover that the half dozen Congress MPs with whom we have been able to discuss "Western Asia" were all far from happy with the party line. It was not therefore a surprise to us to learn that the Government's policy was quite seriously challenged at a meeting of the Congress Parliamentary Party on 5 June. The Deputy Leader of the party, Mr. Hanumanthana, was strongly of the view that India, while maintaining friendly relations with the Arabs, should observe complete neutrality in the present crisis. This view was supported by a number of influential MPs including Mr. Venkatasubbaiah (General Secretary of the Parliamentary Party), Mrs. Sinha and Mrs. Sharda Mukerjee (who are both senior members of the Executive Committee). Most of these critics of the Government's line are associates of Mr. Morarji Desai, and although Mr. Desai has not played any part in this debate, it is generally, and credibly, believed that he too has reservations about the Government's pro-Arab stand.

3. After the outbreak of hostilities, on the morning of 6 June, in an attempt to pre-empt opposition to the statement she was about to make to Parliament on the Middle East, the Prime Minister called a meeting of party leaders, whom she infuriated by suggesting that "in this hour of crisis" they should support the Government. The non-Congress opposition leaders made it clear that they had no intention of giving the Prime Minister a blank cheque to back the Arabs. Mrs. Gandhi's statement was in consequence delayed and, it is believed, modified.

P.A.

4. In her statement, which was eventually made on the afternoon of the 6 June, (summarized in our telegram no. 1172) Mrs. Gandhi said that Israel was responsible for escalating the situation into a war, and made much play with the casualties which Israeli forces had caused to the Indian

/element

W.L. Allinson, Esq., M.V.O.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



... element of the U.N.E.F. I enclose the full text of the statement. The Communists supported the Government's line on this issue but the non-Congress opposition made a concerted attack on the Government in which on this occasion the D.M.K. also participated. The opposition claimed that India was abandoning its policy of non-alignment in favour of one of total support for the Arabs which would throw away any chance which India might have of playing a peace-keeping role. Mrs. Gandhi made a poor showing in reply to the opposition attacks but on the following day she made another virtually identical statement to the Rajya Sabha which met with similar criticism from the non-Communist opposition. On 8 June the Middle East crisis was again raised in the Lok Sabha. Foreign Minister Chagla had little new to say to the House except to announce that the Government of India had lodged a strong protest with the Government of Israel over Indian casualties. The protest was apparently handed over by the Indian Ambassador in Moscow to his Israeli colleague. The non-Communist opposition then launched another attack on the Government's policy in which Mr. Sondhi of the Jana Sangh asked acidly when the Government intended to stop acting like a 14th Arab state. There followed a verbal clash between speakers of the Jana Sangh and the Communists in which passions ran high. Eventually the Speaker, who found himself unable to control the uproar, adjourned the House.

5. We have been interested to learn from the Pakistan High Commission here, who are in a good position to know, that whilst the Indian Government has been widely accused in both press and Parliament for being too pro-Arab, they have also earned the displeasure of the U.A.R. Embassy here for not giving sufficient support to the Arabs in their time of need.

6. The latest development has been that on 8 June the Ministry of External Affairs took the unusual step of summoning the Israeli Consul General, who is normally resident in Bombay, in order to present him with an aide memoire demanding that the "barbarous attacks on the Indian personnel of the U.N. Emergency Force should cease forthwith".

7. Meanwhile, with the exception of the fellow-travelling "Patriot" which is clearly experiencing a dark night of the soul at the humiliation of the U.A.R., Indian newspapers have continued to be critical of the Government's Middle East policy. The "Hindustan Times" of 8 June said that "Mrs. Gandhi's condemnation of Israel for escalating the war, without taking other factors into account, is one-sided". Whilst on the same day the "Times of India" had a long editorial headed "Shameful" which contained a bitter attack on the Indian Government's policy. The "Times" said "in the dismal record of Indian foreign policy in recent times nothing can compare with such an exhibition of amateurishness, the only effect of which will be to attract the world's amused contempt". I enclose a full text of this editorial which contains by far the most detailed and comprehensive criticism of the Indian Government's actions which has so far been published.

8. I am sending copies of this letter, with enclosures, to the Chanceries at Washington, New York and Rawalpindi, and enclose an extra copy for the Foreign Office.

Yours ever

Freely

(D. SLATER)

PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

"2.1"

LOK SABHA

WEST ASIAN SITUATION

P.M.'s STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT

New Delhi, Jyaistha 16, 1889
June 6, 1967

Following is the text of the statement made by the Prime Minister, Shrimati Indira Gandhi, in the Lok Sabha today:

Nearly two weeks ago, my colleague, the Minister of External Affairs, made a statement in this House giving Government's assessment of the explosive situation in West Asia and expressing our deep concern at the developments that were taking place there.

Since then, our efforts in the Security Council as well as outside have been concentrated on counselling moderation and lessening of tension and preservation of peace in that area. Our representative in the Security Council in consultation with the non-permanent members of the Council and others made earnest endeavours to formulate a resolution which might be acceptable to the Council. The resolution aimed at supporting the Secretary General's recommendations contained in his reports to the Council and earnestly appealing to all parties concerned to exercise restraint in order to avoid actions which might aggravate tension. Our Representative met with favourable response and it was hoped that in the next meeting of the Security Council.....

Council, significant progress would be made in this regard.

While these efforts were still continuing, news came yesterday morning of an outbreak of hostilities between Israel and the U.A.R. and other Arab countries.

The Secretary General of the United Nations made a report to the Emergency Meeting of the Security Council yesterday, in which he gave an account of various reports by the UNEF Commander and the U.N. Observers on the U.N. Truce Supervision Organisation and the Mixed Armistice Commissions, of attacks by Israeli aircraft on U.A.R. and Syrian territory.

I do not wish to utter harsh words or use strong language. But on the basis of information available there can be no doubt that Israel has escalated the situation into an armed conflict, which has now acquired the proportions of a full scale war.

The world today faces a disastrous war in West Asia. The armed forces of Israel and those of U.A.R. and other Arab countries are locked in combat, and the situation becomes graver by the hour. If not stopped, this war is likely to expand into a much wider one, drawing into its vortex other countries and developing perhaps into a world war. World peace is in grave peril. Our own national interests are bound up with peace and stability in West Asia. I do not need to expand on this or to describe the horrors and consequences of such a war in West Asia. It is our solemn

duty.....

duty as a Government as also that of the Hon'ble Members of Parliament to help in the restoration of peace in the present perilous situation. It is the bounden duty of all countries, large and small, to work towards this end.

In the Security Council we are making earnest efforts for a cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed forces to the positions they occupied on June 4th. We shall persevere in these efforts.

Hon'ble Members have no doubt learnt with deep resentment of the wanton Israel artillery attack and subsequent strafings by Israel aircraft resulting in the death and injury of a number of personnel of the Indian UNEF contingent in Gaza. These attacks were deliberate and without provocation in spite of clear and unmistakable UN markings and identification of our contingent.

I have addressed a message to the Secretary General of the United Nations on this subject, expressing our grief and indignation at these incidents and I have asked for effective steps to be taken to ensure their

safety and early evacuation from the area of hostilities. Five of our soldiers have died and several have been wounded. There can be no justification for Israel armed forces to have attacked our forces, whose whereabouts, identification markings and intention to withdraw were clearly known to the Israeli authorities.

Government will naturally give adequate compensation to the families of five soldiers who have lost their lives, and we shall make sure that the amount is not less than what they would have received had these men lost their lives in active combat. Meanwhile, I am sending a sum of Rs.25,000, i.e. Rs.5,000 per family, by way of immediate assistance to the bereaved families from the Prime Minister's National Relief Fund.

I am sure the House will unreservedly condemn this cowardly attack on our men, who have been sentinels of peace in West Asia. The Secretary General has lodged a strong protest with the Israel Government. I should like, on behalf of the whole House, to convey our deep sympathies and condolences to the bereaved families of our soldiers who have gallantly laid down their lives in the service of humanity and in the cause of peace.

NS:SPK

PRM

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SHAMEFUL

If the motives that have impelled the Arab powers and Israel to behave in the way they have done are reasonably clear the same cannot be said of the strange caperings and postures New Delhi has adopted on the West Asian crisis. In the dismal record of Indian foreign policy in recent times nothing can compare with such an exhibition of amateurishness the only fruit of which will be to attract the world's amused contempt. Professing to be objective, to be dedicated to peace, to be constructive and to be concerned with the national interest both Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mr. Chagla have provided ample evidence of their inability or refusal to fulfil these noble intentions. It is unlikely that in any other such crisis a Power, not directly involved, has identified itself so completely—by a suspension of all its critical faculties—with the point of view of one party to the dispute. President Nasser himself could not have improved on Mr. Chagla's statement in the Lok Sabha in which Israel is in effect charged with the sin of daring to exist and in which the provocative statements of the Israeli Prime Minister are quoted without any reference to the equally provocative statements the Arab leaders have made from time to time. No evidence has been produced to support the charge that Israel alone is responsible for creating tension in the area, and while the Foreign Minister sympathises with the Arab powers in their "fears" of an Israeli attack he deliberately avoids any mention of Syrian commando raids on Israeli territory or of the openly aggressive postures the Arabs have consistently taken against Tel Aviv. As an uncritical champion of President Nasser's cause Mr. Chagla's performance cannot be bettered and it has the unique consistency of assuming that the UAR can do no wrong.

PARTIALITY

Not even the Soviet Union, whose partiality for the Arab world is dictated by global considerations, has committed itself to the irrationalities which New Delhi has cheerfully accepted without any compelling reason to do so. One can only conclude that the External Affairs Minister was under the impression that he was presiding over a court of law and that the Government of which he is a member is obliged to pass "judgment" on a crisis in which every consideration of intelligent diplomacy recommends discretion and impartiality. Mrs. Gandhi has claimed that there is no "proof" of Syria's responsibility for the commando attacks against Israel. Yet New Delhi has shown little interest in awaiting any confirmation of the many charges Cairo has brought against Tel Aviv—that Israel intended to invade Syria, that Israeli spokesmen alone were provocative, that Israel is responsible for tensions in the region and that Israel is the aggressor. Even if the Syrian commando raids are set aside for the moment it cannot be denied that the Arab States were

the first to mobilise their forces, that they insisted on the withdrawal of UNEF and that they closed the Gulf of Aqaba to free shipping. Surrounded by an unconditionally hostile Arab world, which has always considered itself in a state of war with Israel, Tel Aviv obviously had no alternative but to resort to defensive action.

INCREDIBLE

If the charge of provocation is to be levelled at anyone it must be directed against President Nasser whose pretensions to the role of a saviour of the Arab world are accompanied by an inability to play this role with any conviction. It is incredible that New Delhi has deliberately taken no note of the strident Arab calls for the extermination of the State of Israel. To accuse Israel, in this situation, of escalation is to take leave of even a pretext of rationality and justice. Whether or not UAR claims to sovereignty over the Gulf of Aqaba are finally sustained, the obligation, in peace, to maintain it as a free waterway is undeniable, as is also Cairo's right to close it in the event of war. In doing so, however, President Nasser cannot maintain that this is not an act of war which immediately justifies retaliation by Israel in its own interests. Clearly any cease-fire with a restoration of the *status quo ante* must insist on the situation as it was before President Nasser's blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. Any meaningful cease-fire should above all establish the fact that in demanding the withdrawal of UNEF and closing the Gulf of Aqaba Cairo was guilty of an act of aggression which must be vacated as part of a programme under which both the Arab and Israeli forces are obliged to withdraw to their positions before May 23.

Meanwhile it is evident that New Delhi's protestations of impartiality can only invite further ridicule in the light of the Prime Minister's confession that New Delhi's attitude has been dictated by a desire to answer Pakistani propaganda. The supposition that by cultivating the Arab world India's position in relation to Kashmir and Pakistan will be strengthened is one of those long-surviving myths the External Affairs Ministry has fostered over the years. The unacceptable implication here is that President Nasser is able to shape India's foreign policy on any issue since—in New Delhi's view—the approval of the Arab world is a predominant and decisive consideration. Meanwhile it is reassuring to note that both the United States and the Soviet Union have acted with restraint and a sense of responsibility within the framework of their respective global points of view. Washington obviously had no particular interest in intervening since Israel is quite capable of defending itself and looking after its own interests. The Soviet Union, on its part, while partial to the Arab cause, stops short of encouraging any unnecessary vendetta against the State of Israel. Since it is apparent that in any conflict the Arab States' capacity to act consistently with their belligerent gestures is strictly limited, Moscow can have no reason to oppose a cease-fire that will rescue Cairo from further humiliation.

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REALITY

The Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and to which both Washington and Moscow have subscribed is consequently an appeal that has all the force of reason and reality behind it. Not surprisingly Tel Aviv has promptly declared its willingness to respond and co-operate. In the result Arab non-co-operation in the face of so united an attitude by both the United States and the Soviet Union and the concurrence of a majority in the United Nations will isolate President Nasser and expose his pretensions as an effective leader of the Arab world. In that predicament, he will be unable to derive any comfort from New Delhi's applause or from the fact that he has never received from any other government so uncritical an endorsement of his policies—as an answer, incredible though it may seem, to propaganda from Pakistan. As things are, India's partiality for President Nasser is quite immaterial in the power game being played in the Security Council but the consequences of ineffectual and unnecessary postures by New Delhi cannot be completely evaded. Neither Washington nor Moscow will have been impressed by the pointless exhibitionism in which New Delhi has wallowed and the probability is that, despite the visit Mr. Chagla received from Arab Ambassadors in New Delhi, Cairo is not particularly grateful for a kind of Indian intervention that has not strengthened its position in the slightest degree. As the West Asian crisis peters out the question that surely needs to be asked is whether the country can afford to remain at the mercy of those who are obviously incapable of shaping and conducting foreign policy with intelligence and discretion.

CONFIDENTIAL

Commonwealth Office
London, S.W.1.

20 June 1967

Arab/Israel

Ronald Belcher had a talk with the American, Cargill, on 16 June about various economic topics. There was one point of political interest and it is this I am writing about.

2. Cargill said that he thought the Indians had behaved stupidly over food aid. The Americans had begun negotiations with them over 1½ million tons of grain from the second 3 million tons immediately after the Consortium. The Middle East crisis had broken out at the same time and over the weekend of the negotiations Washington was watching the Security Council meeting in which Partasarathi the Indian Delegate took the lead in speaking forcefully on the side of the Soviets against the U.S. Cargill had spoken to Partasarathi in New York to warn him of the damage this was doing to the negotiations about the grain and was referred to the Indian Embassy where he was shown the exchange of telegrams with Delhi. Cargill saw from the telegrams that Partasarathi had himself questioned the wisdom of his instructions but the Minister of External Affairs in Delhi had specifically and peremptorily reaffirmed them. Later when members of the Lok Sabha questioned the wisdom of Indian tactics Mrs. Gandhi had second thoughts - but all too late.

3. I am sending copies of this letter to Trench in Washington, Moon in New York and Ward in Rawalpindi.

(W.L. Allinson)

J.P. Waterfield Esq.,
New Delhi

P.D

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*Copy to Eastern Dept
in Memorandum*

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British High Commission,

NEW DELHI.

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PL 31/1

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12 JUN 1967
SEZ/2

9 June, 1967

Dear Sir.

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS: RUSSIAN REACTIONS

We have been collecting one or two indications of the reactions of the Russians here to the Arab/Israel conflict.

2. Jaipal, the Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs responsible for the Middle East, told the Head of Chancery that on 5 June, the first day of the war, several Russians who had spoken to him on the subject had expressed personal concern lest they themselves should be recalled to the Russian forces if the situation deteriorated. This may, of course, have been done deliberately by the Russians in order to underline the gravity of the situation but, in any case, these hints stopped when the United States stated that it intended to be neutral in the Arab/Israel conflict. On 6 June, General Lunt, the Defence Adviser, met his Russian opposite number at a cocktail party. The Russian asked General Lunt for his assessment of the relative capabilities of the Arab and Israeli armies and expressed deep surprise at the successes which the Israeli forces seemed to be having. On 8 June, when the fighting was virtually over and the full extent of the UAR debacle had been revealed, I spoke to a member of the Pakistani High Commission, whose information has been reliable in the past and who had just been talking to the Russian Embassy here. He said that the Russians had made no attempt to disguise their disgust at the UAR performance despite the large amounts of Russian military equipment and Russian training which they had received. One of them commented sourly that the Russians might as well have handed their equipment straight over to the Israelis and expressed considerable scepticism as to whether any further Russian military aid would be forthcoming for the UAR. It is interesting to note that the Russians were not only annoyed at the waste of their equipment but also, they said, because the UAR performance would give Russian military training and equipment a bad name and might discourage other countries from taking it, thus benefiting the Western powers.

3. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries in Washington and Moscow and enclose an extra copy for the Foreign Office.

Yours ever
S. [Signature]

(D. SLATER)

P.A.

W. L. Allinson, Esq., MVO,
South Asia Department,
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE.



British High Commission,

NEW DELHI.

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PL 31/1

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9 June, 1967

Dear Tony, [REDACTED] S E 2 / 2

ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT
REPORT ON GIFT OF INDIAN AMMUNITION TO UAR

In our telegram No. 1142 of 2 June (not to Bombay) we reported what Arthur Wooller had learned in Bombay about a shipment of ammunition from India to the UAR.

2. We asked Wooller for any further details which he could discreetly discover. He has since telegraphed that his source has not yet returned to Bombay but that, in any case, the sailing of the ship, which was to have picked up the Indian UNEF contingent, has now been cancelled. Wooller, to whom I am sending a copy of this letter, will no doubt do his best, though with all possible discretion, to discover further details. It is still not clear to us what sort of ammunition is in question; of what relative importance is the quantity involved; or what organization or authority was shipping it.

3. As we reported in our telegram under reference, we passed on the gist of Wooller's report to the American Embassy here. This was perhaps risky but we feel it important to share with the Americans as much as we can. They were extremely interested and had no previous information about it. They have since told us that they asked T. N. Kaul about it, without of course revealing its source, but Kaul flatly denied that there was any truth in it.

4. I am also sending a copy of this letter to Trench in Washington.

yours ever
John.

(J. P. WATERFIELD)

A. A. Duff, Esq., CMG, DSO, DSC,
South Asia Department,
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE.

1. Copy N.E. P. A. P. O. S. O.
2. Enter

P.A.

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TT CAIRO DE PARIS

BAG TERAN DE OTT ANKRA DE LDN BERUT TAVIV DE PARIS

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS-INDIAN POLICY

APPARENTLY UNMOVED BY STRONG CRITICISM IN INDIA AND ABROAD OF ITS
MIDDLE EAST POLICY IN PAST FORTNIGHT GOI HAS CONTINUED TO SUPPORT
ARAB CAUSE. IN STATEMENT IN LOK SABHA ON TUE JUN 6, REPEATED VERBATIM
IN RAJYA SABHA WED DESPITE MILITARY EVENTS OF INTERVENING 24 HRS,
MRS CANDHI SAID QUOTE I DO NOT RPPT NOT WISH TO UTTER HARSH WORDS
OR USE STRONG LANGUAGE. BUT ON THE BASIS OF INFO AVAILABLE THERE
CAN BE NO RPPT NO DOUBT THAT ISRAEL HAS ESCALATED THE SITUATION
INTO AN ARMED CONFLICT WHICH HAS NOW ACQUIRED THE PROPORTIONS OF A
FULL SCALE WAR UNQUOTE. STATEMENT WENT ON TO STRESS DANGER TO WORLD
PEACE AND NEED FOR CEASEFIRE BUT ALSO DEVOTED ONE THIRD OF TEXT TO
ISRAELI ATTACK ON INDIAN PERS IN UNEF ON MUCH SAME LINE AS
PARTHARASATHY AT SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. AT END OF HER STATEMENT MRS GANDHI ASKED FOR MINUTES SILENCE AS
HONAGE TO INDIAN SOLDIERS KILLED AND DR LONIA SSP LEADER MADE
APPROPRIATE COMMENT BY ASKING SPEAKER TO NOTE THAT HE HAD OBSERVED
SILENCE IN RESPECT NOT RPPT NOT ONLY FOR THE INDIAN SOLDIERS BUT
FOR ALL SOLDIERS WHO HAD BEEN KILLED IN THE FIGHTING.

3. DURING DEBATE JANA SANGH, SWATANTRA AND DMK LEADERS WERE ALSO

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PAGE TWO 1191 CONFD

CRITICAL OF GOVT'S ANTI-ISRAEL BIAS WHILE BOTH COMMUNIST PARTIES DEFENDED ANTI-IMPERIALIST ARABS. CONSIDERABLE UPROAR WAS CAUSED WHEN MRS GANDHI SAID NON RPT NON ALIGNMENT DID NOT RPT NOT MEAN UNTHINKING NEUTRALITY AND THAT INDIA HAD MADE A MARK IN THE PAST NOT RPT NOT BY BEING CAUTIOUS AS OPPOSITION MEMBERS HAD ADVISED BUT BY STATING ITS OPINION BOLDLY AND FIRMLY. THERE WERE SHOUTS OF HUNGARY AND TIBET. OPPOSITION MEMBERS POINTED OUT THAT THE ARAB STATES HAD ADOPTED A NEUTRAL ATTITUDE DURING CHINESE AND PAK ATTACKS ON INDIA AND THAT UAR HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN HELPFUL DURING INDO-PAK CONFLICT.

4. TODAY'S TIMES OF INDIA CONTAINED A LONG EDITORIAL HEADED QUOTE SHAMEFUL UNQUOTE CRITICISING GOVT'S MIDDLE EAST POLICY. IT BEGAN QUOTE IF THE MOTIVES THAT HAVE IMPELLED THE ARAB POWERS AND ISRAEL TO BEHAVE IN THE WAY THEY HAVE DONE ARE REASONABLY CLEAR THE SAME CANNOT RPT NOT BE SAID OF THE STRANGE CAPERINGS AND POSTURES NEW DELHI HAS ADOPTED ON THE WEST ASIAN CRISIS. IN THE DISMAL RECORD OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN RECENT TIMES NOTHING CAN COMPARE WITH SUCH AN EXHIBITION OF AMATEURISHNESS THE ONLY FRUIT OF WHICH WILL BE TO ATTRACT THE WORLD'S AMUSED CONTEMPT. PROFESSING TO BE OBJECTIVE, TO BE DEDICATED TO PEACE, TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE AND TO BE CONCERNED WITH THE NATIONAL INTEREST BOTH MRS INDIRA GANDHI AND MR CHAGLA HAVE PROVIDED AMPLE EVIDENCE OF THEIR INABILITY OR REFUSAL TO FULFIL THESE NOBLE INTENTIONS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT IN ANY OTHER SUCH CRISIS A POWER, NOT RPT NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED, HAD IDENTIFIED ITSELF

PAGE THREE 1191 CONFD

SO COMPLETELY-BY A SUSPENSION OF ALL ITS CRITICAL FACULTIES-
WITH THE POINT OF VIEW OF ONE PARTY TO THE DISPUTE UNQUOTE.

EDITORIAL WENT ON TO CRITICISE MR CHAGLA FOR CHARGING THAT
ISRAEL ALONS IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CREATING TENSION IN THE AREA AND
SAID QUOTE AS AN UNCRITICAL CHAMPION OF PRESIDENT NASSERS CAUSE
CHAGLAS PERFORMANCE CANNOT RPT NOT BE BETTERED AND IT HAS THE
UNIQUE CONSISTENCY OF ASSUMING THAT THE UAR CAN DO NO RPT NO WRONG
UNQUOTE.EDITORIAL QUESTIONED GOIS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT CHARGES
AGAINST ISRAEL WITHOUT ANY EXAMINATION OF EVIDENCE AND STATED
QUOTE EVEN IF THE SYRIAN COMMANDO RAIDS ARE SET ASIDE FOR THE
MOMENT IT CANNOT RPT NOT BE DENIED THAT THE ARAB STATES WERE THE
FIRST TO MOBILISE THEIR FORCES, THAT THEY INSISTED ON THE WITHDRAWAL
OF THE UNEF AND THAT THEY CLOSED THE GULF OF AQABA TO FREE SHIPPING.
SURROUNDED BY AN UNCONDITIONALLY HOSTILE ARAB WORLD, WHICH HAS
ALWAYS CONSIDERED ITSELF IN A STATE OF WAR WITH ISRAEL, TEL AVIV
OBVIOUSLY HAD NO RPT NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO RESORT TO DEFENSIVE
ACTION UNQUOTE.TIMES CONSIDERED PRES NASSER WAS MOST GUILTY OF
PROVOCATION AND THAT QUOTE ANY MEANINGFUL CEASEFIRE SHOULD ABOVE
ALL ESTABLISH THE FACT THAT IN DEMANDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF
AND CLOSING THE GULF OF AQABA CAIRO WAS GUILTY OF AN ACT OF
AGGRESSION WHICH MUST BE VACATED AS PART OF A PROGRAM UNDER WHICH
BOTH THE ARAB AND ISRAELI FORCES ARE OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW TO
THEIR POSITIONS BEFORE MAY23 UNQUOTE.

6.TIMES EDITORIAL QUESTIONED MYTH OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPT THAT BY

PAGE FOUR 1191 CONFD

CULTIVATING THE ARAB WORLD INDIAS POSITION IN RELATION TO KASHMIR AND PAK WILL BE STRENGTHENED AND PRAISED RESTRAINT AND RESPONSIBILITY OF USA AND SOVIET ACTIONS.FINALLY AFTER DESCRIBING SECURITY COUNCIL RESLN FOR CEASEFIRE AS AN APPEAL THAT HAS ALL THE FORCE OF REASON AND REALITY BEHIND IT WHICH WILL BE ACCEPTED BY MOST OF THE WORLD ISOLATING NASSER AND EXPOSING HIS PRETENTIONS AS AN EFFECTIVE LEADER OF THE ARAB WORLD,EDITORIAL CONCLUDED QUOTE NEITHER WASHDC NOR MCOW WILL HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE POINTLESS EXHIBITIONISM IN WHICH NEW DELHI HAS WALLLOWED AND THE PROBABILITY IS THAT,DESPITE THE VISIT CHAGLA RECEIVED FROM ARAB AMBASSADORS IN NEW DELHI,CAIRO IS NOT RPT NOT PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL FOR A KIND OF INDIAN INTERVENTION THAT HAS NOT RPT NOT STRENGTHENED ITS POSITION IN THE SLIGHTEST DEGREE.AS THE WEST ASIAN CRISIS PETERS OUT THE QUESTION THAT SURELY NEEDS TO BE ASKED IS WHETHER THE COUNTRY CAN AFFORD TO REMAIN AT THE MERCY OF THOSE WHO ARE OBVIOUSLY INCAPABLE OF SHAPING AND CONDUCTING FOREIGN POLICY WITH INTELLIGENCE AND DISCRETION UNQUOTE.

7.AT THIS MOMENT WITH ONLY JORDAN ACCEPTING CEASEFIRE AND BELLIGERENT STATEMENTS STILL COMING FROM CAIRO AND DAMASCUS PERHAPS WE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT ASSUME THAT WAR IN WESTASIA IS FINISHED.INDIANS ARE VERY AWARE OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WHICH WILL ARISE FROM CONTINUED BLOCKING OF SUEZ CANAL-DELAYS IN SHIPMENT OF RICE FROM UAR AND SPAIN AND OF WHEAT FROM USA AND CDA,DELAYS OF INDUSTRIAL COMPONENTS AND REW MATERIALS FROM EUROPE,INCREASE IN FREIGHT RATES AND

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PAGE FIVE 1191 CONFD

AND DISLOCATION OF PORT HANDLING BECAUSE OF IRREGULAR ARRIVALS. INDIANS ARE ALSO WONDERING WHETHER PRES JOHNSON'S DELAY IN AUTHORIZING NEXT ONE AND ONE HALF MILLION TONS WHEAT TO START ARRIVING END JUL IS CAUSED BY DISPLEASURE OVER INDIAS MIDDLE EAST POLICY. REPORTS HAVE ALSO APPEARED IN PRESS OF ANTI-INDIAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN NEW YORK. ONE CANNOT RPT NOT HELP FEELING THAT WHITE HOUSE WILL LET THEM WORDER FOR A WHILE.

8. WHILE INDEL AT SECURITY COUNCIL HAS WELCOMED CEASEFIRE WE NOTE THAT PARTHARASATHY ADDED HIS PREFERENCE FOR A RESLN WHICH WOULD LINK CEASEFIRE WITH WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARMED FORCES FROM JUN4 POSITION. IT MIGHT HELP REDEEM INDIAS POSITION IN WESTERN EYES IF GOVT COULD NOW UNEQUIVOCALLY CALL ON UAR AND SYRIA TO ACCEPT PRESENT SECURITY COUNCIL RESLNS SINCE ISRAEL HAS INDICATED WILLINGNESS BUT SO FAR THER IS NO RPT NO SIGN OF SUCH AN INDIAN MOVE.

V

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13 JUN 1967	
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CONFIDENTIAL

Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W.1.

12 June 1967

I enclose a copy of Foreign Office telegram No.1085 of 10 June to Amman which asks some pertinent questions about Soviet-Arab relations and the likely trend in Soviet policy after the recent fighting. It occurs to me that Indian views on this subject might be of interest. More important, however, are the questions of what the Indian attitude towards the new Middle East situation is likely to be, and what part the Indian Representative is likely to play in the Security Council.

2. Anything you can let us have on these topics will, I am sure, be of interest and utility here, and in New York and Washington.

(A.A. Duff)

P.A

J.P. Waterfield Esq.,
New Delhi.

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Cypher/Cat A

Immediate: Foreign Office to Amman

Tel. No. 1085 10 June 1967

Addressed to Amman telegram No. 1085 of 10 June and to Kuwait, Jeddah, Bahrain, Beirut, Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers, Rabat, repeated for information to Moscow, Washington, UKMIS New York, UKDEL NATO Paris and Tel Aviv.

Moscow telegram No. 1005 now repeated to all: Soviet intentions in the Middle East.

It is obvious that the Soviet Union is going to be very active in the next few weeks trying to demonstrate that she remains a firm and reliable friend of the Arab States despite the debacle in the war. Having failed to help the Arabs win the war she must now try to help them win the peace.

2. I should be grateful for your considered views as soon as possible on the following:

- (a) the extent to which the position of the Soviet Union in the Middle East has been damaged by the Arabs blaming their failure in the war upon Russian inability or unwillingness to help them, and also upon the shortcomings of Russian military equipment.
- (b) The extent to which Nasser's personal position is linked with the Soviet Union. Is it likely that he himself feels that he has been let down by the Soviet Union?
- (c) Is the Soviet Union likely to be able to restore her position by taking a strong anti-Israel line in the discussions over a peace settlement?

3. I would be grateful for Moscow's views on how hard the Soviet Union is likely to work to restore his strength in Egypt and image in the Arab world. Might they prefer instead to support local Communist parties?

SOSFA sent 2315Z 10 June.

CONFIDENTIAL



British High Commission,
NEW DELHI

9 June 1967

Dear Tony,

Lies about British military involvement

We have of course taken action at all levels and with all types of persons in accordance with the guidances which we have found most helpful.

2. You might like to know, in particular, that on 9 June James Lunt acted formally on Guidance tel. No. 128 with the three Indian Service Directors of Intelligence and asked them to convey to their respective Chiefs of Staff the facts of H.M.G.'s denial of British military involvement and the Jordanian acceptance that neither British nor American aeroplanes had operated over Jordan.

3. This the Indian officers undertook to do but James Lunt formed the impression that some of Nasser's mud had stuck and will continue to do so. The reason for this, James Lunt believes, which I find very interesting, is that the speed of the Israeli victory has shaken the Indian Services who find it hard to believe that the Israelis could have done it all by themselves. So we may find it hard to nail the "collusion" lie.

4. You might be amused by the enclosed front page of BLITZ dated 10 June which came out just as I write. The front page headline "Four reasons why Arabs will win" under the by-line of the Editor, R.K. Karajia, is particularly pleasing.

5. We had police warning this morning of a substantial demonstration to be mounted against us and the Americans tomorrow by the Indian Association for Afro-Asian solidarity, the C.P.I. (R) and the Peace Council. We took dispositions accordingly and the police have been helpful. The latest information indicates that the demonstration will not be mounted. Calcutta have reported that they expect a demonstration today.

yours ever,

John

(J. P. Waterfield)

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 57
13 JUN 1967

SEZ/2

A. A. Duff, Esq., CMG DSO DSC,
South Asia Department.

1. S. T. T. *[Signature]*
2. E. P. A. *[Signature]*

R. K. KARANJIA on war in West Asia



FOUR REASONS WHY ARABS WILL WIN

THE SPIRIT of Arab unity, solidarity and preparedness is typified by these dramatic pictures of President Nasser of the UAR locked in a fraternal embrace with King Hussein of Jordan (right) who flew to Cairo to sign a joint defence pact, and (top) 16-year-old Abdel Hamid Nasser, the UAR President's eldest son, going through his paces during rifle practice with the Futema Youth Organisation in Heliopolis.



The most wanted, most sold motor starter in India



A compact, elegant starter that offers complete protection to your motor. How? When overloading or single phasing occurs, or when supply voltage is low, this starter will trip, disconnect supply and keep your motor from burning out.

Why can't it fail? Every overload relay is accurately calibrated and individually tested; the relay is of the manual resetting type which unmistakably indicates overload.

Rugged coil: Besides being vacuum impregnated and baked, the LT-LK coil undergoes a 4000 volts impulse test that no other starter coil undergoes.

The only Indian starter that has competed successfully in the markets of Europe.

LT-LK
SWITCHGEAR DIVISION
LARSEN & TOUBRO
LIMITED

FROM THE MOMENT IT WAS ANNOUNCED last week-end that the Israeli Hitler, General Moshe Dayan, had been appointed new War Minister of Israel I knew war was about to start. I have now begun to write this despatch minutes after the news of the Israeli attack early on Monday morning.

This is a mad and desperate aggressive act by a small power-hungry government that would not have dared do it without very substantial encouragement from its backers, Britain and America.

Israel accuses the UAR of firing the first shot, and the UAR accuses Israel, but the Israeli Government has been boasting quite openly what it intends to do.

The contrast

General Dayan, the exhibitionist with the black eyepatch — which he wears only for effect and does not seem really to need as photos show him with a slit in the middle of the patch for him to see through — was careful enough after his appointment to talk about "diplomatic means", but he also said Israel did not want others to fight for her. She would fight alone.

President Nasser by contrast has not only declared he does not want to destroy the Jewish people, only the Israeli Government. There are also several very good reasons why it is not in his interests to start a war. The simple fact is that he has already won a decisive moral victory in this confrontation, a victory that can be summed up under four main headings:

1 CONTRARY to Western and Israeli calculations, the UAR Government was able to achieve almost overnight the unity of all Arab nations.

The new mutual assistance treaties with Jordan and Iraq, the healing of the rift with Palestine nationalist leaders, the joining in a single National Liberation Force of the two wings of the Yemeni anti-royal and anti-imperialist movement, and the support of even royalist leaders — the loyalty to Arab interests of King Hussein of Jordan and King Feisal of Saudi Arabia, both of whom only recently were being wined and dined by British royalty — all this came as an unexpected shock to Israel and Britain in particular, as it meant just what they feared most, the consolidation of Arab unity. This is certainly the most important of the Arab gains.

2 NEXT was the full moral and political support of the Soviet Union as explicitly stated by Premier Kosygin.

3 IN SPITE of the reluctance of some non-aligned countries to annoy the Western Powers, the whole Afro-Asian world in the United Nations closed up in solidarity with the Arab world.

4 FINALLY, President Nasser's unequivocal claim to the Straits of Tiran as an inland water of the UAR, a claim supported by many international legal experts, including India's Foreign Minister Chagla speaking on behalf of the Indian Government, and refuting Western attempts to get it accepted as an international waterway by the United Nations, completely torpedoed the carefully built up Western case and called their bluff of having International Law on their side.

Bound to win

Of course, no one can be so foolhardy as to try to predict how the mad Israeli act of aggression will end, or how far it will spread or how long it could last, but no matter what the cost, the four factors listed are the reasons why I say without hesitation that Arab unity is bound to win in the end.

I feel sure, also, that the fair treatment given to Jews in the UAR in contrast with the way in which the Israeli Government drove out the Arabs, creating a

PAGE 3

Durgagiri runs amok: 5

FREE...FRANK...FEARLESS...FIRST
BLITZ

Indo-Arab unity

Quite in keeping with the cowardly and perfidious aggression against the United Arab Republic has been Israeli's wanton and wicked attack on the withdrawing contingents of the United Nations Emergency Force. Five Indian soldiers have been killed and several injured by Israeli planes strafing the Indian convoy, clearly painted white and bearing UN markings.

This dastardly and diabolic action makes our blood boil with rage; and not all the waters of the Seven Seas can ever wash the blood stains off the hands of these murderers. It is as though the Zionists are emulating the methods of Adolf Hitler and his grisly gang. The fate that overtook the neurotic Fuehrer cannot entirely be unknown to his puny imitators in Tel Aviv; and if they want to go down the Gadarene slope to their final doom and destruction, none will stand in their way.

It is a curious coincidence that a day before this barbarous outrage, Israel's apologists in India should have tried to foul their own motherland. The General Secretary of the Swatantra Party, who is more pro-American than even Lyndon Johnson, accused the Government of acting as a "chaprasi" of the United Arab Republic.

Masani evidently believes in the old dictum of the politician that in the absence of any argument to resort to abuse; and if he had his way, India would long ago have become the "khansamah" of the western powers.

Masani feels no country has a right to block an international waterway; and he paints a gruesome picture of what would happen to India if the Suez were to be closed to international traffic.

The same logic is used by the President of Jan Sangh. But Balraj Madhok must inject his communal poison even into this essentially humane question. All the Arab countries had supported Pakistan and, therefore, they could have no claim on our moral support. Evidently Madhok believes in perpetual enmity among nations.

How is it that the leaders of these two leading parties of Right Reaction should almost have anticipated the moves and arguments of Israel? Does it not show that the Washington lobby in India is working overtime? It was significant that the Chairman of the Swatantra should have repeated its offer to the Congress to form a democratic coalition government at the centre, keeping the communists out. This has precisely been the theme of Rajaji ever since the general election. The very material eat is out of the democratic handbag flaunted by vested interests for quite a long time.

The idea is to bring about a coalition of all the reactionary groups in the country and isolate the progressive forces. These reactionaries have forgotten the old saying that "politics ends at the water's edge." They are not ashamed to utilise the grim war unleashed by Israel for their own petty purposes.

It is trite but true that out of evil cometh good. Faced with the perfidy of Israel, the Arab nations are united as never before in their long and chequered history. If they can keep up this unity, not all the Imperialists can get a foothold in the Arab homeland. This is precisely the time to strengthen the bonds of Indo-Arab friendship. Let India extend its complete support to the United Arab Republic; it will bring the dawn of a new era in Asia.

BOUQUETS & BRICKBATS

Stop this waste

Mr. P. K. Sawant,
Food Minister, Maharashtra,
Sachivalaya,
BOMBAY.

SIR: While the government is cutting down rations and permitting steep rises in the prices of essential food stuffs, nothing has been done to stop the colossal waste every day in the city's posh hotels.

There are several restaurants in the city which serve only full plates of any dish and the quantity is so much that about half of it is wasted by the diner.

A friend of BLITZ has pointed out that even when he requested the waiter in a certain hotel to take away a portion of the dish he was served, though he was prepared to pay the price of the full dish, the waiter refused to oblige and much against his conscience he was compelled to waste half the food.

Again, while children today have to go without a teaspoonful of sugar in their meagre milk ration, the sweetmeat shop counters groan under piles and piles of delicacies which only the very rich can indulge in.

The situation in Bombay today is reminiscent of the times in France when Marie Antoinette asked the people to eat cakes if they could not get bread.

—VOX POPULI,

Blot

Mr. P. G. Kher,
Urban Development Minister,
Maharashtra,
Sachivalaya,
BOMBAY.

SIR: The BEST is pressing you to allow them to complete the sub-station on the Oval Maidan. We call upon you not only not to give in to BEST's demand but to tear down the ugly half-completed structure. Once again BLITZ warns that it will not allow any encroachment whatsoever on the few remaining open spaces in the city.


—VOX POPULI.

Remedy

Mr. Morarji Desai,
Union Finance Minister,
NEW DELHI.

MORARJIBHAI: Regarding your offer of award to authors of a plan to prevent smuggling is superfluous. Here with we submit our plan free gratis and for nothing. Shoot the smugglers who are caught.

—VOX POPULI.



All YOUR Answers

War on United Nations

N. S. KOTIAN (Bombay): Why did Israel planes attack the UN contingent even while it was withdrawing from the Gaza strip, killing eight Indians?

The whole sequence of events in the West Asian crisis points to the fact that Israel is not only fighting the Arabs on behalf of its Western paymasters, but is also fighting the UN which has, of recent times, completely repudiated Western policies. It is significant that even before Israel opened hostilities against the Arabs, its air force tried to force down the UNEF plane carrying General Rikhye even though it was flying over Arab territory.

G. SUNIL PETER (Nizamabad): Why do young girls like old uncles?

While parents do their duty by giving them bread and butter, uncles give them jam.

C. P. MALGI (Hubli): Women are more attached to Swamis, than men. Why?

Brains are not the strong point!

S. S. AHLUWALIA (Rander): What should one prefer a kiss or miss?

Kiss-miss!

JOHN BOB (Hyderabad): How you are awarding prizes? For the best question or for the best answer?

You don't get the prize—so now you know.

ATHANIKAR (Bijapur): Who is wiser, a questioner or an answerer?

To be wise, why do you ask?

K. V. PRABHAKAR (Hyderabad): Is there any competition for Mrs. World also?

Every Mrs. has already won the competition.

AZHAR PARWAZ (Nizamabad): What is common between you and me?

BLITZ

DEV P. RAJ (Bhimavaram): God made woman to temper man. Man is brute without woman. Comment.

With her he is a worm!

AZHAR PARWAZ (Nizamabad): What will be outcome of 5,000 marriages which took place in Patna within a week?

You will know within a year!

R. NAGRAJ (Bombay): Is marriage a self service cafeteria?

It is indentured labour!

T. V. G. KRISHNA RAO (Ajmer): What is the relationship between R. K. Karanji and B. K. Karanji?

They are brother editors.

VISHNU GULLABAUDI (Gulbarga): What should I do if a girl stares at me?

Wink!

R. YADAGIRI (Hyderabad): Can man enjoy talking to a woman?

If he is deaf!

K. B. KOMAR (Poona): How long a questioner has to wait to see the answer in the BLITZ?

Now or never!

R. B. GOOPTA (Jhargram): Does anything really happen by chance?

You were born, were'nt you?

MOHAN R. BHAT (Sangli): Everybody makes fun of my baldness. Help please.

Put on a bald front!

P. M. LAVINGIA (Surendranagar): How much is the Voltage of a woman?

Her voltage depends on her AGE.

P. PRAVIN (Chausad): How many copies of BLITZ printed every week?

Over 32,250 copies every week.

K. N. NAIDU (Bombay): Have you any question to ask?

Why do you ask silly question?

D. K. SANYAL (Halishahar): What is the full name of EMS Namboodiripad?

Elankulath Manakkal Shankaran Namboodiripad.

N. V. S. N. MURTY (Berhampur): Every man is architect of his own fortune. What about woman?

The contractor!

D. KRISHNA (Hyderabad): What is the secret of tight dresses?

They reveal all secrets.

● This week's prize goes to N. S. Kotian (Bombay).



Boring has started on the Malabar Hill tunnel project?

That's right, Son.

Or is it into the Municipal funds?

I don't know, Son.

And, Daddy?

Go on, Son?

Limaye called Indira a dumb doll?

Yes, Son?

Because she is not a ventriloquist's dummy?

I don't know, Son.

GUILT

Guilty men who suffer from
The blood of Jews upon their hands,
Now give their victims gun and bomb
To shift the guilt to Jewish hands.

—SCORPIO.

(11)

British High Commission,

NEW DELHI.

CONFIDENTIAL
PL 31/1

9 June, 1967

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS: RUSSIAN REACTIONS

We have been collecting one or two indications of the reactions of the Russians here to the Arab/Israel conflict.

2. Jaipal, the Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs responsible for the Middle East, told the Head of Chancery that on 5 June, the first day of the war, several Russians who had spoken to him on the subject had expressed personal concern lest they themselves should be recalled to the Russian forces if the situation deteriorated. This may, of course, have been done deliberately by the Russians in order to underline the gravity of the situation but, in any case, these hints stopped when the United States stated that it intended to be neutral in the Arab/Israel conflict. On 6 June, General Lunt, the Defence Adviser, met his Russian opposite number at a cocktail party. The Russian asked General Lunt for his assessment of the relative capabilities of the Arab and Israeli armies and expressed deep surprise at the successes which the Israeli forces seemed to be having. On 8 June, when the fighting was virtually over and the full extent of the UAR debacle had been revealed, I spoke to a member of the Pakistani High Commission, whose information has been reliable in the past and who had just been talking to the Russian Embassy here. He said that the Russians had made no attempt to disguise their disgust at the UAR performance despite the large amounts of Russian military equipment and Russian training which they had received. One of them commented sourly that the Russians might as well have handed their equipment straight over to the Israelis and expressed considerable scepticism as to whether any further Russian military aid would be forthcoming for the UAR. It is interesting to note that the Russians were not only annoyed at the waste of their equipment but also, they said, because the UAR performance would give Russian military training and equipment a bad name and might discourage other countries from taking it, thus benefiting the Western powers.

3. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries in Washington and Moscow and enclose an extra copy for the Foreign Office.

(D. SLATER)

PA

W. L. Allinson, Esq., MVO,
South Asia Department,
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE.

CONFIDENTIAL

PL 31/1



RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 57
21 JUN 1967
SE2 2

*With the Compliments
of the
British High Commissioner*

(D. SLATER)

PA
PL 21/VI/1

Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi-21.

9 June, 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

PL 31/1

9 June, 1967.

Middle East Crisis

In my letter, PL 31/1 of 2 June, I reported the reactions in Delhi to the Middle East Crisis and the opposition both in press and Parliament which had been aroused by the Indian Government's policy.

2. In public meetings and seminars the opposition have been keeping up their pressure on the Government. However, not all the opponents of the Government's policy were in the opposition parties, and we have been interested to discover that the half dozen Congress MPs with whom we have been able to discuss "Western Asia" were all far from happy with the party line. It was not therefore a surprise to us to learn that the Government's policy was quite seriously challenged at a meeting of the Congress Parliamentary Party on 5 June. The Deputy Leader of the party, Mr. Hanumanthana, was strongly of the view that India, while maintaining friendly relations with the Arabs, should observe complete neutrality in the present crisis. This view was supported by a number of influential MPs including Mr. Venkatasubbaiah (General Secretary of the Parliamentary Party), Mrs. Sinha and Mrs. Sharda Mukerjee (who are both senior members of the Executive Committee). Most of these critics of the Government's line are associates of Mr. Morarji Desai, and although Mr. Desai has not played any part in this debate, it is generally, and credibly, believed that he too has reservations about the Government's pro-Arab stand.

3. After the outbreak of hostilities, on the morning of 6 June, in an attempt to pre-empt opposition to the statement she was about to make to Parliament on the Middle East, the Prime Minister called a meeting of party leaders, whom she infuriated by suggesting that "in this hour of crisis" they should support the Government. The non-Congress opposition leaders made it clear that they had no intention of giving the Prime Minister a blank cheque to back the Arabs. Mrs. Gandhi's statement was in consequence delayed and, it is believed, modified.

4. In her statement, which was eventually made on the afternoon of the 6 June, (summarized in our telegram no. 1172) Mrs. Gandhi said that Israel was responsible for escalating the situation into a war, and made much play with the casualties which Israeli forces had caused to the Indian

/element

W.L. Allinson, Esq., M.V.O.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.

... element of the U.N.E.F. I enclose the full text of the statement. The Communists supported the Government's line on this issue but the non-~~Communist~~ opposition made a concerted attack on the Government in which on this occasion the D.M.K. also participated. The opposition claimed that India was abandoning its policy of non-alignment in favour of one of total support for the Arabs which would throw away any chance which India might have of playing a peace-keeping role. Mrs. Gandhi made a poor showing in reply to the opposition attacks but on the following day she made another virtually identical statement to the Rajya Sabha which met with similar criticism from the non-Communist opposition. On 8 June the Middle East crisis was again raised in the Lok Sabha. Foreign Minister Chagla had little new to say to the House except to announce that the Government of India had lodged a strong protest with the Government of Israel over Indian casualties. The protest was apparently handed over by the Indian Ambassador in Moscow to his Israeli colleague. The non-Communist opposition then launched another attack on the Government's policy in which Mr. Sondhi of the Jana Sangh asked acidly when the Government intended to stop acting like a 14th Arab state. There followed a verbal clash between speakers of the Jana Sangh and the Communists in which passions ran high. Eventually the Speaker, who found himself unable to control the uproar, adjourned the House.

5. We have been interested to learn from the Pakistan High Commission here, who are in a good position to know, that whilst the Indian Government has been widely accused in both press and Parliament for being too pro-Arab, they have also earned the displeasure of the U.A.R. Embassy here for not giving sufficient support to the Arabs in their time of need.

6. The latest development has been that on 8 June the Ministry of External Affairs took the unusual step of summoning the Israeli Consul General, who is normally resident in Bombay, in order to present him with an aide memoire demanding that the "barbarous attacks on the Indian personnel of the U.N. Emergency Force should cease forthwith".

7. Meanwhile, with the exception of the fellow-travelling "Patriot" which is clearly experiencing a dark night of the soul at the humiliation of the U.A.R., Indian newspapers have continued to be critical of the Government's Middle East policy. The "Hindustan Times" of 8 June said that "Mrs. Gandhi's condemnation of Israel for escalating the war, without taking other factors into account, is one-sided". Whilst on the same day the "Times of India" had a long editorial headed "Shameful" which contained a bitter attack on the Indian Government's policy. The "Times" said "in the dismal record of Indian foreign policy in recent times nothing can compare with such an exhibition of amateurishness, the only effect of which will be to attract the world's amused contempt". I enclose a full text of this editorial which contains by far the most detailed and comprehensive criticism of the Indian Government's actions which has so far been published.

8. I am sending copies of this letter, with enclosures, to the Chanceries at Washington, New York and Rawalpindi, and enclose an extra copy for the Foreign Office.

(D. SLATER)

W 112

PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

"2.1"

LOK SABHA

WEST ASIAN SITUATION

P.M.'s STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT

New Delhi, Jyaistha 16, 1889
June 6, 1967

Following is the text of the statement made by the Prime Minister, Shrimati Indira Gandhi, in the Lok Sabha today:

Nearly two weeks ago, my colleague, the Minister of External Affairs, made a statement in this House giving Government's assessment of the explosive situation in West Asia and expressing our deep concern at the developments that were taking place there.

Since then, our efforts in the Security Council as well as outside have been concentrated on counselling moderation and lessening of tension and preservation of peace in that area. Our representative in the Security Council in consultation with the non-permanent members of the Council and others made earnest endeavours to formulate a resolution which might be acceptable to the Council. The resolution aimed at supporting the Secretary General's recommendations contained in his reports to the Council and earnestly appealing to all parties concerned to exercise restraint in order to avoid actions which might aggravate tension. Our Representative met with favourable response and it was hoped that in the next meeting of the Security Council.....

Council, significant progress would be made in this regard.

While these efforts were still continuing, news came yesterday morning of an outbreak of hostilities between Israel and the U.A.R. and other Arab countries.

The Secretary General of the United Nations made a report to the Emergency Meeting of the Security Council yesterday, in which he gave an account of various reports by the UNEF Commander and the U.N. Observers on the U.N. Truce Supervision Organisation and the Mixed Armistice Commissions, of attacks by Israeli aircraft on U.A.R. and Syrian territory.

I do not wish to utter harsh words or use strong language. But on the basis of information available there can be no doubt that Israel has escalated the situation into an armed conflict, which has now acquired the proportions of a full scale war.

The world today faces a disastrous war in West Asia. The armed forces of Israel and those of U.A.R. and other Arab countries are locked in combat, and the situation becomes graver by the hour. If not stopped, this war is likely to expand into a much wider one, drawing into its vortex other countries and developing perhaps into a world war. World peace is in grave peril. Our own national interests are bound up with peace and stability in West Asia. I do not need to expand on this or to describe the horrors and consequences of such a war in West Asia. It is our solemn duty.....

duty as a Government as also that of the Hon'ble Members of Parliament to help in the restoration of peace in the present perilous situation. It is the bounden duty of all countries, large and small, to work towards this end.

In the Security Council we are making earnest efforts for a cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed forces to the positions they occupied on June 4th. We shall persevere in these efforts.

Hon'ble Members have no doubt learnt with deep resentment of the wanton Israel artillery attack and subsequent strafings by Israel aircraft resulting in the death and injury of a number of personnel of the Indian UNEF contingent in Gaza. These attacks were deliberate and without provocation in spite of clear and unmistakable UN markings and identification of our contingent.

I have addressed a message to the Secretary General of the United Nations on this subject, expressing our grief and indignation at these incidents and I have asked for effective steps to be taken to ensure their

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safety and early evacuation from the area of hostilities. Five of our soldiers have died and several have been wounded. There can be no justification for Israel armed forces to have attacked our forces, whose whereabouts, identification markings and intention to withdraw were clearly known to the Israeli authorities.

Government will naturally give adequate compensation to the families of five soldiers who have lost their lives, and we shall make sure that the amount is not less than what they would have received had these men lost their lives in active combat. Meanwhile, I am sending a sum of Rs.25,000, i.e. Rs.5,000 per family, by way of immediate assistance to the bereaved families from the Prime Minister's National Relief Fund.

I am sure the House will unreservedly condemn this cowardly attack on our men, who have been sentinels of peace in West Asia. The Secretary General has lodged a strong protest with the Israel Government. I should like, on behalf of the whole House, to convey our deep sympathies and condolences to the bereaved families of our soldiers who have gallantly laid down their lives in the service of humanity and in the cause of peace.

and we shall make sure that the amount is not less than

NS:SPK

PRM

128/4
I am sending a sum of Rs.25,000, i.e. Rs.5,000 per family, by way of immediate assistance to the bereaved families from the Prime Minister's National Relief Fund.

I am sure the House will unreservedly condemn this cowardly attack on our men, who have been sentinels of

- 8 JUN 1967

SHAMEFUL

If the motives that have impelled the Arab powers and Israel to behave in the way they have done are reasonably clear the same cannot be said of the strange caperings and postures New Delhi has adopted on the West Asian crisis. In the dismal record of Indian foreign policy in recent times nothing can compare with such an exhibition of amateurishness the only fruit of which will be to attract the world's amused contempt. Professing to be objective, to be dedicated to peace, to be constructive and to be concerned with the national interest both Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mr. Chagla have provided ample evidence of their inability or refusal to fulfil these noble intentions. It is unlikely that in any other such crisis a Power, not directly involved, has identified itself so completely—by a suspension of all its critical faculties—with the point of view of one party to the dispute. President Nasser himself could not have improved on Mr. Chagla's statement in the Lok Sabha in which Israel is in effect charged with the sin of daring to exist and in which the provocative statements of the Israeli Prime Minister are quoted without any reference to the equally provocative statements the Arab leaders have made from time to time. No evidence has been produced to support the charge that Israel alone is responsible for creating tension in the area, and while the Foreign Minister sympathises with the Arab powers in their "fears" of an Israeli attack he deliberately avoids any mention of Syrian commando raids on Israeli territory or of the openly aggressive postures the Arabs have consistently taken against Tel Aviv. As an uncritical champion of President Nasser's cause Mr. Chagla's performance cannot be bettered and it has the unique consistency of assuming that the UAR can do no wrong.

PARTIALITY

Not even the Soviet Union, whose partiality for the Arab world is dictated by global considerations, has committed itself to the irrationalities which New Delhi has cheerfully accepted without any compelling reason to do so. One can only conclude that the External Affairs Minister was under the impression that he was presiding over a court of law and that the Government of which he is a member is obliged to pass "judgment" on a crisis in which every consideration of intelligent diplomacy recommends discretion and impartiality. Mrs. Gandhi has claimed that there is no "proof" of Syria's responsibility for the commando attacks against Israel. Yet New Delhi has shown little interest in awaiting any confirmation of the many charges Cairo has brought against Tel Aviv—that Israel intended to invade Syria, that Israeli spokesmen alone were provocative, that Israel is responsible for tensions in the region and that Israel is the aggressor. Even if the Syrian commando raids are set aside for the moment it cannot be denied that the Arab States were

the first to mobilise their forces, that they insisted on the withdrawal of UNEF and that they closed the Gulf of Aqaba to free shipping. Surrounded by an unconditionally hostile Arab world, which has always considered itself in a state of war with Israel, Tel Aviv obviously had no alternative but to resort to defensive action.

INCREDIBLE

If the charge of provocation is to be levelled at anyone it must be directed against President Nasser whose pretensions to the role of a saviour of the Arab world are accompanied by an inability to play this role with any conviction. It is incredible that New Delhi has deliberately taken no note of the strident Arab calls for the extermination of the State of Israel. To accuse Israel, in this situation, of escalation is to take leave of even a pretext of rationality and justice. Whether or not UAR claims to sovereignty over the Gulf of Aqaba are finally sustained, the obligation, in peace, to maintain it as a free waterway is undeniable, as is also Cairo's right to close it in the event of war. In doing so, however, President Nasser cannot maintain that this is not an act of war which immediately justifies retaliation by Israel in its own interests. Clearly any cease-fire with a restoration of the *status quo ante* must insist on the situation as it was before President Nasser's blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. Any meaningful cease-fire should above all establish the fact that in demanding the withdrawal of UNEF and closing the Gulf of Aqaba Cairo was guilty of an act of aggression which must be vacated as part of a programme under which both the Arab and Israeli forces are obliged to withdraw to their positions before May 23.

Meanwhile it is evident that New Delhi's protestations of impartiality can only invite further ridicule in the light of the Prime Minister's confession that New Delhi's attitude has been dictated by a desire to answer Pakistani propaganda. The supposition that by cultivating the Arab world India's position in relation to Kashmir and Pakistan will be strengthened is one of those long-surviving myths the External Affairs Ministry has fostered over the years. The unacceptable implication here is that President Nasser is able to shape India's foreign policy on any issue since—in New Delhi's view—the approval of the Arab world is a predominant and decisive consideration. Meanwhile it is reassuring to note that both the United States and the Soviet Union have acted with restraint and a sense of responsibility within the framework of their respective global points of view. Washington obviously had no particular interest in intervening since Israel is quite capable of defending itself and looking after its own interests. The Soviet Union, on its part, while partial to the Arab cause, stops short of encouraging any unnecessary vendetta against the State of Israel. Since it is apparent that in any conflict the Arab States' capacity to act consistently with their belligerent gestures is strictly limited, Moscow can have no reason to oppose a cease-fire that will rescue Cairo from further humiliation.

REALITY

The Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and to which both Washington and Moscow have subscribed is consequently an appeal that has all the force of reason and reality behind it. Not surprisingly Tel Aviv has promptly declared its willingness to respond and co-operate. In the result Arab non-co-operation in the face of so united an attitude by both the United States and the Soviet Union and the concurrence of a majority in the United Nations will isolate President Nasser and expose his pretensions as an effective leader of the Arab world. In that predicament, he will be unable to derive any comfort from New Delhi's applause or from the fact that he has never received from any other government so uncritical an endorsement of his policies—as an answer, incredible though it may seem, to propaganda from Pakistan. As things are, India's partiality for President Nasser is quite immaterial in the power game being played in the Security Council but the consequences of ineffectual and unnecessary postures by New Delhi cannot be completely evaded. Neither Washington nor Moscow will have been impressed by the pointless exhibitionism in which New Delhi has wallowed and the probability is that, despite the visit Mr. Chagla received from Arab Ambassadors in New Delhi, Cairo is not particularly grateful for a kind of Indian intervention that has not strengthened its position in the slightest degree. As the West Asian crisis peters out the question that surely needs to be asked is whether the country can afford to remain at the mercy of those who are obviously incapable of shaping and conducting foreign policy with intelligence and discretion.

CONFIDENTIAL

(9)

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,

S.W.1.

8 June, 1967.

Arab/Israel

I enclose for your information Washington telegram No. 1958 of 7 June and U.K. Mission New York telegram No. 1262 which you will see contain a suggestion that an independent United Nations investigation into charges that British aircraft were used on the side of Israel should be carried out by members of the Security Council represented in U.N.E.F., namely Canada, Brazil and India. The New York telegram shows that there are snags about this and it may well be that nothing more will happen. But if it seems likely that India is involved we will see to it that you are kept fully informed.

2. I am copying this letter for information to Alec Ward in Rawalpindi.

(W. L. Allinson)
South Asia Department

J. P. Waterfield Esq.,
British High Commission,
New Delhi.

PA
PL 21/VI/

CONFIDENTIAL

Copies to Mr MacRogers ~~W.M.~~ CONFIDENTIAL
Mr Barltrop (2)
Mr Doubleday Dfacc
Mr Swann Mownd
Mr Lutter Eastern Dfacc
Major Bowes Mof Dfacc



✓ Mr. W.H. 12/6

My dear Comard,

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

8 June, 1967.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 57
12 JUN 1967
SEZ 12

The Indian Army and the Arab/Israel Conflict

In Delhi telegram 1161 we reported the request by the Ministry of External Affairs for any information about the Middle East war.

2. You will be interested and perhaps amused to know that the Assistant Military Adviser received on 7 June a plaintive appeal from one of the G.S.O.(I)s in the Military Intelligence Directorate for any information on developments in the Middle East. Colonel Tull's Indian colleague, who is responsible for looking after the foreign Military Attaché corps, had apparently been asked to prepare and keep up a situation map, but lacked almost all the necessary facts and equipment. He told the A.M.A. that there was no suitable map of the area in Army H.Q. and he had no means of listening in to the B.B.C. bulletins. (The A.M.A. subsequently got the impression that by this he meant that he was not supposed to listen to the B.B.C. bulletins; General Lunt hopes to find out discreetly whether in fact this is a standing order in the Indian Army.) The A.M.A. tactfully forebore to ask him why he was not prepared to rely on All-India Radio or the official press releases, and instead promised to provide him with such information as we had.

3. This has already been put in hand with the B.I.S. who will continue to provide the A.M.A. with the necessary bulletins, etc. for passing to his D.M.I. colleague. Tull has also provided a map.

4. It would be in keeping if the Indian Colonel had made a similar appeal to other foreign colleagues, but in this instance the appeal seems at least to have been made to us first, and possibly exclusively, since the Americans have not so far been approached. We appear therefore to have been offered a ready made channel for the expression of H.M.G.'s views in quarters normally and formally unreceptive to such views. We are of course not disposed to regard these appeals for British help from an under-equipped Indian department as a reflex from old habits of dependence, but even if the recipients themselves fudge up the provenance of their facts before presenting them, they will still be our facts, and lodged where we want them to be.

5. The D.M.I.'s appeal, as General Lunt has observed, also throws an interesting sidelight on the impoverished state of the Indian Army's intelligence of other parts of the world, as a result of their obsession with Pakistan and China.

Yours ever,
Bernard Kay.
(B. H. KAY)

W.L. Allinson, Esq., M.V.O.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.

PA
PL 20/vi/

(7A)

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPER/CAT A

PRIORITY COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO RAWALPINDI

TELNO 672 6 JUNE, 1967 (M.E.W. & U.N.D.)

SE2/2.



CONFIDENTIAL.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 581: MIDDLE EAST.

IN VIEW OF RAPIDLY DEVELOPING SITUATION BOTH OF MIDDLE EAST
GENERALLY AND IN NEW YORK, IT IS NOT PRACTICABLE TO KEEP YOU
COMPLETELY UP-TO-DATE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITY COUNCIL,
PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF NEED IN PRESENT SITUATION TO AVOID
UNNECESSARY TELEGRAPHING. THERE IS AT PRESENT NO USEFUL GUIDANCE
WE CAN GIVE YOU BEYOND TEXTS OF SPEECHES BY FOREIGN SECRETARY
YESTERDAY, 5 JUNE AND PRIME MINISTER TODAY, FULL TEXTS OF WHICH
HAVE BEEN TELEGRAPHED TO YOU. IF HOWEVER THERE ARE ANY SPECIFIC
POINTS ON WHICH YOU NEED FURTHER INFORMATION PLEASE LET US
KNOW.

CROSEC SENT 0931Z/7 JUNE

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
C.O. M.E.W. & U.N.D.
J.I.P.G.D.
S.A.D.
F.O. U.N.D.

P.B

CONFIDENTIAL

Re: on our middle east &
India F. policy file

WT 9/6



Mr. Kay - What is all
this? WT 8/6 P.B

With the Compliments
of the
British High Commissioner

Mr. Meenaw

You may like to know
as our file (attachm).

Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi-21.

TC 8/6

COM.B.728

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 57
- 9 JUN. 67
SEC 2 2

6 June, 1967.

BRITISH INDIAN DEVELOPMENT LTD.

I feel we must keep you posted on the activities of Mr. T. A. Guest. Some of his commercial contacts appear to have been developed through Diwan Chaman Lall, an Establishment figure but an inveterate and indeed dangerous fellow traveller. This association has brought Guest into 'progressive' circles in Delhi. He was seen at a Czech reception some time ago, and now he seems to have developed social contact with the U.A.R. Embassy.

2. Last week he telephoned Gordon Feast to say he had been invited to a U.A.R. reception for Mr. Salah El-Abd, President Nasser's special emissary to Mrs. Gandhi, and he asked for advice. Feast quite properly told him that he should make his own decision and that he saw no reason to advise him to refuse. The upshot was that Guest telephoned the Acting High Commissioner in the small hours to say that he had heard much of great import at this affair, which he was anxious to communicate. Scott later saw him, but the information Guest offered added nothing new to our knowledge of U.A.R. intentions or Indo-UAR relations.

3. Guest is a fanatical name dropper (he freely claims a close personal acquaintance with Oliver Forster, which the papers you have sent us hardly justify), and would-be entrant to high places. It seems quite possible that he may now embark on a phase of political busybodying which could well be an embarrassment, and we may find that we have to disown him, or snub him, or both. We shall, meanwhile, treat him with proper courtesy, but will definitely discourage any political initiatives.

4. It is possible however Guest may be running out of funds, as we hear on good authority that one of his cheques has bounced. Up to now he has been no more than a tiresome nuisance, and we must hope that he remains no more than this. Possibly his finances will compel him to retire from Delhi.

4. I am copying this letter to Miss Muskett in the Board of Trade and to Allinson in S. Asia Dept.

G.C.O.Key, Esq.,
Asia Economic Dept.,
C.O., LONDON.

(GUY L. SIMMONS)

PL 126/561/1.



W. L. Atkinson Esq.,

South Asia

Dept.,

C. O.



With the Compliments
of the
British High Commissioner
(D. Slater)

May 30th 1967. *sent 8/6/67* *100 p.m.*

R Copy to Mr. Turner (NEWUD)
25 ARABIAN DEPT. Rd

Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi-21.

Ther. P. V. W. Atkinson 2/6

LOK SABHAUNSTARRED QUESTION NO. 714TO BE ANSWERED ON THE 29TH MAY, 1967GOVERNMENT IN EXILE PROPOSED BY ADEN
NATIONALISTSQUESTION

No. 714 SHRI MADHU LIMAYE: DR. RAM MANOHAR LOHIA:
SHRI S.M. BANERJEE: SHRI H.J. PATEL:
SHRI GEORGE FERNANDES:

Will the Minister of External Affairs be pleased to state:

- (a) whether Government's attention has been drawn to the report about the proposal to set up a Government in exile by the Aden nationalists;
- (b) where its Headquarters will be located;
- (c) whether Government propose to extend recognition to this Government; and
- (d) if not, what other help Government propose to give to the nationalist movement there?

.....

ANSWER

THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
(SHRI M.C. CHAGLA)

(a)&(b): Towards the middle of April 1967 the Government had seen reports that Mr. Abdul Qawee Mackawee, Secretary General of the Front for Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (Flosy) had said that his organisation would consider setting up an Adeni Government in exile in Taiz(Yemen).

(c) As the Government in exile has not yet been set up, the question of Government of India's recognition of it does not arise.

(d) The Government of India has consistently supported the right of independence of the people of Aden and Southern Arabia. This view has been consistently maintained by us in the United Nations and elsewhere. The Government of India adheres to the stand already taken in the matter.

7 JUN 1967

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 57
8 JUN 1967

Sergeant

Times

Cautious view by Mrs Gandhi

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

DELHI, JUNE 6

Under pressure from members of her own party who believe that the Government has gone too far in supporting President Nasser, Mrs. Gandhi, the Prime Minister, made her statement to Parliament today on the Middle East more cautiously balanced.

She said there could be no doubt "that Israel has escalated the situation into an armed conflict" but nowhere did she use the word "aggression".

P.B.W.R. 8/6 - but not on this file! The cuttings
India Foreign Policy of U.S. in Arab/Israel

Extract - The Hindustan Times
May 18th 1964

Sir.—I would like to draw the attention of all thinking Indians to the nature of the demonstration that took place on Israel's Independence Day reception in New Delhi recently.

There were about 100 demonstrators, the nucleus being formed by Arab Students of Delhi University. They arrived in three buses along with a truck-load of stones. They surrounded my house from all sides. After showering us with leaflets they pelted us with stones. They broke electric installations at the gates, charged into an annexes smashed its windows and doors and then wrecked the furniture within. By then a small posse of constables arrived and held them at the gates.

All the guests who ran the gauntlet of the demonstrators were subjected to vile abuse; many ladies were spat on. Attempts were made to set fire to the cars parked outside. Despite this, over 300 of the expected 500 guests attended the reception. It was not till after 9 p.m. that they were allowed to leave.

There is little doubt that this assault had been planned well ahead of time and a great deal of money had been spent on printing fake invitation cards and posters and on hiring transport. It was an unmanly assault worthy only of hired rowdies. People may differ about whether or not India should enter into full diplomatic relations with Israel. But no one will dispute that we cannot be held to ransom by a bunch of foreigners from exercising our democratic right of free assembly and speech. It is time the Ministries concerned prescribed the limits beyond which foreign demonstrators must not be allowed to go.

I would like to assure my Arab friends that violence will not deter me from persisting in my efforts to have my country (like 82 others including two Muslim and our neighbours Burma, Nepal and Ceylon) establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. The Arab States' indifference to our plight in 1962 when the Chinese invaded our frontiers and their outright hostility towards us during our confrontation with Pakistan in 1965 convinces me that our policy towards them should be to give them that we get from them. India owes nothing to the Arab States.

We shall continue to celebrate Israel's Independence Day till an Israeli embassy takes over that function. We will also be better prepared to counter cowardly attacks on our right to do as we wish in our own country. I would like to add that although considerable damage was done to property, the police behaved with commendable tact.—Yours etc.,

KHUSHWANT SINGH
President,
Indian Friends of
Israel.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 57
21 MAY 1967
SER 2

PA

May 18th 1964

Sangh chief assails Israel Day incidents

H. T. Correspondent

Naini Tal, May 17—Jan Sangh President Balraj Madhok today condemned the recent disruption by Arab students in New Delhi of the reception organized by the Indo-Israel Friendship Society on the occasion of Israeli Independence Day.

He said: "It is a grave interference in the internal affairs of our country and a mischievous attempt to bring the Arabs' conflict to India.

"Israel is a friendly country. India has absolutely no clash of interests with that country; rather there are many fields of activities in which India and Israel can usefully co-operate.

The action of the Arab students, therefore, deserves the strongest condemnation of all Indian nationalists.

Mr Madhok urged Union Home Minister Chavan to make a searching inquiry into the incident and take steps to expel those Arab students from India who had indulged in hooliganism.

He also demanded an inquiry into the role of Arab diplomatic missions who have been spreading and patronizing anti-Israel activities in India. They must realize that if they persisted in such activities, it would be impossible for them to hold any function in their embassies as well."

On the demand for formation of a State comprising hill districts of Uttar Pradesh, Mr Madhok said if the formation of such a State on the pattern of Himachal Pradesh was vital to accelerate the pace of economic development of hill people and would be in the larger interests of the country, he would support the move. He, however, added that he would place the matter for consideration of his party.



P.A.

~~Mr. Duff~~

You will wish to see Mr. Freeman's despatch (at 5) on the State Visit to India of the President of the Sudan.

2. Mr. Freeman summarises the visit as "lacking in political content". This lack of content seems to apply in toto to Indo/Sudanese political relations, references to which on our recent files are remarkable for their apparent total absence.

3. You may wish to note that the importance which the Indians and Sudanese attached to the principle that the use of force as a means of settling international disputes must be renounced (paragraph 6 of the communiqué) did not inhibit them from agreeing (paragraph 9) that stronger measures including the use of force can no longer be avoided to put an end to the illegal racist minority régime in Zimbabwe.

P. Lever

(P. Lever)

7 June, 1967

P. Lever PL 12/5/1

Printing, by any?

Copying action?

Action has been taken

PL 12/5/1

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12:6
PL 12/5/1

Separate minute

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(PL 360/77)

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SUMMARY

New Delhi Despatch No. 8

THE STATE VISIT TO INDIA
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SUDAN

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 57
23 MAY 1967
SE2/2

The invitation to the President of the Sudan was in pursuance of the Indian ambition of leadership in the non-aligned world, but the visit was lacking in political content. The final communique contained references to Rhodesia and South Arabia, but not in a form to which we could take exception. (Paras. 1 - 4)

2. Indo-Sudanese relations are more meaningful on the economic than on the political plane. (para. 6)

Separate minute

Ar
12:6

CONFIDENTIAL

(PL 360/77)



BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,

Despatch No. 8

NEW DELHI.

CONFIDENTIAL

16 May, 1967.

Sir,

STATE VISIT TO INDIA OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SUDAN

I have the honour to report that the President of the Sudan, His Excellency Sayed Ismail El Azhari, paid a State Visit to India from the 28th of April to the 5th of May, 1967. He was accompanied by, among others, Sayed Ibrahim El Mufti, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Sayed Hamza Mirghani, Minister of Finance & Economics, and Sayed Izza El Din El Sayed, Minister of Commerce and Supply.

2. The Sudanese President seems to have been invited by the Indians in pursuance of their idealistic, if now doubtfully realistic or effective, ambition of leadership in the "non-aligned" world. In terms of this ambition, however, the visit seems to have been even more lacking in political substance than those made here last October by Presidents Nasser and Tito (my despatch No. 24 of 1966). In the course of his stay, which included visits to Delhi, Aligarh, Hyderabad and Bangalore, President El Azhari was

/reported

The Right Honourable Herbert Bowden, C.B.E., M.P.,
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs,
Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

reported to have had conversations with the President of India, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, and the Minister of External Affairs. It was, however, clear that on the political level Indo-Sudanese relations consist largely of protestations of mutual goodwill. The speeches exchanged consisted of the standard non-aligned generalities about neo-colonialism, peaceful co-existence, Rhodesia and Vietnam, clichés which were repeated in the final communique, of which I enclose a copy.

3. There were two references in the communique of direct interest to the United Kingdom. On Rhodesia, the two countries expressed deep concern at the "deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe" and agreed "that" the measures so far taken have proved to be ineffective and therefore stronger measures including the use of force can no longer be avoided to put an end to the illegal racist minority regime". The second expressed the support of both countries for "the struggle of the people of Southern Arabia so that they may attain freedom and independence in accordance with the resolutions of the U.N. forthwith". The style perhaps suggests that we have the Sudanese rather than the Indians to thank for the fact that neither of these passages emerged in a form to which we need take serious exception.

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- 3 -

4. The empty nature of the visit was underlined at the State banquet given by the President of the Sudan for the President of India, which I attended. The distinguished Indians and Sudanese present had apparently neither the ability nor much desire to communicate with each other and the meal was mainly conducted in ruminative silence. The President of the Sudan made a long, repetitive and ill-translated speech in Arabic, through which President Radhakrishnan of India slept peacefully, waking just in time to deliver an uncharacteristically perfunctory reply. Shortly thereafter the party broke up in an atmosphere of general relief.

5. On the economic and commercial plane, Indo-Sudanese relations are more meaningful. The Indo-Sudanese trade agreement signed in 1965 was extended last December for a further period of one year and in 1965-6 India, which is the Sudan's largest customer for cotton, took approximately £4.3 million worth of Sudanese imports, and exported goods worth approximately £6 million to the Sudan. During the President's visit the Sudanese Ministers of Finance and Commerce held discussions with the Indian Government; officials tell us that whilst no additional agreements were reached, means

/were

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- 4 -


were discussed of increasing Indo-Sudanese trade and Indian technical assistance to the Sudan. These talks, therefore, seem likely to be the most practical outcome of what was otherwise an unremarkable visit.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to H.M. Ambassador at Khartoum.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant,


(HIGH COMMISSIONER)



CONFIDENTIAL



VISIT OF H.E. SAYED ISMAIL EL AZHARI,
PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN TO INDIA -
28TH APRIL TO 5TH MAY, 1967.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

At the invitation of the President of India, His Excellency Sayed Ismail El Azhari, President of the Supreme Council of State of the Republic of the Sudan, paid a State visit to India from the 28th April to the 5th May 1967. He was accompanied, among others, by H.E. Sayed Ibrahim El Mufti, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Sayed Hamza Mirghani, Minister of Finance & Economics, and H.E. Sayed Izz El Din El Sayed, Minister of Industries & Mines and Acting Minister of Commerce and Supply. The President and his party received a warm and cordial welcome from the Government and the people of India. This reception was a symbol and a manifestation of the deep mutual desire to foster closer understanding, cooperation and friendship between the governments and the people of the Sudan and India.

2. During his last visit to India in 1955, as the first Prime Minister of the Sudan, President Azhari visited various places of historical and cultural interest and also saw projects for development in progress. On the present occasion, President Azhari visited Aligarh, Hyderabad and Bangalore and saw more of India's cultural heritage, present progress and future plans. President Azhari expressed his admiration for the strengthening and consolidation of India's parliamentary democracy and planned evolution towards a welfare state in accordance with the principles of social justice, political freedom, and equality before the law of all communities and of all faiths.



=2=

3. During his stay in New Delhi, President Azhari had talks with President Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi, and other members of the Government of India on the present international situation and on matters of mutual interest, particularly the developing economic and technical cooperation between them. These talks were held in an atmosphere of frankness, understanding and cordiality and revealed a similarity of views on many international issues and contributed greatly to strengthen the bonds of mutual respect and friendship between the leaders and the peoples of the two countries.

4. Taking part in the talks on the Sudan side were also H.E. Sayed Ibrahim El Mufti, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Sayed Hamza Mirghani, Minister of Finance and Economics, H.E. Sayed Izz El Din El Sayed, Minister of Industries and Mines and Acting Minister of Commerce and Supply and H.E. Sayed Ahmed Salah Bukhari, Ambassador of Sudan to India.

5. Taking part in the talks on the Indian side were also Shri Morarji Desai, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Shri M.C. Chagla, Minister of External Affairs, Shri Dinesh Singh, Minister of Commerce and Shri P.L. Bhandari. Ambassador of India to the Sudan.

6. Both sides reiterated their faith in the continuing validity of the policy of non-alignment which has made a positive contribution to the cause of peace and international cooperation. They also stressed the importance of the acceptance of the principles of peaceful co-existence by the world community if international peace and security are to be safeguarded. They stressed in particular the



=3=

importance of the principle that the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes must be renounced. They continue to be opposed to all forms of imperialism, hegemony or monopoly of power and interference, direct or indirect, by one State in the affairs of another. They were opposed to military alliances and other groupings which stand in the way of international cooperation.

7. The President of India expressed India's determination to continue its earnest efforts towards the implementation, in letter and spirit, of the Tashkent Declaration with a view to establishing good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan. The President of the Supreme Council of State of the Republic of the Sudan expressed his faith in the goodwill and ability of both countries to reach an honourable and peaceful settlement of all the outstanding problems between them in accordance with the U.N. Charter and the Tashkent Declaration and thereby help to establish good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan.

8. Both sides noted with renewed satisfaction that the laws of the two countries guaranteed freedom of worship and equality of status to all their citizens.

9. Both sides reiterated their firm opposition to colonialism and neo-colonialism in all their forms and manifestations, and condemned the alliance between forces of colonialism and racism. In this context, they expressed deep concern at the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe and agreed that the measures so far taken have proved to be ineffective and therefore stronger measures including the use of force can no longer be avoided to put an end to the illegal racist minority regime in Zimbabwe. They also condemned the inhuman and immoral policies of apartheid pursued with increasing brutality



=4=

by the racist minority regime in South Africa. They hoped that all states would extend their unreserved cooperation and support to the United Nations in all its efforts to compel the Government of South Africa to abandon such policies which are a threat to peace and security. They expressed the hope that the full weight of international public opinion and authority of the United Nations would be brought to bear without any further delay in securing to the people of South West Africa their just and legitimate right of self-determination. They also declared that the denial of freedom and fundamental rights to the people of Angola and Mozambique and other Portuguese colonial territories was wholly contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and the repeated resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

10. Both sides reiterated their full support for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people and their efforts for the realisation of their rights in accordance with the Declaration of the 1964 Cairo Conference of Non-aligned countries.

11. Both sides also expressed their full support for the struggle of the people of Southern Arabia so that they may attain freedom and independence in accordance with the resolutions of the U.N. forthwith.

12. Both sides viewed with great concern the situation in Vietnam which constitutes a continuing serious threat to world peace and the danger of escalation leading to a more serious conflagration. They were convinced that the Vietnamese problem is basically political and that there could be no military solution to this problem. They both agreed that the

Geneva Agreements of 1954 provided a suitable basis for the settlement of the problem of Vietnam. The people of Vietnam should be free to decide their future without any foreign interference. President Azhari expressed the appreciation of the efforts of the Indian Government towards a peaceful solution of the Vietnamese problem.

13. Both sides expressed their concern at the unabated arms race which poses a serious threat to international peace and security and urged an early agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. They emphasised the serious dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons and called for the early conclusion of a comprehensive treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with the principles approved by the U.N. General Assembly at its XX Session and reaffirmed at its XXI Session, in particular the principle of an acceptable balance of obligations and responsibilities between the nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear states.

14. Both sides attached great importance to the urgent and imperative need for initiating practical steps for promoting among developing countries mutual trade and economic cooperation, collaboration in the fields of industrial ventures, training in modern scientific research and technical skills, as a means of strengthening their national independence and self-reliance. They expressed the hope that such cooperation and collaboration would be given a further stimulus at the forthcoming meeting of the 77 developing countries scheduled to be held in September this year. In this context, they also reviewed with satisfaction the cooperation that already exists between their two



=6=

countries. They discussed various proposals for mutual cooperation and expressed confidence in the further development of mutually advantageous trade and other economic relations.

15. The President of the Supreme Council of State of the Republic of the Sudan extended an invitation to the President and the Prime Minister of India, which were accepted with pleasure.

16. Both sides expressed deep satisfaction that the visit of the President of the Supreme Council of State of the Republic of the Sudan and the opportunity it had afforded for a friendly exchange of views has further strengthened the ties of friendship and understanding and mutually beneficial economic and cultural relations between the two countries.

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CONFIDENTIAL



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PL.5/129/1

British High Commission,

NEW DELHI.

Reg: Copy to Eastern Dept
PL 17/11 Then put by 17/5
PL 17/11 Then put by 17/5

SE 2/2

16 May, 1967.

Dear Sir, Indo-Israeli Relations

As you know, India is very cool in its relations with Israel, largely in order to maintain friendship with the nationalist Arab states. There is no Israeli representative here at Embassy level, but there is an Israeli Consul-General who has to live in Bombay and who is usually snubbed by the Ministry of External Affairs when he does visit Delhi.

2. However, there have been suggestions in the press and Parliament over the last year that India's courting of the Arabs was yielding no benefits and that a more friendly attitude to Israel might be advantageous, particularly since, after the Security Council elections at the end of last year, it was revealed that Israel had voted for India, whereas most of India's Arab friends seemed to have voted for Syria.

3. This weekend Indo-Israeli relations were again in the news. On 14 May the Indian Friends of Israel Society, a private body, dedicated to improving relations between the two countries, gave a reception to celebrate Israel's Independence Day, to which a number of prominent Indians and foreign diplomats had been invited. However, at the time when the reception was due to begin a crowd of Arab, and a few Indian students assembled outside the private house where it was to be held, shouting anti-Israeli slogans and attempting to prevent guests from entering. Stones were thrown, scuffles broke out and eventually mounted police had to be called to disperse the demonstration and allow those guests who had managed to get into the house to go home again.

4. All this has created a bad impression here and Daljit Singh, the President of the New Delhi Congress Committee, who was one of the would-be guests, has written to the Home Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs protesting at the incident and calling for the expulsion of the ringleaders among the Arab students. Thus the cause which the Friends of Israel espouse has gained rather than suffered by the incident.

5. I am sending a copy of this letter to Chancery, Tel Aviv.

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17 May. 1967
SE 2/2

Yours ever
D. Slater

(D. SLATER)

W.L. Allinson Esq., M.V.O.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W.1.

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With the compliments of

THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Ray - Exter 2 rec'd
29 Apr 1967

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British Political Agency,

BAHRAIN

17 April, 1967

Dear Michael,

INDIAN TRADE AGENT

Would you please refer to the correspondence about Indian representation in Bahrain, which rests with my letter 1903/66 of 13 October, 1966.

NTR

SB106/176

2. By March this year it was obvious that the Ruler had gone to ground over these requests. There were also signs of renewed restiveness on the Indian side. Accordingly I had a discussion with the Ruler and his brother on 4 March at which I advanced the argument that the Indians were asking only for minor concessions for the sake of administrative convenience; that these concessions could not be regarded by anyone as the thin end of a wedge or as a precedent for other countries; and that I saw no harm in meeting the Indian requests. The Ruler eventually agreed and I later suggested to the new 1st Secretary from the Indian Embassy in Baghdad, who was paying his first visit to Bahrain, that his Ambassador should send a reminder mentioning only the two requests and excluding the introductory passages (enclosure in my letter 1903/66 of 19 June, 1966 to Sir William Luce) which, I felt sure, had put the wind up the Ruler. The Indians followed this advice and sent another letter (copy enclosed). The Ruler has answered this in the affirmative. Thus another very small step in modernisation has been taken, but only after protracted delay and heart-searching on the Ruler's part. It is most important that the Indians should not try to use these concessions as a stepping stone to greater things. If they do they will effectively queer their pitch. Perhaps the High Commission in New Delhi could make this point to them. I shall do so to the Ambassador when he visits here in early May.

3. I am copying this letter with copies of the enclosure to Glen Balfour-Paul at the Residency and to the High Commission in New Delhi.

Yours ever

Tony

(A. D. Parsons)

M. S. Weir, Esq.,
Arabian Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON S.W.1.

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(E3)

AMBASSADOR OF INDIA,
BAGHDAD

No. Bag/Con/411/7/66

March 15, 1967

Your Highness,

I would like first of all to offer to you my greetings and my sincere hope that you are keeping the best of health.

2. I am sorry I am troubling Your Highness once again with regard to matters concerning Indians in your domain. After my visit to Bahrain in May, 1966, I had written a letter on May 29, in which I had requested Your Highness to permit the Indian Government Trade Agent at Bahrain to perform certain functions with a view to assisting the Indian nationals. As I then pointed out, employers in Bahrain desiring to bring employees from India had to go through certain formalities for which at present they wait for the periodical visit of a consular officer from Baghdad. If the forms could be attested by our Trade Agent, this would help the Indians greatly in your domain.

3. Similarly, persons resident in Bahrain wishing to invite their dependents, kinsman or friends to visit them have to sign sponsorship declarations. These are at present being signed in the presence of the consular officer visiting Bahrain from Baghdad once in three months. Much hardship could be removed if the Trade Agent was permitted to attest the sponsorship forms.

4. Your Highness agreed to give sympathetic consideration to my proposals and I hope it would now be possible for Your Highness to permit the Indian Trade Agent at Bahrain to perform these functions.

5. Kindly accept, Your Highness, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Signed Mahboob Ahmad

His Highness,
Shaikh Isa Bin Salman Al-Khalifah, K.C.M.G.,
Ruler of Bahrain,
BAHRAIN.

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R.

15 March, 1967

As you know, Mr. Neil Marten has a P.M. down on 21 March to ask the Commonwealth Secretary "which Commonwealth countries have made representations to him about the proposed withdrawal of United Kingdom forces from Aden".

2. I enclose a draft reply and background notes, etc., on which I should welcome your early comments.

3. I am not sure whether, if the relevant figures are available in your Department, it would be worth including in our notes an indication of roughly how many Commonwealth citizens there are in Aden. I imagine that most of them will be Indian or Pakistani.

4. Though strictly speaking the point hardly arises on the present question, it is possible that the Commonwealth Secretary will ^{be asked} whether it is intended that South Arabia should be a member of the Commonwealth after independence. Though I do not think that any public announcement has been made here, I have the impression that the South Arabian authorities themselves may have stated that

/they

D.H.S. Blatherwick, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

R. B

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they do not intend to apply for Commonwealth membership. In any case I should welcome your advice on this point.

(A.G.L. TURNER)
Middle East, Western &
United Nations Department

Copy to:

✓ Mr. Marshall (SAD)
Mr. Doubleday (Defence Department)
Mr. Spendlove (CPR Department)
E.W.F. Umfurd (Ministry of Defence)


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DRAFT REPLY TO P.Q. no. 141. (Mr. Neil Marten).

As the Hon. Member may be aware, it is not the practice to reveal what confidential diplomatic exchanges may take place between Governments.

Notes for Supplementaries

1. It is not seen how the interests of Commonwealth countries might be affected, one way or the other, by our withdrawal from Aden.
2. The preservation of law and order after our departure and the prevention of any disorders which might endanger the lives of Commonwealth citizens in Aden would be the responsibility of the Federal Government.
3. The question of postponing the date of the withdrawal of our troops, because of the possibility of disorders, would be a matter for the Foreign Secretary.
4. The question of any representations which might be made by the Persian Gulf States would also be a matter for the Foreign Secretary.
5. Whether Aden will be a member of the Commonwealth after independence is a separate question.



Background Notes

P.Q.
1 March

It is not known what has prompted Mr. Marten's Question. An earlier Question by him, addressed to the Minister of Defence, is attached.

P.Q.
10 March

2. No representations have been received from any Commonwealth country. The draft Reply follows an Answer given to a recent similar Question by Mr. Duncan Sandys.

3. The only Commonwealth country who has directly expressed an interest in the situation in Aden after our departure is India, who has some fears that the resulting vacuum might be filled by Pakistan. During President Ayub's Commonwealth visit Mr. Pirzada, Pakistan Minister of External Affairs, raised the question of the admission of Pakistani professional men to Aden. The thought behind this was interpreted by the High Commissioner as being that the Pakistani community in Aden would be in need of leaders after Independence.

4. A United Nations Mission to South Arabia has recently been appointed and is expected to arrive in Aden ~~before the~~ ^{early next} end of the month. Any modification of our plans for the withdrawal of our forces would be a matter for the Foreign Secretary, who would first have to take into account any recommendations by the Mission.

5. Though it is not the intention that South Arabia should be a member of the Commonwealth after independence, no public announcement to this effect has yet been made in Britain.

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R S R
cc. Arabi B / P.O. W/1
SENT
P.F. 1/1/67

Canadian Embassy,
British Interests Section,
Cairo.

5 January, 1967

2SER 91/6/4 (27)

Please refer to paragraph 2 of Robert Tesh's letter 1062/66 of 15 December in which he comments on the interest of the new Indian Ambassador, Mr. Pant, in the Yemen. This interest seems to be continuing as the Indian Counsellor tells us that he is about to make a trip to the Yemen and the Americans, who are curious as to the reason behind the Indian interest in the Yemen, have remarked that one of the Indian Third Secretaries, Mr. Ranjit Gupta, has paid three visits to the Yemen recently.

2. I am copying this letter to John Wilton in Aden as Abraham hopes to visit him on his forthcoming visit to that part of the world, and also to Slater in New Delhi and to Stratton in Rawalpindi.

P. B.

(W. H. G. Fletcher)

A. A. Duff, Esq.,
Commonwealth Relations Office.

Mc Marshall

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